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Preface 
 
The completion of this book is very much like Confucius’ journey of a thousand miles.   It was 
not the first step that was difficult, though, but reaching the end-post, which seemed to shift with 
each passing step. I initially planned to finish it in three years, or at least within the seven-year 
residency period allowed by the University of the Philippines School of Economics (UPSE).  
What was not planned was my marriage to a Dutch economist, which consequently led me to 
migrate to Europe, and eventually resulted to two wonderful daughters.  I had always been proud 
of my somewhat nationalist resolve not to leave the Philippines despite the opportunities to join 
the massive wave of Filipino migration overseas, so adapting to my migrant status was more 
difficult than I had first foreseen. I have also underestimated the physical, mental and emotional 
rigours of motherhood, especially in a place where ‘yayas’ (nannies) are paid in gold, and with 
grandparents being 10,534.96 km. away.   
In 2000, I made another attempt to pursue my dissertation and took the chance to speak 
with Prof. Bill Ethier during one of his visits to the Netherlands.  He suggested that I approach 
Joe Francois for supervision, and this advice eventually led me to Erasmus University.   It is one 
of my great fortunes that Joe has agreed to be my PhD supervisor, despite my repeated 
mispronunciation of his name in the beginning.  It still amazes me how much I have learned in the 
five years I have worked with him (it must have amazed him, too, given my hopeless struggles 
with all those equally hopeless equations!).  He has invested significantly in my work, and for that I 
am truly grateful.  His intellectual generosity will also remain an example.   
I would also like to thank Erasmus University for having generously accepted me under their 
hospitality program, allowing me to pursue my doctorate in Europe and at the same time 
accrediting my previous course work  in UPSE.  I would also like to thank the De La Salle 
University which funded my PhD studies during the period that I served as assistant professor in 
their faculty of Economics.   I am likewise grateful to my outstanding mentors in UPSE, especially 
to Noel de Dios, who was initially my PhD supervisor, and who remain one of the most 
important influences in my professional life as a researcher and teacher.  
I am also grateful to Miriam Manchin, Joe Francois and Douglas Nelson, for their 
permission to use our joint papers for this book.   
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends who have almost, but fortunately, not 
totally, given up hope that I will ever finish this dissertation.   To my parents, who have missed all 
my graduations, and sadly including my promotion (due to the cold and the distance), I dedicate 
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this book.  One of the reasons I have never given up this PhD, despite all the odds, is the 
resolution to give them my doctorate as a gift.  
A big thank you to Jacques, whose  love and patience gave me the room I needed to pursue 
this work, even if it sometimes meant swallowing his own tremendously heavy work pressures, in 
order to relieve me from some family duties.  He also very wisely did not get involved in my work, 
even if he shares my interest in the topics I have chosen. But he has also clearly contaminated me 
with his passion for economic integration, and I have obviously benefited from our hours of 
discussion, even though I sometimes took pleasure in not always agreeing with him.  Mayumi and 
Yasmine have also been very loving, and understanding, learning to be independent maybe a bit  
faster than most of their friends.  They have sweetly curbed in their extra demands, waiting 
patiently till Mama’s book was finished.  Finally, I would like to thank my many friends who have 
cheered me on, and who often believed more in me, than me myself.  I am sure that they are 
happy that I have now one less reason (or excuse) to be so absent-minded.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In a political economy perspective, discrimination that leads to the diversion of trade 
towards partners is an enduring property of regional blocs.   According to this view, it 
is the concept of trading in preferences within a closed region that makes regional 
integration schemes politically viable and attractive.  Giving preferences to partner 
producers, for instance, enables the club to fulfil various political economy objectives:  
subsidise each other's exports (Johnson, 1965), hasten the pace of industrialisation, 
create more trade, or achieve other non-economic goals, without necessarily sacrificing 
domestic production.  In general terms, therefore, political economy theory expects 
regional integration areas (RIAs)  to be trade diverting.  Conversely, once trade creation 
becomes prevalent, the political viability of the preferential agreement itself is 
threatened.   
The empirical literature  on the welfare effects of regional bloc formation has 
indeed produced some evidence of trade diversion. 1   However, the occurrence of trade-
creating RIAs has clearly not been ruled out either, which then begs the question of how 
such results could be supported and sustained by the political market for protection.  
One line of reasoning is suggested by Richardson (1993), who argues that increased intra-
bloc trade weakens the political strength of lobbies in relatively less competitive 
members, thus helping to lower the region-wide demand for protection.  This contradicts 
the Grossman and Helpman (1995) analysis of free trade agreements, which states that 
agreements which lead to enhanced protection (that is, domestic industries being out-
competed by regional partners) are not politically sustainable.  Based on this view, the 
weakening of the political power of local industries as foreseen by Richardson, will not 
take place because domestic political lobbying will ensure that the regional agreement will 
never be signed in the first place. 
The proliferation of FTA initiatives as well as the deepening of existing regional 
integration schemes have also triggered a re-thinking of the political dynamics of  
                                                 
1 Chapter 2 of this book provides a survey. 
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regionalism as it has developed in the last decade.    Baldwin (1993), for instance, 
suggests a ‘domino’ theory behind the enlargement of existing RIAs, particularly the EU, 
and the overall burgeoning of discriminatory agreements everywhere.  The theory begins 
with an idiosyncratic ‘push’, such as the deepening or enlargement of an existing RIA,  
which sets the regionalism domino moving.  This upsets the political equilibrium in a 
country considering membership,  largely through the increased political activity of 
exporters who are threatened by whatever reduced market access the expansion of the 
RIA might imply.    The cost of protection rises, thereby increasing the probability that 
the political equilibrium tilts in favour of participation in,  or initiation of the regional 
agreement. 
Baldwin’s theory, however, is founded on the earlier cited Grossman-Helpman 
framework, where the political feasibility of an FTA rests on the ability of that 
arrangement to deliver enhanced protection for everyone concerned.   On one hand, the  
lobbying behaviour of regional exporters is sensitive to the expectation of a ‘balanced’ 
distribution of market shares,  and on the other hand, the assumption of status quo 
lobbying on the part of import-substituting producers depends on the expectation that  
the increase in regional supplies will not lead to any fall in the prevailing domestic prices.    
Intrinsically, this still means that any trade creation will arrest the domino momentum, 
and could also possibly cause governments to re-erect the domino blocs back into their 
original place.    Also, how does one explain that initial push to begin with?    If one 
wants to understand the dynamics behind the shift of policy, it is particularly important 
to unravel the critical forces of change.   
Some other authors take on another track, altogether.  It is assumed that the 
formation of a regional bloc, while possibly entailing increased political costs for 
everyone involved, also satisfy non-economic goals that justify the taking up of these 
costs.  Schiff and Winters (1997) illustrate regional integration as diplomacy, while 
Fernandez and Portez (1998) explore the credibility-enhancement properties of RIA 
membership, enabling countries to lock-in necessary economic reforms.  Whalley (1996) 
also provide an extensive survey of the various political-economic motives prompting 
RIA formation.   
Behind these approaches, lie an implicit assumption of a less-than passive 
Government, whose preferences are not only dictated by the financial offers of the 
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highest policy bidders, but one which is guided by some form of vision, or a calculus of 
self-interest, independent from short-term protectionist demands.   Industrialisation or 
growth motives, are typically some of the key motives driving the policy choice of 
government leaders.    In fact, the popular debate surrounding regionalism in the last 
decades is filled with references to the need to amass scale economies, or sustain/trigger 
high rates of growth by attracting foreign direct investments.    
Ethier (1998), in analysing the stylised facts of recent regional initiatives, argued that 
in gauging the economic or the political economy effects of RIAs, it might not be 
appropriate to take the Vinerian perspective of trade creation / diversion in the 
assessment of regionalism today.  He points out that the decision of governments to 
enter a RIA may in fact be an endogenous response to emerging trade-investment-
reform opportunities triggered by multilateralism in one hand, and changes in production 
technology on the other hand.  A regional initiative, in the context set by Ethier, does not 
only affect producer’s profit and government objective function by transforming intra-
regional trading patterns, but even more importantly, by inducing changes in investment 
and upgrading decisions of producers within and outside the region.  How this would in 
turn affect the reform or growth-oriented strategies of participating governments is 
another key factor determining the policy choice of whether or not to join a regional 
grouping. 
The peculiarities of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) underscore the 
importance of taking into account the different environments surrounding the rise of 
recent regionalism.  Initial studies on the impact of AFTA all focused on the trade effects 
of the agreement, and reached the same conclusion that freeing regional trade will have 
minimal, if not trivial, effect on increasing intra-ASEAN exchange.  The seemingly lack 
of an economic rationale for an AFTA led many observers to claim that the 1992 
Agreement was primarily a political effort, and being such, any substantial progress in 
liberalisation among the ASEAN Member States would be difficult to expect. The 
succeeding delays in implementation, the lack of clear institutional procedures, the length 
and the perceived complication in the process of transition all fed the scepticism that 
AFTA will in fact be, ‘another futile trade agreement’.  It was also predicted that given 
the tenuous economic grounds for the agreement, “any instability or disequilibrium 
induced by extra-regional events, and factors to which all ASEAN countries are so 
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sensitive to, would be catastrophic to AFTA or other ASEAN schemes” (Mun Heng & 
Low, 1992, p. 11). 
Contrary to most expectations, however, the AFTA regional scheme was twice 
accelerated, and the pledge to minimise the amount of excluded products has largely 
been met.   In 1997, when the financial crisis debilitated the entire region, the target date 
of AFTA was not compromised, as predicted, but was brought forward by another year, 
to 2003.  However, the Informal ASEAN Summit in November 2000, did issue a 
protocol allowing room for the delay of the required tariff cuts for the last remaining 
tranche of temporarily excluded products. Still, by 2005, there are no more temporary 
exclusions for ASEAN–6 2 and the average tariffs within the region has fallen to 1.87% 
(down from an average of 12.76% in 1993).    The importance of intra-ASEAN trade did 
increase from a 19.86% share of total exports in 1991, to 25.80% in 1996, before the 
financial crisis caused a sharp slump in total and intra-ASEAN exports.  Although it is 
difficult to ascertain whether or not such a rise in regional trading would have occurred 
even without an AFTA, to claim that the agreement was a mere political instrument with 
hardly any economic value seems likewise inappropriate. 
In fact, it is highly unlikely that the momentum to realise AFTA could have 
gathered strength (even during the height of the financial crisis) without an overriding 
economic impetus propelling economic integration.  Since the start, the foreign direct 
investment motive has been cited in the officials and non-governmental circles as a 
principal driving force behind the formation of the AFTA, but it was only years later that 
observers and scholars have come to weigh in the viability of the regional drive based on 
its impact on FDI inflows (Athukorala & Menon, 1996).  With the benefit of hindsight, it 
is now apparent how important it was for ASEAN in the 1990s to forge a collective 
response to the opening up of the Chinese market and the resulting dramatic increase in 
China’s share of global FDI.  While the more than 400% growth of foreign investments 
in ASEAN from 1985 – 1992 is in all accounts impressive, it pales beside the FDI 
performance of China.  In 1990, total FDI in China was just over $4 billion.  After just 
three years, this figure has risen to $27.5 billion and in 1996, to $40.8 billion (see Table 
1.1).  Considering that economic growth and industrial modernisation in ASEAN, 
                                                 
2 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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especially since the 1980s, have been anchored on its ability to attract foreign capital and 
technology, the impending loss of competitiveness to China as FDI hosts, must have 
been a powerful motive to shore up ASEAN economic cooperation.   
The analytical question at this point, is how one can characterize the political 
equilibrium when regionalism is driven by scale economies and FDI motives, as in 
ASEAN.  The answer is not immediate given that standard political economy literature 
remains firmly based on assumptions of constant returns to scale.  This implies that 
welfare is neutral to any policy-induced market expansion, and consequently, so are 
preferences of political actors over trade policy.  A sizeable literature on variable returns 
to scale do address the welfare effects of trade,  but there seems to be no systematic 
effort to feed these analyses into mainstream endogenous protection theory. 
 
Table 1.1  Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN countries and China ($ billions) 
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source:  ADB Asian Development Outlook, various issues 
 
One objective of this book is therefore to explore the theoretical implications of 
increasing returns to scale on the political determination of the optimal level of 
protection.  This is done, first in chapter 2, where the literature covering endogenous 
protection, variable returns to scale,  and regionalism, is surveyed, and in chapter 3 where 
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endogenous protection in the presence of increasing returns to scale is formalised.  
Given the inherent difficulties of capturing the implications of scale effects on the 
political market, the ambitions of this study can not be but modest.  It is, after all, not for 
nothing that the analysis of endogenous protection has remained within the confines of a 
constant-returns-to-scale world for so long a time.  Indeed, neutralising the effects of 
scale has kept basic models tractable, enabling analysts to focus on the essential 
consequences of trade policies on the welfare of various stake-holders, and the resulting 
trade of political goods in the policy market.  The assumptions of constant-returns-to-
scale, however, must inevitably be relaxed in order to begin to understand the current 
dynamics of regionalism, and of trade policy-making, in general, where scale effects 
assume much more than a marginal role. 
The next collection of chapters take a more applied approach in the analysis of 
regionalism.  They are essentially a selection of essays written to examine empirically the 
political economy determinants of EU trade policy, as in Chapter 4,  the actual extent of 
regional integration in ASEAN, in Chapters 5 and 6, and the general equilibrium impact 
of the full implementation of an AFTA, in Chapter 7.     
In Chapter 4, entitled ‘deconstructing EU Trade Policy’, the political underpinnings 
of EU import protection is examined.   Most empirical work in endogenous protection is 
focused on the US , perhaps partly due to the numerous difficulties one can expect in 
directly observing the political economy dynamics in the EU, where overt lobbying and 
political contributions are illegal, and where the policy mechanisms have evolved in both 
ambition and complexity.  We argue, however, that it is important to unravel not only the 
collective, but also the national preferences of Member Countries, because while the 
supply of regional protection may correspond to the sum of individual national demands, 
the common trade policy in the EU and the complexities surrounding it, conceal the 
interplay of private, national and aggregate regional interests.   
Empirical tests of political economy models, in particular, that of the influence-
driven approach of Grossman-Helpman, involve the use of lobbying indicators to serve 
as the weights attached by government to industry profits.  In this Chapter, we instead 
employ a general equilibrium approach to estimate the direct and indirect marginal 
impact of protection at the sectoral level, and use these estimates to econometrically 
derive the revealed pattern of policy weights.  These resulting weights,  lend us some 
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insights into the relative protection of agriculture and manufacturing, for instance.  We 
also find that the strength of downstream linkages matters for policy weights and the 
rates of protection, as does the national posture of industry.   
The next series of chapters on the ASEAN Free Trade Area, begins with the 
analysis of preferential tariffs in chapter 5.  Despite the region’s success in implementing 
the tariff liberalisation commitments under the AFTA, questions remain regarding the 
relevance and credibility of the whole regional exercise. This is largely due to the 
prevalent view that the most basic of instruments offered by AFTA, namely the 
preferential tariffs, are hardly ever used in practice.  It is true that in the last decade, MFN 
tariffs have rapidly fallen as well, thereby diminishing the relative importance of AFTA 
preferences.  The extent in which preferences have been eroded, or the manner in which 
preferences has affected actual market access in ASEAN, however, is not known, 
because of the enormous data problems confronted by ASEAN analysts.   We therefore 
partly address some of these data problems and we employ a gravity model to arrive at 
alternative ways of gauging the importance of preferences in the absence of data on the 
actual utilisation of AFTA preferential tariffs.  We also aim to identify the range of 
products where AFTA might exert  some trade-stimulating effect on intra-ASEAN trade. 
The low utilisation of ASEAN preferences hint to presence of non-tariff barriers 
and particularly to the high costs of compliance to the rules of origin.  Chapter 6 
provides an analysis of these rules,  especially those that accompany the web of East 
Asian FTAs that has emerged in the last 3-4 years.  While the coverage of regional 
integration may be substantial, one of the real tests of the liberalisation intent of 
members can be gleaned from the design of the agreements’ rules of origin.  
Understanding the actual depth and scope of regionalisation, therefore should entail 
some appreciation of the restrictive or liberalising effects of these rules.   
Just what is the worth of preferences in terms of their welfare effects?  This is the 
question posed in chapter 7, where the benefits of the full utilisation of AFTA 
preferences are estimated using a CGE approach.  Since full utilisation implies the 
successful implementation of trade facilitation measures, and removal of non-tariff 
barriers (including those linked to rules of origin), the estimation of AFTA effects also 
provides an indication of the economic returns corresponding to these policy efforts.  
AFTA simulations performed by past CGE studies assume that ASEAN liberalisation 
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under the AFTA leads to the reduction of MFN tariffs all the way to zero.    In this 
study, instead, the actual AFTA regime is approximated by the use of  trade-weighted 
rates of the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs or the CEPT.   Scenarios of global 
liberalisation, open regionalism (AFTA rates extended to non-ASEAN countries), full 
AFTA (complete elimination of intra-regional tariffs),  and  AFTA (reduction of MFN 
tariffs to CEPT rates), are compared.  
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the key ideas raised in this study and concludes.   
  9 
 Chapter 2  
 
 
 
 
Endogenous Protection, Agglomeration and Regionalism:   
A Literature Survey 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Trade policy as practiced, is often considered as a critical component in an overall 
development and industrialization strategy, especially in the developing world.  Policy is 
seen as a way of affecting the size of markets, thereby stimulating scale economies which 
eventually make growth sustainable.  Such thinking, in fact, is frequently behind the 
adoption of either a protectionist or a free trade regime.  Familiar infant industry 
arguments accompany the former, while the latter is argued, among others, to be an 
effective FDI strategy that enables local producers to access global markets.  The 
apparent attraction of many governments towards the formation of regional integration 
agreements (RIAs) recently,  is likewise brought on by the need to pool and expand 
markets.  Again, whatever the degree of regional openness opted for, building up 
economies of scale is one of the  principal motives.  
However, despite the obvious association between growth objectives and the choice 
of trade policy regimes, such linkages are not explicitly or adequately addressed in 
political economy theory.  Since all the major approaches are based on the assumption of 
returns to scale being constant,  private profits or overall growth are neutral to any 
change in size, and therefore do not enter as  variables in the calculation of political 
payoffs.   Moreover, the behaviour of political actors is, in general,  implicitly assumed to 
be characterized by myopia, so that the implication of policies on long-term growth, and 
as a consequence, on long-run profits and electoral success are often ignored.   
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One reason for this neglect is perhaps the fact that endogenous protection models 
are largely based on developed-country setting where politicians have relatively less 
pronounced or explicit industrialization motives,  lobbying is a more dominant feature of 
the policymaking process, and where the maturity of democratic institutions (could) 
effectively curtail the policy discretion of the government elite.  The determination and 
the shift of policies produced in the political market is thus largely a demand 
phenomenon.  Once the assumption of the self-interested politician is made, the focal 
point of the analysis shifts to the lobbying behaviour, and what drives it.  There is 
increasing attention given to the role of institutions, and it is not entirely excluded that 
politicians would actually perform their duty  and have some regard for public interest, 
but behaviour and outcomes remain driven by the desire to maximize the pay-offs of the 
politically active.   
This present survey will lay several key pieces of endogenous protection literature 
along side those dedicated to the analysis of increasing returns to scale (IRS), with the 
aim of  underlining some of the challenges and opportunities inherent in efforts to link 
these fields.  It is organized as follows.  The following section provides a brief overview 
of the main approaches in endogenous protection as well as empirical findings.  Section 
three tackles the IRS literature, with focus on the welfare effects of trade policies in the 
presence of variable returns to scale.  Section four is centered on the subject of 
regionalism.  This, like the literature on endogenous protection and IRS, has developed 
to be a huge intellectual ground to cover, so that focus will be placed on ‘new 
regionalism’ (Ethier, 1998) and FDI-driven RIAs.  Section five summarizes and draws 
some key lessons.   
 
2.2   Survey of Political Economy Models 
One of the main premises of political economy is that policies are best understood by 
scrutinizing the workings of the political market rather than relying on pure economic 
logic.  A government that opts for trade protection, for instance, is not mainly motivated 
by the intention of augmenting the economic well-being of the general populace.  The 
aim instead, is to favor the interests of the median voter, or raise the incomes of sectors 
that command great political influence through their role in securing the electoral future 
of political parties and incumbent leaders.  Unfortunately for the world’s voters, public 
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policies are often ‘produced’ based on the same private valuation of costs and benefits 
that drive the demand and supply of goods, rather than on the calculation of net societal 
gains.  Understanding the nature of this policy market therefore requires insight on the 
preferences of suppliers and demandeurs of these policies, as well as the strategic 
interaction of political players.   
Starting from the demand side, preferences over trade policy are inevitably shaped 
by the income effects of alternative trading regimes.  Nelson (1988) points out that since 
demand and supply functions are taken as given, the ultimate determinant of 
income/profit effects is the relative mobility of production factors across various sectors.  
Taking the long-run assumption of perfect factor mobility, for instance, tariffs are 
expected to raise the income of voters who own the factors intensively used in the 
production of the protected good.  Capital and labor owners are therefore anticipated to 
assume opposing positions in the tariff debate regardless of the type of industries that 
employ their services.  In the short-run, however, factor mobility is regarded as highly 
constricted so that the income prospects of factors are tied to the fortunes of their 
employers.  Voters then would tend to coalesce along industry lines, this time regardless 
of factor ownership. 
Ultimately, however, the political influence of private agents depends on their 
capacity to act and express their individual preferences.  If political action or participation 
is costless, as in the basic referendum model of Mayer (1984), then the optimal tariff is 
decided by the median-voter’s preferences, which in turn is determined by his/her factor 
ownership relative to the country’s overall factor endowments.3  For instance, if labour 
holds the critical vote, as one would expect in a labour-rich economy, then the chosen 
trade policy is the subsidy of exports, being an intensive user of the country’s most 
abundant  resource.   
In a one-person, one-vote setting, the power of numbers is only too obvious.  
However, alternative scenarios exist where individuals, largely by pooling their resources, 
could influence the weights attached to their votes, thereby making participation or the 
exercise of political influence, costly.  How to jointly act,  becomes the central question, 
together with how to solve that inevitable free-riding problem that besieges most 
                                                 
3 Key assumption is that preferences are single-peaked:  voters differ only in their factor ownership. 
  12 
collective ventures.  The expenditures of rent-seeking individuals therefore not only 
consist of direct lobbying costs but cover the costs of organization as well. 
 As for the supply of the protection, government preferences are determinant.  In 
its simplest characterization, government choice is seen as fully reflecting the electorate’s 
will as expressed by the median-vote.  In most models, however, government behavior is 
largely described as being motivated by self-interest, which is best served by (re-) election 
into power or continued political support, as in the incumbent’s case.  If the acquisition 
of power is costless and entry into the political contest is free, as in a world of perfect 
information and perfect electoral competition, then election victory is fully determined 
by aggregate welfare, making government’s self-interest completely compatible with 
national interest.   However, once politicians face the need to inform and convince the 
electorate in order to win votes, and/or given the incentive to raise their ‘profits’ through 
influence peddling,  then campaign resources becomes a key element in shaping 
government behavior.  This then opens up a channel wherein lobby groups, with their 
offers of financial support, can directly sway electoral results,  and consequently compel 
the inclusion of their member’s private well-being into the preference function of elected 
officials.  The voters’ saving grace is that in a working democracy, regular elections are 
bound to sanction the accommodation of the interests of individual lobbies that comes 
at the expense of aggregate welfare, as well as discipline visible rent-seeking behaviour on 
the part of incumbents.  The political cost of protection in terms of lost votes, thus still 
necessarily entails the consideration of  public interests in the government’s welfare 
maximization.   
Characterizing the institutional setting  is essential as well since it delineates the 
political constraints and incentives, and defines the set of strategies available to players.  
In current theoretical literature, however, assumptions made about institutions are largely 
based on advanced industrial countries, predominantly the US (Grindle, 1999).   Grindle   
observes that political action is typically depicted as being initiated by societal groups 
such as parties or lobbies, or by public opinion, which is in contrast to the state-centric 
politics as practiced in most developing countries.  Policy-making is also assumed to take 
place in transparent and stable political settings, again much different from those 
observed in relatively young and unstable democracies.    
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The importance of leadership, though hardly disputed, is not mirrored in standard 
endogenous protection theory.  This may be partly due to the ‘society-centric’ tradition 
of the literature as mentioned above.  The difficulties involved in formulating a general 
characterization of what may be idiosyncratic in nature, is another analytical hurdle.   Not 
only is it difficult to isolate the circumstances that produce leadership, but establishing 
whether a policy was brought about by an act of vision, or by  masked self-interest, is a 
complex challenge as well. Moreover, it is tempting to assume that given the periodic 
electoral contest that leads to the future being discounted heavily, politicians are not 
prone to cultivate long-term vision, anyway.  This under-representation of leadership 
helps reinforce a rather cynical view of governance, that is, the effects of policies on 
public welfare enter as a cost component  in the political calculus,  while the pursuit of 
the welfare of the powerful few delivers direct political benefits and thus motivates the 
behavior of elected leaders. 
In the various approaches to endogenous protection, such is the underlying 
assumption of government behavior.   Magee, Brock and Young (1989), for instance, 
depict the political parties’ probability of being elected rising with the financial 
contribution offered by lobbies to the electoral campaign of favoured officials, but fall 
with the amount of overall distortions the public expects from its policy interventions.  
Trade policy, in this electoral competition approach, is determined by the strategic 
interaction of  pressure groups in their choice of contribution spending and the electoral 
competition between parties.   It is a  two-stage game wherein parties first trigger the 
process by picking the policies which maximize the probability of their being elected, 
followed by the response of pressure groups in the form of financial support for the 
campaign of the party whose electoral platform carry the desired policy of the lobbies.   
The outcome of the Nash game played by the two political lobbies produces the 
equilibrium tariff rates. 
In the  political support function approach, largely attributed to Hillman (1989),  
government’s preferences are explicitly described while those of sectoral lobbies are 
simply assumed to be folded into the government welfare function.  It offers no detailed 
account of lobbying effort but policy makers are assumed to be weighing the gains of 
these particular industries against the efficiency losses borne by society as a result of 
protection.  Tariffs raise industry profits and consequently draw political support from 
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producers, but at the same time, drive down the consumers’ real income thereby eliciting 
a negative vote.  Equilibrium tariffs therefore result from the government’s (political 
support) maximization problem, where the willingness of government to marginally trade 
units of producers’ profits against losses in consumer welfare plays a critical role.   
The role of these policy weights attached by government to producer and consumer 
welfare is given further emphasis in Grossman and Helpman’s (1994)  political 
contributions approach.  The tariff-determination process is sketched as a common 
agency problem where  lobbies act as principals offering financial contributions meant to 
directly influence the policy choice of the incumbent government.  Contrary to the game 
described by Magee, Brock and Young, lobbies move first by presenting the incumbent 
with a donation contract of contribution schedules that state the level of donation for 
each possible policy stance taken. The agent, in turn, takes these contributions as given 
and proceeds to optimize its welfare  that is linear in total campaign  donations  and  
aggregate  welfare.   An  important assumption is that of Berheim and Whinston (1986) 
"truthful Nash Equilibria”.4   This essentially implies that the contributions  reflect the 
true worth of the policy good to the lobbies, making it possible to aggregate the 
preferences of participating principals.  Given quasi-linear preferences, the government is 
thus expected to maximize the weighted sum of overall welfare and the welfare of the 
lobbies involved. 
While politicians can ill-afford to ignore the societal cost of protection, it seems to 
be implicitly assumed that  producer interests relatively weigh more.  The whole subject 
of policy weights is, in fact, rather ad-hoc and illusive, given the numerous exogenous 
factors that could exert some influence, such as the number of impressionable voters (or 
extent of rational ignorance), design of institutions, or even the ‘type’ of political leaders.    
Reference is often made of Olson’s (1965) collective action theory, where power is not in 
numbers, but lies in the presence of strong and intense motivation to act.  Relative to 
consumers and to exporters, who are greater in number, import-competing producers are 
better able to overcome the free-riding dilemma, and face greater incentives to mount a 
collective action, since their policy stakes are more easily identifiable. 
                                                 
4  See Grossman & Helpman, 2002, chapter 1 for a more complete treatment of the common agency 
problem and Bernheim and Whinston’s model that produces an efficient ‘truthful’ equilibrium in a non-
cooperative game setting. 
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Table 2.1  Endogenous Protection Models 
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Lobbying is thus the principal driving force in the political market as in the tariff-
formation function approach, where tariffs are completely determined by the amount 
of lobbying resources employed by pressure groups.  Findlay and Wellisz (1983), Brock 
and Magee (1978), and Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982) analyze the entire tariff-formation 
process as a game between private groups with opposing interests and actively lobbying 
for Government assistance.  The eventual tariff is a result of a Nash equilibrium in the 
two industries' lobbying strategies.  
Regardless of government’s relative valuation of industry and aggregate welfare, it 
remains so that any increase in the deadweight loss due to protection raises the price of 
lobbying itself, since producers must ‘compensate’ government for its political cost.  
However, given less than perfect information, or assuming rational ignorance on the part 
of the general electorate, the public ‘perception’ of societal welfare loss, may be subject to 
manipulation, so that lobbying resources can sometimes be expected to be used in 
creating, or swinging public opinion in favor of protection.  It helps that  individuals are 
said to place a greater welfare weight on the loss of a given amount of income than on an 
income gain of the same amount  (Baldwin, 1989).  It is thus easier to build up public 
sympathy and support for declining or ailing firms, and their need for continued or even 
greater protection.  The greater is the propensity of the public to tolerate such protection, 
the lower is its political cost, and consequently, the lower is the necessary financial 
outlays for lobbying. 
In cases wherein conservatism characterizes the government’s social welfare 
function, protection may even come free of any lobbying cost on the part of producers.  
Corden (1974) suggests that it is possible to interpret the conduct of trade policy as an 
attempt to avoid “any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant 
section of the community.”  Sectors subject to high adjustment costs due to competition, 
or those that employ a large share of vulnerable income earners, could therefore be 
expected to collect the highest lobbying surplus. The same is true whenever government 
is said to place a high premium on equity as in Constantopoulos (1974) and Fieleke 
(1976).  Protection will likewise be supplied to sectors with a large proportion of low 
income (and/or unskilled) earners, without any collective action on the part of 
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beneficiaries.   Trade policy is also totally supply-driven whenever governments display 
nationalistic preferences, or attaches public good value to the creation of national 
‘champions’.    
Appendix A provides a condensed overview of the formal treatment of the 
approaches just discussed.  Table 2.1 presents the derived equilibrium tariffs, and the 
determinants of protection implied by these tariff expressions, while Table 2.2 
summarizes some of the key empirical results.     
 
Empirics of endogenous protection 
Based on previous discussions, the political power of a sector is largely determined by its 
voting strength, the effectiveness of its collective action, and the extent to which its 
interest coincides with that of a socially-concerned  government. Empirical investigations 
would therefore typically begin by identifying certain industrial characteristics that could 
indicate the presence of these influence-enhancing properties.  Voting strength, for 
instance, is proxied by size of labor employment, while most country studies  justify the 
use of industry size (Baldwin, 1989).  Moreover, Caves (1976) suggests that 
geographically dispersed sectors are also likely to  enlist the support of more regionally 
elected leaders, and thus possess greater voting power via their congressional 
representatives.  
In terms of facilitating collective action, however, numbers do not necessarily imply 
strength as it only induces free-riding.  On the other hand, industry or market 
concentration does matter not only because free-riders are easier to detect in a smaller 
pool of players, but also because the income effects of policies are more intensely felt by 
producers who stand to lose the most.   Bigness, may also be a virtue since large 
industrial output would obviously provide substantial financial resources to fund 
lobbying activities.   However, there is a political risk of being perceived by the public as 
peddlers of influence to the few and mighty, making politicians averse to enacting 
policies that are clearly partial to lobby interests.  This is one of the reasoning used to 
explain the choice of tariffs and not subsidies and quotas, for instance, which are more 
firm-industry-specific.  Firms may also decide to direct their lobbying towards moulding 
public opinion to their advantage, also for this reason. Still, the rather ambiguous 
relationship between industrial concentration and protection found in empirical results, 
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may nonetheless be partly due to the political fall-out of being too closely identified with 
rent-seeking lobbies. 
Counter-lobbying is yet another element that could potentially dilute the 
effectiveness of collective action.  Cadot, de Melo & Olarreaga (2004) point out that it is 
not the size of total output per se that may be influential, but the amount of sales 
directed to final users.  Lobbying is more costly for producers of intermediates as they 
must outbid the offers of downstream users lobbying to reduce the tariffs of their inputs.  
Final good manufacturers, on the contrary, are not expected to face resistance from 
consumers who are assumed to be hindered by free-riding obstacles. 
Lobbying is so central to standard models based on self-interested government that 
establishing a good indicator of its presence and extent is deemed necessary for a 
satisfactory empirical test of the model.  Pioneering work on this field has been done by 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Gawande and Bandhopadhyay (2000), who study the 
cross-sectoral variations of NTB coverage ratio in the US.  They rely on contributions 
data of the Political Action Committees (PACs) in ascertaining which sectors could be 
taken as being represented by lobbies.  They find that when the distinction between 
organized and non-organized industries is accounted for,  the variation of protection 
across sectors conform to the theoretical expectations of the Grossman-Helpman model, 
that is, the level of protection of politically active industries increases with the output / 
import ratio,  but falls with any rise in import demand elasticities.   
However, Gawande and Krishna (2002) in their extensive survey,  draw attention to 
some puzzling results of these structural estimations.  The derived weights attached by 
government to overall welfare, a, for instance, is surprisingly high:  between 100 to 3000.   
The lack of sufficient theoretical underpinnings of these weights, preclude the 
establishment of any priors, thereby making it difficult to draw anything definitive from 
these findings.  Cadot, Gretcher and de Melo (2003) offered an alternative test of the 
Grossman-Helpman model and generated a much lower weight of 5.1.  They themselves 
admit, however, that even at this rate, lobbying is still prohibitive, as this implies a 
political contribution of  $5 for each dollar of deadweight loss. It is clear that the 
problem lies in the crafting of the lobby indicators.  Actual monetary contributions are  
just one of the many forms of lobbying, and may not even be the principal or preferred 
means employed by producer lobbies in many countries. 
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Table 2.2  Summary of Empirical findings 
Determinants of 
protection 
observed 
relationships 
Authors  
employment / 
industry size 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Finger, Hall, & Nelson (1982)  
Lee & Swagel (1997)  
Cadot, de Melo & Olarreaga (2004)  
Mansfield & Busch (1993) (case of NTBs) 
{Goldberg & Maggi (1999) ;Gawande & 
Bandhopadhyay (2000); McCalman (2004); Mitra, 
Thomakos & Ulubasoglu (2000)} - (but only in case 
of organized sectors) 
Hong (2005); Karacaovali (2005) 
Trefler (1993) – free-rider problem 
Esfahani & Leaphart (2000) 
unemployment rates + Mansfield & Busch (1993) 
unempl. benefits + Matschke (2004) 
import penetration + 
 
- 
Anderson (1980); Marvel & Ray (1983); Baldwin 
(1985) 
Lee & Swagel (1997); Afontsev (2002); Hong 
(2005) 
import growth + Trefler (1993); Cheh (1974) 
import demand elast. - Goldberg & Maggi (1999) 
industrial 
concentration 
+ 
 
- 
Pincus (1975);  Saunders (1980); Trefler (1993) 
Ferreira & Facchini (2004) 
Caves (1976); Finger, Hall, & Nelson (1982); 
Anderson & Baldwin (1987) 
geog. concentration of 
producers 
+ Pincus (1975); Caves (1976); Godek (1985), except 
for the case of NTBs (Ray, 1981) 
geog. concentration of 
consumers 
- Pincus (1975); Trefler (1993) 
proportion of low-
skilled, vulnerable (i.e. 
elderly) workers 
+ Cheh (1974); Anderson & Baldwin (1987);  
Esfahani & Leaphart (2000) 
output/profit growth - Marvel & Ray (1983); Ray (1991) 
type of goods (cons. 
or intermediates) 
+ (cons) 
- (interm) 
Baack & Ray 1983; Marvel & Ray (1983); Ray 
(1991); Cadot, Gretcher, de Melo (2003) 
capital-labor ratio 
(country-wide) 
- Magee, et al (1989) 
capital-intensity - 
 
EL 2000;  Anderson & Baldwin (1987); Ray (1981) 
Beaulieu & Magee (2004) 
number of 
parliamentary 
constituencies 
+ Mansfield & Busch (1993) 
economies of scale 
productivity 
+ 
+ 
Afontsev (2002) 
Karacaovali (2005) 
income growth - Ray (1987); O’Halloran (1994); Bohara & Kaempfer 
(1991) 
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As Table 2.2 illustrates, a considerable bulk of empirical work is geared to  test how 
much of protection could be attributed to the government’s social welfare goals.  
Protection of industries with a large share of low-skilled, low-income and/or elderly 
workers, for instance, indicate government preference for equity and the alleviation of 
adjustment costs due to foreign competition.  Harm caused by import surges, or other 
external shocks leading to recession or high unemployment, is also observed to induce 
policy intervention, notwithstanding the absence of lobbying on the part of producers.   
Some empirical results, however, seem to hint at the predominance of politicians’ 
industrialisation motives.  Protection was observed to be increasing with capital intensity, 
as found by Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) , for example.  Moreover, country studies on 
China (Hong, 2005), Russia (Afontsev, 2002) and Columbia (Karacaovali, 2005), find that 
protection is higher in large industries.  Economies of scale also display a significant 
effect on Russian and Columbian tariff levels, while more productive sectors are also 
found to enjoy higher tariffs in Columbia.  Lee and Swagel (1997) also observed that 
controlling for the simultaneity between wages and protection, industries with higher 
value added per worker are more likely to be protected. 
The endogeneity of protection with respect to productivity noticed by Karacaovali 
is a particularly interesting result given the implicit assumption that the usual beneficiaries 
of policy intervention are inefficient import-competing firms.  On one hand, greater 
productivity implies lesser vulnerability to foreign competition, and thus relatively lower 
returns under a protectionist regime. Still, one can argue that large productive firms could 
more easily translate their economic strength into political influence.  In theory, only a 
marginal role is conceded to output size and its growth, considering it determinant only 
in the presence of lobbying activity in the sector. Moreover, the assumption of constant 
returns to scale in theory implies that while productivity might influence the granting of 
protection, protection itself has no effect on productivity via the expansion of industrial 
output. 
The rhetoric of actual policy debates, is filled with the contrary, however.  The need 
to generate scale economies as an instrument for catch-up growth, a means to maintain a 
country’s competitive position, or attract foreign direct investments, for instance, have 
been dominating the menu of arguments used by government and industry alike.  Even 
from a political economy viewpoint, that is, assuming that politicians and producers are 
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purely  motivated by self-interest, the presence of scale economies could have significant 
implications on the political costs and benefits of protection, and could potentially shift 
preferences over trade policy.  Externalities that are domestic in origin, for instance, 
lowers the deadweight losses of protection (i.e. political cost of supplying protection), 
while increasing the returns to lobbying, not only through higher sales but also through 
lower production costs.   Internationally generated scale economies, on the other hand, 
implies that profits are a function of a sector’s integration in the global economy.  
Moreover, improvements in productivity of firms world-wide, and the manner in which 
agglomeration forces further strengthens the competitive position of the front-runners, 
ensure that ever increasing tariffs would be necessary to maintain the profit margins of 
local producers.  As a consequence, lobbying outlays must increase, and so will the 
political cost of protection in the form of deadweight losses.  Taking scale economies 
into account, thus potentially alters the current valuation of the price and the returns to 
protection, and fundamentally changes the strategies of public and private political actors. 
 
2.3 Variable returns to scale and the welfare effects of trade policy 
 
The impact of scale economies on the political market while being far from trivial is 
nonetheless not given ample attention in endogenous protection literature.  This may 
have been rational given the ‘unwanted’ consequences of introducing variable returns: 
multiple equilibria, indeterminacy, and path dependency.  Slight modification in 
assumptions also easily leads to divergent analytical paths.   For instance, focusing on 
final goods, as was done by Krugman (1981), or on producer or intermediate goods, as 
was the choice of Ethier (1979, 1982), bring to the fore different sets of welfare and 
policy issues.  In the case of final goods, different assumptions of market structure, 
monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, could even produce contrasting results, while 
for intermediate goods, welfare effects starkly differ depending on whether the assumed 
source of externalities is the  national or global market, or whether the good 
characterized by increasing returns to scale (IRS) is traded or not. 
Unleashing the ‘messy’ implications of IRS, however, is behind much of the 
‘newness’ introduced in various fields, such as economic growth, industrial organization, 
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technology, development and economic geography.  Still, in international trade, the 
subject of scale economies is sometimes met with ambivalence or even discomfort 
because it exposes a set of circumstances where free trade could be potentially harmful, 
and thereby provides ideological ammunition to protectionist and neo-mercantilists 
interests.  It is argued that even if it would be possible to do better than free trade, the 
information needed by government to get intervention right is just too gargantuan to be 
accessible.  The dilemma faced by policymakers, however, is that a laissez-faire approach 
that leads to poverty/low-growth traps, or  deindustrialisation, may be a politically 
unacceptable risk.   
For small and developing countries, in fact, theory predicts a loss of welfare under 
free trade as this would result to the specialisation in the good produced under 
decreasing returns to scale (DRS).  It is well known that in the presence of increasing 
returns to scale, the marginal costs faced by private producers exceed that borne by 
society, so that in equilibrium, the IRS good is underproduced. Thus, under the Kemp 
and Negishi (1970) criterion, a country can unambiguously gain only when trade results 
to incomplete specialisation and to the expansion of the production of the IRS good.  
Panagariya (1981) instead, illustrates in a two-country model with symmetric tastes and 
technology, that non-intervention will lead a small open economy to specialize 
completely in the DRS good.  Welfare maximization in this case, would therefore require 
a permanent tax cum subsidy scheme that would promote the  expansion of the IRS 
good and the contraction of the DRS good. 
Depending on the initial size or comparative advantage, scale economies could 
therefore ‘lock’ a country into a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ specialisation.  As demonstrated by 
Panagariya (1981) and Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (1998),  in a setting where 
nonconvexities result to multiple equilibria, stability arguments lead to the expectation of 
a high-output/wage and a low-output/wage equilibria.  Figure 2.1 is a graphical 
representation of Panagariya’s (1981) IRS model in a small-country context, replicated 
here from Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan.  Sector 2 is assumed to be subject to IRS, 
while sector 1 is produced under constant returns to scale.   As in Herberg and Kemp 
(1969), the production possibilities frontier (PPF) is shown to be strictly concave and 
strictly convex to the origin as output of sector 1, Q1, and output of the IRS good, Q2, 
respectively approach zero.  The price line is also shown to cut the PPF from below 
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depicting the inequality of the price and the social marginal cost of producing the IRS 
good.   
In the example shown in Figure 2.1, three equilibria are identified for a given price 
ratio, two corresponding to diversified production, E2  and E1, and the third, E3, to 
complete specialisation.   Figure 2.2, on the other hand, mirrors these equilibria in the 
labor market where IRS in sector 2 production results to an upward sloping labor 
demand curve.  Using the Marshallian tatonnement process to establish the supply 
response of labor to changes in wages, it is found that E1 is an unstable equilibrium while 
the rest is stable.5 The question at this point is which of these equilibria will eventually be 
selected.  In the context of a static economy, initial conditions largely determines whether 
a country ends up in a high or a zero manufacturing output equilibrium.  If the size of 
manufacturing employment of a country is, for instance, such that it finds itself initially 
to the right of E1  in Figure 2.2, then the adjustment process will bring that economy to 
E3. Labor employment slightly above E1, on the contrary, leads to a high-output position 
of E2.  This illustrates the risk a  developing country may face in being trapped in a state 
of preindustrialisation, as the small manufacturing sector vanishes with complete 
specialisation in agriculture.   
Figure 2.1 
             Figure 2.2
 
                                                 
5 Since labor is assumed to move towards the sector that offers the higher wage, any disturbance to the left or 
right of E1 will send the equilibrium away from E1, making it unstable. 
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Moving to a high-wage industrialized equilibrium is obviously the much preferred 
state, and indeed agents will be willing to shoulder the adjustment costs implied by such a 
move, given the assurance or confidence that such a state could actually be attained.  This 
is the point raised by Krugman (1991) in his work on the role of expectations in 
equilibrium selection.  Thus, whatever the size of initial manufacturing employment, it is 
possible for an economy to industrialize as long as expectations for a take-off is 
adequately coordinated. 
  Matsuyama (1991) using global dynamics analysis further explores the 
circumstances where history or expectations are determinant, and considers the role of 
government policy in affecting the set of equilibria under various assumptions of 
employment size, strength of scale economies, and the rate of time preferences.  Policy 
intervention is judged as effective if it is able to generate a ‘good’ equilibrium or eradicate 
a ‘bad’ one.  With weak scale effects, and low initial manufacturing employment, an 
industrial take-off  is highly unlikely under laissez-faire.  But even if the employment is 
high to begin with, deindustrialization remains a possibility due to self-fulfilling 
pessimism.  In both instances, a subsidy or a tariff is required to escape the poverty trap, 
or prevent the return to zero-output stationary state.  However, if scale economies are 
sufficiently strong initially, then the role of expectations becomes decisive, and 
government is left with a relatively less intrusive task of coordination or infusing 
optimism in the private sector.   
All these assumes, however, that scale economies are nationally generated,  that is,  
the economy-wide productivity gains stem from the greater specialisation implied by a 
larger domestic production of manufactures.6  The novelty introduced by Ethier in his 
1979 and 1982 seminal articles is that free trade in producer goods, effectively expands 
the size of the market where specialisation could be further encouraged, resulting to the 
interplay of internal and external economies that increases productivity world-wide and 
brings down costs.   
The assumption of international increasing returns to scale alters the nature of 
analysis in two fundamental ways.  First, the problems of indeterminacy and multiple 
                                                 
6 The typical approach in literature is to adopt the so-called Marshallian externalities, that is, scale economies 
are assumed to be external to the firm but internal to the industry as a whole.  This enables one to 
reconcile the presence of increasing returns to scale with perfect competition.   
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equilibria is suppressed,  since equilibrium adjustments entail changes in the number of 
production units or product variety, and not in the size of production of individual firms.   
Second, much of the welfare implications of trade policies, particularly for small 
countries are reversed when it is the size of the international market that matters instead 
of national output. Francois (1992) illustrates how the merit of commercial policies is 
significantly reduced in the context of international increasing returns to scale.  The 
benefits of subsidies aimed to boost economies in a small country, for instance, is likely 
to spill-over to producers of other countries, who will see their costs fall as soon as 
subsidies lead to an increase in the size of global output.  Similarly, any tariffs that result 
to a fall in the number of intermediates varieties available for international producers will 
eventually hurt local suppliers due to lower scale economies and hence, higher 
production costs.   For a large country, the only difference is the presence of terms of 
trade effects, which on one hand, adds to the adverse welfare effects of externalities 
stemming from subsidies, but at the same time provides some gains due to the 
application of optimal tariffs.   The latter is bound to invite retaliation, however, so that 
the inevitable conclusion still points to the policy superiority of free trade. 
This policy assessment is once again altered if scale economies is assumed to be 
generated not from the production of intermediates but from final goods instead.  As 
Flam and Helpman (1986) tried to illustrate, under the setting of monopolistic 
competition a small tariff may be welfare improving, even for a small country.  This is 
because despite the economy’s size, individual firms producing differentiated goods 
exercises monopoly power, that is, they face a downward sloping demand function.  A 
small tariff, by shifting demand from foreign to domestic varieties,  therefore has the 
effect of raising the output price, leading to more R & D activities, more product 
varieties and eventually to higher output in the aggregate.7  Consumers, assumed to have 
love for variety, also experience some welfare improvement from the availability of more 
varieties, whereas the economy as a whole gains because of the so-called pro-competitive 
effect of trade policy.  This refers to the rise in the individual firm output of the under-
produced good to socially optimal levels.  Flam and Helpman show, however, that even 
                                                 
7 Free entry exerts a countervailing effect on domestic demand however, so that the end outcome depends on 
the relative strength of these opposing pressures. 
  26 
without this latter effect, the terms-of-trade effects together with the consumer gains 
from increased varieties are enough to outweigh any adverse welfare effects that a fall in 
firm output may generate. 
In endogenous protection literature, there is hardly any accommodation of variable 
returns to scale, except for a recent article by Chang (2005) which imbeds the type of 
results discussed above into the protection-for-sale model of Grossman and Helpman.  
The point of departure is the optimality of a small tariff, so that lobbying is aimed at  
obtaining tariff levels still higher than this optimal rate.  This would then imply that the 
equilibrium tariffs reached under assumption of increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition is higher than those attained in a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) world, and 
that tariffs for unorganized sectors will never fall below zero, unlike the negative 
protection rates hypothesized in the standard case.  This is because under monopolistic 
competition, lobbies’ care about the tariffs faced by other sectors only as consumers who 
gain from the lowest possible price for their imports.  Secondly, it is assumed that export 
taxes are welfare improving from a revenue perspective, so that lobbying by organized 
export groups would not necessarily lead to export subsidies, but to an export tax rate 
lower than those faced by unorganized firms.  Finally, for sectors with low import 
penetration (hence, large domestic output), protection is expected to be high not only for 
organized firms but also for those unrepresented by lobbies.  The standard Grossman 
and Helpman reasoning is behind this result for organized firms (i.e. larger size implies 
bigger stakes in terms of profits), while for sectors without lobbies, tariffs are positive to 
begin with, in contrast to the CRS result of negative  protection. 
Chang’s work is motivated by the need to explain protection, given that most of 
today’s trade comes in the form of trade of differentiated products, or intra-industry 
trade.  The first step taken is therefore to incorporate the Krugman-Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition model in a standard endogenous protection analytical 
approach. As stressed by Ethier (1982), Markusen (1989) and Francois (1992), however, 
it is trade in intermediates rather than final products that characterize much of two-way 
trade.  Moreover, in sectors where intra-industry trade is truly dominant, one would 
expect scale economies to be international in scope, thus making free trade, and not a 
small tariff, the optimal policy choice.  If ever government intervention emerges as a 
first-best option, then it can only be because of the need to move to a global optimum, 
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or to a high-output, high-wage equilibrium.  That would then assume that increasing 
returns to scale originates from the increased production of differentiated manufacturing 
products due to a bigger domestic market. 
Unfortunately, there is no work known to the author at the moment of writing, 
where endogenous protection is modelled in the presence of increasing returns to scale in 
intermediate goods production.  Baldwin et. al (2003) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 
(2002), however, did consider the political economy repercussions of industrial 
agglomeration.  One of the basic assumption of Ethier’s analysis is the ever falling costs 
of transportation and communication that facilitates finer specialisation in world 
production, and easier access to important markets.   However, once transportation 
costs,  are fully taken into account, for instance, then benefits may emerge for vertically-
integrated firms to locate in a single production base, or within countries with significant 
demand.    
Under this setting, any lobbying-induced expansion of output could induce foreign 
entry, which potentially leads to crowding out and falling profits for individual local 
firms. Along similar analytical lines, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud explains the policy 
tendency to support ailing firms.  Using the Grossman and Helpman model, they show 
that unlike the case of expanding firms whose incentive to lobby is eroded by the entry 
of foreign producers,  firms in declining sectors tend to lobby harder, being better able to 
appropriate the rents engendered by protection.  This is because foreign interest is 
dampened in sectors where the likelihood of recovering entry costs (i.e. product 
development, advertisement, etc.) is low.  In Baldwin et. al, on the other hand, the 
combination of unilateral protection and entry restrictions (i.e., investment capital 
restrictions, business regulations, etc.) is examined with respect to its impact on lobbying 
incentives, showing that if political power is such that both import and relocation barriers 
could be raised, then the real income of lobbying firms will rise. 
In new economic geography, however, foreign entry is desirable, especially the ones 
that trigger the expansion of industrial output which then further strengthens the 
backward and forward linkages among firms.  This could then potentially lead to 
industrial agglomeration that catapults an economy to a high-growth equilibrium, 
generating higher incomes and profits for all.  In this context, the cost of being by-passed 
as a production base could be quite significant given that cost advantages generated by 
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scale economies in the preferred location tend to cumulate through time.  This implies an 
ever widening price wedge between the protected market and that of its competitors, 
leading to even higher lobbying expenditure rates that would be needed to attain an 
adequate level of protection.  Clearly, the political tariff equilibrium is bound to fall, as 
rising lobbying costs and deadweight losses, exert downward pressures on demand and 
supply, respectively. 
With scale economies elsewhere undermining protection domestically,  strategies 
and preferences over trade policy are bound to be modified.  One direction of change is 
towards the use of trade policy as an instrument to enhance the attractiveness of the local 
market as a production base for global manufacturers.  Thus, unlike the case envisaged 
by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, lobbying might be aimed at obtaining an active policy 
that will facilitate, rather than hamper, foreign entry.   Exactly what set of policies will be 
opted for depends on the kind of “agglomerative forces” a country might want to exploit 
to outcompete its rivals.  For developing countries with small manufacturing markets, 
low wages are the principal draw, so that unilateral liberalisation, or selected market 
opening through ‘free trade zones’ (export processing zones)  might be preferred.  Bigger 
markets, on the other hand, offer lower overall production costs due to the productivity 
benefits implied by large scale production.  Further elimination of trade barriers, together 
with the granting of fiscal and other investment incentives would then be among the 
many available options.    
The surge of regionalism in the last two decades could also be explained along these 
lines.  Puga and Venables (1998) noted that the formation of regional groupings could 
have a dynamic effect on industrial location.  As earlier mentioned, given that 
transactions are costly if firms cross national borders, agglomeration benefits are reaped 
by firms close to other firms.   When locational competition among similar countries 
work to neutralize the effects of policies aimed to enhance foreign interest, there are 
benefits to be gained through coordination and collective action.  Moreover, a bigger 
regional market is by far a more attractive production hub, conferring on individual 
members a competitive position each would have been unable to achieve acting alone.   
Lastly, as Francois (1994) points out, policies geared to enhance local production when 
scale economies are international in scope only lead to externalities that might be better 
internalized by the formation of a regional grouping.   
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2.4    Regionalism 
From a purely political economy perspective, however, membership in an RIA can only 
emerge as a political equilibrium if doing so would enhance the domestic protection of 
the participating country.  It therefore implies that the principal merit of an RIA is its 
ability to divert trade, thus giving local exporters an opportunity to sell at higher prices 
and at the same time causing import-substituting industries minimal harm.   This in 
contrast with orthodox trade theory, where countries do not resort to protectionism 
having recognised the gains of international trade and they would all the more not join an 
RIA when they have the option of unilateral tariff reduction (Krauss, 1972).  Along 
classical lines, the only valid justification considered by Johnson (1965) is the terms of 
trade argument:  a customs union among countries eliminates the beggar-thy-neighbour 
terms-of trade effect due to activist tariff policies of members.   
It took Cooper and Massell (1965) to articulate the problem of the economic 
rationality of an RIA.  They argue that economic efficiency through trade creation can 
not be the objective of countries joining an RIA since it can be proven that non-
preferential trade policy is superior to an RIA as a device to bring about more trade.  
Therefore the rationale for an RIA must lie beyond its trade-creating effects and can be 
traced to the non-economic objectives held by member countries.  Cooper and Massell 
argues that in the case of developing countries, the key to the development of an 
economic theory for CU begins with the acceptance of industrialisation as a principal 
policy objective.  The analysis should then proceed to investigate how joining the RIA 
will allow the developing countries to "achieve more economically the ends served by 
protection." 
Johnson expressed a similar idea albeit in a more general context.  By attaching a 
public good value to the objectives set by nationalism, he is then able to provide an 
economic rationale for the formation of a customs union among countries who share a 
strong preference to expand their production and exports of industrial products.  In the 
Johnson framework, there are gains to be attained because a country opening its market 
for the industrial exports of the other country is guaranteed a reciprocal treatment and 
access to the market of the partner country for its own industrial products.  Through an 
RIA, each country can offer its partners an increase in exports while minimising its own 
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loss of production.  Participation in an RIA therefore becomes a disguised form of 
subsidy:  each partner indirectly subsidises its own industrial exports by subsidising its 
industrial imports from the other. 
In both analyses, the merit of an RIA is seen through the manner it enables 
countries to further pursue their industrialisation goals and still allow them to maintain a 
degree of protection from foreign imports.  In the case that the entire increase in 
industrial production in the region is brought about by trade diversion, the benefits to be 
derived by members are maximised since no loss or sacrifice of domestic production is 
experienced8.  The crux of the matter is that countries can achieve their policy objectives 
more effectively as a discriminating club than when they are acting alone.  One can 
suppose that countries experience the need to expand their "domestic market" in order 
to reach a scale of industrial production that would eventually enable them to be 
competitive in the global market.  This "training ground" argument is certainly one that is 
still widely used by RIA advocates today. 
 The idea that mercantilist motives drive countries to form an RIA permeates much 
of political economy literature today.    In fact, in many models there is an implicit  
assumption that the member countries' objective is to divert trade, and it is only once this 
condition is fulfilled that an RIA can be feasible.   However, as Whalley (1996) points 
out, analyses of the impact of an RIA and predictions on what form arrangements would 
eventually take can be misleading if the main objectives for individual RIAs are not kept 
firmly in mind.  He then presents a range of factors that countries take into account in 
their decision to participate in an RIA:  safe haven concerns; locking-in domestic policy 
reforms; the use of trade agreements to underpin security arrangements;  and the tactical 
interplay between multilateral and regional trade negotiating positions.  
Traditional trade gains or market access is certainly one key economic goal, 
especially if major trade partners are involved.  For smaller countries, joining an RIA that 
includes a large market is particularly attractive. However, it must be pointed out that 
many RIAs are formed among countries with similar trade structures.  This refers 
                                                 
8 However, this requires that a complementary production structure exists among member 
countries.  Otherwise, with substantial overlapping, trade creation will most likely dominate the 
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particularly to developing countries, where key markets of interest are often outside the 
integrating region.  Hence, there seem to be hardly any  economic rationale of forming 
an RIA if factor endowments are similar and the scope for increasing efficiency by 
allowing comparative advantages to emerge, is limited.   Even in a political economy 
view,  an RIA would not be plausible since trade creation can be expected to exceed 
trade diversion in such instances.  
RIA advocates often refer to the dynamic9 as opposed to the static effects as a more 
important economic justification of forming a regional grouping. Baldwin (1989, 1992), 
in applying neoclassical growth theory to regional integration came to the conclusion that 
the medium-term bonus could double or even treble an RIA’s static efficiency effect on 
output.  Economic integration is also said to induce foreign direct investment (FDI) in as 
much as it could raise the rates of return on capital (see Baldwin, Forslid, & Haaland, 
1996, and Baldwin & Seghezza 1996).  Given that tradable goods are typically more 
capital-intensive than non-tradables, an RIA could increase the relative demand for 
capital by reducing the transaction costs on tradable goods relative to tradables.  
Moreover, an RIA may make capital equipment imports more accessible and/or enhance 
the efficiency of the financial sector (thus lowering the cost of funds) by exposing it to 
more regional competition.  
The more important avenue with which an RIA can induce FDIs is by improving 
the credibility of a country’s sound policies and/or lowering the degree of uncertainty on 
the success of reforms.  For developing countries, unilateral trade liberalisation would 
lack credibility because of time inconsistency and asymmetric information problems.  
Fernandez and Portes (1998) explained how an RIA could strengthen the incentives to 
implement its liberalisation commitment better than does the WTO.  The larger 
constituency of the WTO offers substantial room to behave as a free-rider.  Retaliation is 
therefore costly (hence, not credible), leading to greater difficulties in extracting 
cooperation or compliance.  An RIA, on the other hand, may be an effective tool for 
dealing with the free-riding and sanctioning problems and thus be a more attractive 
                                                                                                                             
RIA, and the end result of the RIA for members would then be negative since the loss through 
national income foregone would exceed that of the rise in industrial production. 
9 Schiff and Winters (1998) defines dynamic effects as ‘anything that affects a country’s rate of growth over 
the medium term’. 
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vehicle to lock-in domestic reforms.  Moreover, there is also more scope for punishment 
if an RIA delivers benefits beyond the WTO (i.e. investment).  In a similar vein, if 
investors are hindered by the uncertainty about the nature of the economy and the type 
of government they face, then a country’s entry in an RIA could be used as a device to 
signal not only the government’s liberal intentions but also the existence of the right 
economic conditions that would instil or even compel local industries to increase its 
efficiency and overall competitiveness.   
Bagwell and Staiger (1993) argue that the motivations discussed in the current 
section remain difficult to reconcile with the mercantilist flavour that characterises  actual 
negotiations.  They insist that Johnson was right all along:  governments enter an RAI 
mainly for terms of trade reasons.  Governments do not join an RIA as a means to 
liberalise their trade, indifferent to the policy commitments of their partners.  Instead, the 
main driving force of RIA formation is the manner in which an RIA could internalise the 
effects that the partner country’s policies have on other members.  They conclude that 
during the transition period during which an FTA is being formed, the effect of an FTA 
will be to reduce the volume of trade between members and non-members.  The 
anticipation of a future reduction in multilateral trade flows inhibits the enforcement of 
low MFN tariffs, leading to temporarily higher multilateral tariffs.  Once the RIA 
formation process is completed, however, liberal multilateral trade policies can be 
restored, as the initial balance between current and expected future trade flow re-
emerges.  Again, a critical assumption made here is the presence of trade diversion in the 
formation  of an RIA.   
 
Political Economy view of RIA 
As earlier mentioned, an RIA where trade creation is expected to dominate ( or at least, 
where trade diversion is unimportant) is a puzzle in political - economic terms. The main 
stream view is exemplified  by Grossman and Helpman (1995), where they conclude that 
FTAs are likely to arise only if they provide overwhelming benefits that would allow 
government to ignore lobbies or if they tend toward enhanced protection.  They use the 
similar framework surveyed earlier in section 2.2, and they emphasise, as in their earlier 
work on trade wars and trade talks (1993), that international relations among politically 
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motivated governments involve two stages of strategic interaction.  In the first setting, a 
country’s policy stance is the outcome of political competition among various special 
interests, and the extent of the government’s concern for aggregate welfare.  The 
international equilibrium is subsequently determined by give-and-take between 
governments.10 
Suppose therefore that two governments, A and B, are faced with only two choices:  
to pursue an RIA or not.  Interest lobbies, moving first, will then design their 
contribution schedules, Ci , and associate their gifts with the government’s entry into an 
FTA, CiF ,  or with the status quo, CiN.   The interest groups play a Nash game and set 
their contributions noncooperatively.  The government will then decide to enter the FTA 
if its welfare, W, is higher with the FTA than without, that is,   
∑∑ +≥+ i NiNi FiF aWCaWC .  To find the value of WF and CiF, the effects of FTA is 
measured for voters and special interest groups, respectively.  Consider a situation where 
τiA  >τiB > 1 and B’s endowment of the specific factor is such that B is unable to supply 
all of A’s import demand and this will cause A to continue to import from non-members 
at the relatively higher domestic price, τiA.  Then  trade-shifting, as it was first illustrated 
by Shibata (1971), will bring about enhanced protection for producers in B since it would 
allow then to divert all output towards the A market and sell at higher prices.  If B, on 
the other hand, is able to satisfy all of A’s demand at the lower price, τiB , then producers 
in A will receive less than before.  The FTA has given rise to reduced protection. 
The effects on welfare are familiar from standard customs union literature.  In the 
case of enhanced protection, producers in B gain and the government earn extra tariff 
revenues from goods now imported from abroad, while welfare in A is reduced by the 
amount of tariff revenue lost.   In contrast, when protection is reduced, producers in A 
suffer profit losses, tariff revenues are zero, but consumers gain via low prices.  Country 
                                                 
10 When an FTA involves across the board liberalisation (i.e. all tariffs are set to zero), the political contest in 
the second stage is not very different from that of the initial stage:  export interests compete against 
import-substituting interests.  However, if negotiations involve product-by-product liberalisation then the 
battle is between the export interests in one country and the import-competing firms in the other country 
producing in the same sector. 
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B in this case, only gains from higher tariff revenues11.  A significant part of the support 
for an FTA would therefore originate from exporters expecting to sell at higher regional 
prices.  This implies that an FTA will be reached by A & B only when there is enough 
‘balance’ in the potential trade between them.  Specifically, there must be a sufficient 
number of potential exporters who will lobby for entry, or a sufficient number of sectors 
where welfare gains can offset losses from trade diversion. 
Grossman and Helpman then proceed to show that in the event that governments 
are able to negotiate for long periods of adjustment and /or exclude some sectors from 
the agreement, an FTA could be made politically viable.  Governments A and B in this 
setting, will make alternating offers, with each government naming a number of 
exclusions.  If offers are not accepted, either the negotiation comes to a halt or counter-
offers are proposed.  The process continues until an agreement is reached or negotiations 
breakdown.  The conclusion reached in both instances is similar:  an FTA is a 
supportable equilibrium only when enhanced protection (i.e., trade diversion) prevails.  
As the authors themselves put it:  ‘an FTA is most likely to be politically viable exactly 
when it would be socially harmful’. 
Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (1996)  apply the Grossman-Helpman model in a 3- 
country model .  They then ask what integration between country A and B will do to 
protection against a non-member country C’s exports.  They consider the case where 
tariffs on different goods are substitutes:  if one is reduced (by FTA members) others rise 
(on C).  This is because the unprotected sector contracts, increasing the size and reducing 
the lobbying costs of the other sectors.  They conclude that a propensity to raise non-
RIA tariffs exists for members and hence, an RIA constitutes a move away from 
multilateralism. 
The same view is taken by Levy (1997):  an FTA, once feasible, can undermine 
political support for multilateral liberalisation, and can never enhance political support 
for broader free trade.  Adopting a median-voter (with differentiated product) model, he 
shows that by offering the median voter disproportionately large gains (via additional 
product varieties) with relatively small loses ( through adverse price shifts), the bilateral 
                                                 
11 Output is still diverted totally to A’s and B’s tariff revenue is increased through non-partner imports 
coming in to satisfy B’s demand for i. 
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FTA could raise the utility of the median agent above that offered by a multilateral 
agreement.  According to Levy, this is more likely the case in FTAs between countries 
with similar capital-labour rations and roughly different median voters.  Once again, trade 
diversion among members with different tastes but a large scope for intra-industry trade, 
has saved the day for a discriminatory arrangement. 
Leidy & Hoekman (1992)  adds another pessimistic verdict in their study of the 
effects of RIA on the multilateral trade negotiation process.  Using a public choice 
framework, they illustrate that the interest group participation in the determination of 
negotiators’ preferences will produce non-transparent ‘holes and loopholes’ which will 
heavily limit liberalisation not only in an RIA but in multilateral trade negotiation (MTN) 
processes as well.  The model contains three stages:  pre-negotiation, negotiation and 
implementation.  The vision that sets the agenda is introduced in the first period.  In the 
negotiation stage, a blueprint for policy is produced through formal government-to-
government bargaining.  However, officials are subject to domestic lobbying pressure 
which alters the negotiators’ preferences over policy packages.  Finally, in the 
implementation stage special interest groups work to influence the administrative details 
of the agreement, which in turn determine how the new policy will affect the distribution 
of income.  The behaviour of interest groups in earlier stage depends on their 
anticipation of the extent of autonomy and malleability of the administrative bureaucracy.  
It is clear that a rule-based, well-behaved bureaucracy will induce sectoral lobbies to 
move their activities in the negotiation as opposed to the implementation stage.  In 
contrast, when policy actions occur mainly in the last stage due to the discretionary and 
autonomous character of administrators, groups will withhold their lobbying resources 
during negotiations and instead offer them later to administrative bureaucrats. 
In sum, what one can expect from regional, or multilateral negotiations, for that 
matter, is an agreement which may appear liberalising in its bold print and rhetoric, but in 
effect hides its essentially protectionist character behind the complex and ambiguous 
details that are contained in its articles, escape clauses, timetables, interpretative notes, 
administrative instructions, enacting provisions, grey area measures, and the like.  Due to 
the underlying domestic political pressures faced by its members, an RIA can be 
expected to introduce higher net protection, accommodate a number of non-transparent 
trade-inhibiting provisions, and retard the overall progress for global trade liberalisation. 
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It is not surprising that the proliferation of regional agreements in the last two 
decades, has sparked renewed fears concerning the future of the multilateral system.  
About 55-60% of world trade now occurs within such trading blocs and there is virtually 
no country, with very few exceptions, which has not taken part in an RIA exercise in one 
time or another.12  The intense debate about the desirability of RIAs highlights the 
ambiguity that has long accompanied customs union theory.  In the Vinerian tradition, 
for instance, a customs union (CU) is good if it creates trade, but it is not necessarily bad 
if it induces some diversion.  This is because despite the diversion, a regional agreement 
still brings about increased imports and hence, more consumer surplus in the high-cost 
partner.  The end-result is said to depend on the ‘size of the triangles’ (i.e. the relative 
sizes of consumer and producer surpluses).  For many decades discussion about RIAs 
has largely centered on these types of discourses, that is, on the welfare consequences of 
RIA creation on member countries.  It is only in the last decade that analytical interest 
has shifted to the issue of how RIAs impacts on nonmembers’ welfare and on the global 
trading order as a whole.  
 
Open Regionalism and the agglomeration motive  
The inconsistency of regionalism with multilateral liberalisation has been strongly refuted 
by advocates of recent initiatives, claiming that global openness, is in fact, the dominant 
trend.  However, the term ‘open regionalism’,  which has been coined to express this 
view, was quick to elicit dismissal, given the seemingly unavoidable contradiction that the 
term implies (i.e. non-discriminatory, and yet preferential). Proponents and interested 
analysts, for this reason, have made several attempts to give the concept more clarity.  
Wei and Frankel (1995) offer four possible definitions:  (1)  open membership ( given that 
entry criteria are met, nonmembers can choose to join); (2) non-prohibitive (any member 
can unilaterally extend benefits to nonmembers); (3) selective liberalisation and open benefits 
(members can choose to liberalise on an MFN basis, sectors where they dominate world 
trade) and; (4) reduction in non-member barriers (collective lowering of trade restriction vis-à-
vis  the rest of the world).   
                                                 
12 The GATT was informed of 33 regional trading arrangements in the first half of the 1990s alone.  That 
constitutes a third of all regional agreements since 1948 (Frankel, 1997). 
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As mentioned earlier, endogenous protection theory expects that same conditions 
that will make RIA politically feasible will be the same conditions that will retard progress 
in global liberalisation. A dissenting view is given by Richardson (1993)  when he 
suggested that the initial trade diversion that could occur in the formation of a free trade 
area is precisely the stimulus that could create incentives for a country to further reduce 
external tariffs.  There are two key elements in his argument.  One is the likelihood of a 
steady decline in political influence as the declining industry is exposed to regional 
competition.  Second, the incidence of trade-shifting13, and the subsequent loss of tariff 
revenues by the high-cost partner, means that with the lower political costs of further 
liberalisation, it will be to a country’s interest to actually lower its external tariffs so as to 
recapture the tariff revenues from higher imports.  This begs the question of why an 
import-competing industry with foresight will not oppose the FTA in the first place.  
Richardson’s answer has the same tinge of mercantilism as Grossman and Helpman 
(1995):  for an FTA to be feasible, there must be enough sectors in country A, where 
exporters would gain from reduced tariffs in country B so as to outweigh the losses to 
importers from reduced tariffs against non-partner C.  Only in this way will the 
government’s political support function increase enough for it to enter an FTA.  Putting 
it differently, an FTA permits a ‘packaging’ of tariff reductions that, whilst harming some 
sectors, emerge as beneficial overall.  There remain a number of unresolved issues, 
however.  The line of reasoning persists that trade diversion, and hence, the opportunity 
to sell at higher prices in partner markets, drives the political feasibility of an FTA.  The 
expectation that diversion would eventually turn into trade creation will therefore weaken 
the ex-ante support for an FTA.  Richardson suggests that it is possible to incorporate an 
explicit channel by which industry groups in country B would participate in the internal 
political contest of country A so as to bloc its move to lower tariffs against C producers.  
However, interested industries from non-member countries could also join in the fray, 
and help off-set the efforts of partner lobbyists.  The outcome of such a political circus 
where a government must consider the weights of still a greater number of players, 
becomes even more ambiguous. 
                                                 
13 This reasoning is similar to Shibata’s (1971) trade-shifting, and Grossman and Helpman’s enhanced 
protection arguments. 
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Some nonetheless agree with Richardson that there remains no clear expectation for 
a trade-diverting FTA, because even with diversion, welfare may increase or decrease.  
Wonnacott (1996) for instance, argues that trade diversion triggers a process of trade 
liberalisation within the region with all the expected effects of more competition in a 
larger market.  It could very well be that country B will emerge as A’s lowest-cost 
supplier, as specialisation in B will cause reduction in technical inefficiencies, higher 
investments, economies of scale, and the like.   Wonnacott also points out that an 
expanding FTA could reverse previous diversion, as in the case of the unwinding of past 
diversion of US imports from Mexico to higher-cost Canada (due to the Canada-US 
FTA) with the inclusion of Mexico in a NAFTA.  Lastly, he cites the possibility that an 
FTA may lower the resistance to multilateral liberalisation because the exposure to intra-
regional competition makes members better prepared to confront world competition not 
only in its domestic but in the regional export markets as well. 
The view that any source of liberalisation is good is shared by a number of RIA 
proponents (Bergsten, 1996; Destler, 1995).  Wei and Frankel (1994) for instance, 
consider the hypothesis that the act of liberalisation (through an RIA) can help build and 
mobilise pro-liberalisation political constituencies.  Using the framework of the 
Fernandez-Rodrik status-quo bias, they show that under certain conditions, a 
government might be unable to garner a majority vote in favor of multilateral 
liberalisation, and yet might be capable of having regional liberalisation passed by 
majority vote.  The RIA when completed can then shift the economic incentives in such 
a way as to urge the majority to vote for further liberalisation. 
Here attention is once again shifted to the importance of the origins of the 
liberalisation motive of a government.  It could be more appropriate to state that while 
the incidence of trade diversion may have liberalising by-products, the actual practice of 
open regionalism may still have more to do with the underlying reasons why 
governments would want to reduce trade barriers. 
The idea that trade (creation or diversion) is not the principal driving force behind 
an RIA and open regionalism is formalized by Ethier (1998).  He assumes a reform-
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minded government with a concern for social welfare.14  The model considers the 
following sequence of events:  (a)  industrial countries (IC) undertake multilateral trade 
liberalisation; (b) lower tariffs makes the global economy more productive, hence, 
enhancing the less-developed countries’ (LDCs) chances of instituting successful 
reforms15;  (c)  LDCs compete for IC investments; and (d) LDCs enter into an RIA with 
an IC because by giving IC exports preference, they ensure that IC will invest in its 
partner developing country rather than the other.   The major role of regionalism is 
therefore to facilitate reform in the less-developed country, by stimulating investments. 
Ethier’s is a many-country, specific-factors model with N industries and M 
countries endowed with human capital (H), skilled labor (L) and unskilled labor (U).  
There are two stages of production,  a (more sophisticated process) and b  , to produce 
the final output x  =  f (ai , bi ), where ai  = Hi , and bi= kLbi  (Lbi is the amount of L  
allocated to stage b production).  That  k = k (ΣNi-1 Lbi), means that the increasing returns 
to scale is dependent on the size of L worldwide employed in producing bi.   
Let R denote the social welfare benefit of reform.  Then there is r* which is the 
minimum expected value that R must attain for government to give up autarky for 
reform.  Ethier depicted R (i.e. success of reform) as being determined by investments 
from the IC, that is, by both k and Lb . However, since direct investments will entail trade 
in b-stage products,   the level of trade barriers in the IC for such trade plays a decisive 
role.  A lower tariff in IC for b products, for instance, lowers the cost of obtaining a 
marginal unit of b through the establishment of a foreign subsidiary, relative to the cost 
of producing the same product at the IC. Unilateral liberalisation on the part of IC 
therefore encourages direct investments, which (due to higher k and Lb) in turn will 
induce more LDCs to reform.   
In a world where several LDCs decide to reform simultaneously, none can 
guarantee that they will actually get the foreign investments.  By forming an RIA with an 
IC, the partner LDC is differentiated from the rest and attracts IC investments, which 
ensures the success of its reforms.  The IC, on the other hand is assured that it will not 
                                                 
14 Ethier claims that governments would have no incentive to enter into multilateral trading arrangements, 
otherwise. 
15 Successful reform by the LDCs, in turn, will influence the international equilibrium, and provide new 
stimulus for liberalisation. 
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find itself facing a tariff (hence, higher production costs),  when it re-exports its b-stage 
product.  Regionalism, in this sense, serves as a mechanism for coordination by removing 
uncertainties on future behaviours of both the LDC and IC.  
There is clearly a compatible and even supportive relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism in this model.  In fact, it captures the virtuous cycle of 
increasing openness as  one step of liberalisation moves countries to a new international 
equilibrium that creates incentives for further trade barriers reduction.   
The notion of competitive liberalisation as described by Bergsten (1995) runs on a 
similar vein.  In a race to win foreign capital, RIA members will seek to dismantle trade 
barriers faster than the  other.  In the event that an RIA is formed by small countries in 
order to differentiate and make themselves more attractive as investment sites, the fact 
that the investing developed country is outside the regional scheme makes the imperative 
even stronger to simultaneously lower nonpreferential tariffs as well.  Moreover, 
competitive liberalisation can have demonstration effects that could lessen the 
uncertainty which accompanies any reform.  Liberalisation is said to be made easier in a 
country which is part of a group with other liberalising economies, because each can 
observe its neighbours’ prosperity (Drysdale & Garnaut, 1993).16 
Empirically, the nature of the relationship between RIAs and global liberalisation is 
not definitive.  It does show, however, that at least for some regions, trade barriers 
against nonparticipating countries, and hence, the scope for trade diversion, has gone 
down throughout the years.  Wei and Frankel (1995), referring to the bilateral trade data 
during 1970 - 92, pointed out that there were regions that while exhibiting an inward 
bias, nonetheless conformed with the notion of open regionalism.    In a gravity panel 
regression with dummies representing intra-regional groups (explicit and implicitly 
formed), they found that both Western Europe and East Asia groups were “open” in the 
sense that their trade was in general higher than what one would have expected from 
their economic, geographic and cultural characteristics.  East Asia, for example, despite a 
very high intra-regional bias, tended to trade 100% more with a country outside the 
region than two random countries both outside East Asia. Upon further division of East 
Asia into ASEAN countries and others, both show highly significant openness.  When 
                                                 
16 The authors call this the “prisoners’ delight.” 
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Western Europe is classified into the EC countries and others (i.e., the former EFTA), it 
is the EC countries that display positive openness. In contrast, there were signs of trade 
diversion for both the Western Hemisphere and APEC countries. Over the same period, 
their respective outsider trade was 8% and 25% less than what is expected based on their 
economic and geographic characteristics.    Overall, the estimates of openness (see table 
2.3) do show that the greater intra-regional trade was not necessarily at the expense of 
countries outside the region.  At the same time that countries have opened with respect 
to their neighbours,  the level of openness (i.e. Netherlands, United Kingdom, Belgium, 
Singapore, Chile, United States [adjusting for population and GDP per capita]), and the 
increase in openness (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Thailand) that was observed in RIA-member countries remained significant. 
 
2.5    Conclusions 
In the extreme scenario that national political leaders are totally captured by vested 
interests, any channel for liberalisation, whether regional or global, will be blocked.  Such 
assumption of capture pervades a large part of endogenous protection literature and 
brings the focus of analysis to the profit motives of producer groups.  Government is 
therefore seen as a ‘notional’ decision-maker or an arbiter who takes the results of the 
political contest as given.  The primacy of the import-competing producer may be 
tempered whenever the government’s mercantilists motives confer exporting producers 
increased political weight as well.  Hence, in the event that an RIA is exogenously 
proposed, either for security, or political reasons, the institutional rules and post-RIA 
tariffs will be set so as to promote export interests with the least possible harm to locally-
oriented producers.  Trade diversion is an inevitable consequence of RIA formation. 
The history of economic cooperation among neighbouring countries does provide a 
number of examples to support such rather sombre view on regional integration.  
Exclusions of sensitive sectors, particularly in agriculture and textiles & clothing, long 
transition periods, the resort to non-tariff measures and other technical barriers, etc., all 
work to preserve the protection enjoyed by domestic producers.   Moreover, the strategic 
exchange of preferences, industrial complementation schemes, and even the design of 
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rules of origin that favour regional input suppliers, only further demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of the trade-diversion motive in regional arrangements.  
Progress in regional integration in more recent years, however, also show episodes 
where a marked shift in policy towards openness is evident.  The scope of product 
exclusions have significantly narrowed down, especially in manufacturing goods, and 
while tariff peaks and other non-trade protective measures persist, the overall trend 
towards liberalisation, even in the realm of MFN tariffs, is difficult to ignore.  Moreover, 
there exist empirical evidence favouring the conclusion that what characterizes the recent 
surge of preferential trading agreements is in fact, trade-creation, and not trade-diverting 
results.   
‘New regionalism’ as Ethier (1998) calls it, is largely driven by scale economies and 
foreign direct investments motives,  which render a purely Vinerian approach inadequate 
in explaining the dynamics of RIAs today.  However, in endogenous protection models 
on regionalism, trade creation and trade diversion are still the main channels through 
which an RIA could affect the size and distribution of incomes.  Hence, they remain the 
principal determinants of the political strategies chosen by firms and governments alike. 
To further our understanding of current RIA initiatives, what seems to be needed is 
an analytical approach that takes into account the role of agglomeration and scale 
economies (which are perceived to be driven by FDIs) on the political feasibility and 
sustainability of RIAs. As a first step, the effects of market size and variable returns to 
scale on the political costs and benefits of protection must be better scrutinized.  From 
the literature on variable returns to scale, it is evident that the expected welfare effects of 
trade policy differ depending on the assumptions made about the kinds of goods 
(intermediates or final); market structure; source and scope of externalities; and initial 
market size.  The preferences of political actors over trade policy would thus vary 
accordingly as well.  Import-competing interests, for instance, are not always necessarily 
served by rising protection,  nor is free trade always the optimal policy that promotes 
overall efficiency and welfare.  The latter implies that circumstances exist wherein 
increasing the supply of protection do not inescapably lead to increasing political costs 
on the part of governments.  Moreover, since trade policy can potentially lead an 
economy to move from a low to a high-growth equilibrium and vice-versa, the politically 
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optimal level of protection can be expected to change as patterns of trade and 
production correspondingly shift. 
Once scale economies and agglomeration are taken into account, then market size 
no longer becomes a marginal element in the analysis.  In current literature, the 
importance of size is merely conditional on the amount of lobbying or its implication on 
the voting power of an industry.  In an increasing-returns-to-scale framework, market 
size assumes a pivotal role as it determines the strength of scale effects  and the 
effectiveness of trade policy in effecting a break-point that could potentially cause the 
economy to leap towards a more superior equilibrium.  
In this context, formation of a bigger regional market by neighbouring countries 
through an RIA could be seen as an effort to enhance the growth effects brought on by 
larger scale of production.  Since the entry of foreign firms could introduce the desired 
agglomeration effects of increased manufacturing output, the decision to create a free 
trade area could also be seen as a strategic move to affect the locational decision of 
foreign firms.  Coordination among countries intensely competing for FDIs possibly 
leads to higher pay-offs as compared to a non-cooperative outcome.   In so far as 
expectations also determine the equilibrium position of an economy with scale 
economies, then forming a RIA is likewise a probable means to reduce whatever 
uncertainties foreign and local producers might have.   On the one hand, entry in a RIA 
acts as a signal that the necessary economic conditions exist to induce efficiency and 
competitiveness in firms.  And on the other hand, a bigger market increases the 
likelihood that a critical mass of manufacturing activity could develop in the region, 
thereby bolstering the confidence of foreign and local investors alike. 
While liberalisation may imply significant political costs, the costs of being left in the 
periphery may be perceived to be more substantial.  Moreover, since the benefits of 
agglomeration and scale economies cumulate through time, this means that the 
productivity differences between the core and peripheral countries likewise increase.  
Maintaining status quo protection thus entails greater lobbying expenditures, and it is 
conceivable that a critical point is reached wherein the costs overtake  the benefits of 
higher protection.  This is one probable driving force behind the fall in the tariff 
equilibrium in political markets observed in the last two to three decades. 
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One interesting question is what consequences can be expected in the RIA when 
agglomeration does not take place, or when expectations are not met regarding the 
integration of markets.   Intuition would suggest that a total collapse of partnerships 
would occur, since political costs were incurred without the corresponding benefits.  
However, we observed other responses as well, such as the seeking of alternative 
partners, as what is observed in ASEAN in recent years.    This is the bicycle theory of 
regionalism, which states that countries continuously seek the momentum for 
liberalisation or regionalism since a still-stand would inevitably lead to failure.  This turns 
the standard tenet of endogenous protection on its head, as this would suggest that while 
protection may be the politically rational choice, countries opt instead for freer trade.  
This is as good reminder as ever that a general endogenous protection theory is yet to be  
formulated, and the same is true for a general customs union theory, even half a century 
after Viner’s (1950) seminal work. 
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Appendix  2.1 
 
A simple but fully-specified model (i.e., describes both the supply and demand side of 
protection) is provided by the median-voter approach pioneered by Wolfgang Mayer 
(1984).  It is the simplest model of trade policy determination where citizens in a 
referendum directly vote on the level of  tariffs.  Given single-peaked preferences, the 
resulting protection rate is the one picked by the median voter. Using the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, it shows that trade policy is determined by the relationship between the 
country's aggregate endowment ratio and the factor endowment of the median voter.   
Assume a small economy producing two goods, X and Y, with individuals 
sharing identical, homothetic preferences.17 Every individual is endowed with the same 
fraction of labor, jil  , and a varied fraction of capital, jiγ . Both factors are infinitely 
divisible and perfectly mobile between the two sectors and tariff revenues are distributed 
by the government in a lump-sum fashion.  It is further assumed that imports are 
relatively more capital-intensive than exports. 
With preferences assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, an expenditure function can be specified 
in the usual form: ]min[),( XPYuPe ii += ; for ),( XYuu = .  Revenue functions can also 
be defined in terms of prices, Pi , tariffs, t, and factor endowments, so that 
Ψ : XPYtP ii +=Ψ max[),,(ς (Y, X, Ψ ) feasible]. Setting world prices equal to one, 
economy-wide equilibrium can thus be summarized by: 
(1) )(),,(),( tItPuPe ii +Ψ= ς ; 
where I , represent imports and defined as:  pp reI −=  .   Aggregate income is then just 
the sum of real wages, ωω 1~ −= ue , real capital returns, rer u
1
~
−
= , and total government 
revenues, )(~ 1 IteG u−= .  
Let the indirect utility function of each individual j be expressed as 
(2) rnGrnv ji
j
i
j
~)(]~~~[),( 11 −− −+++= γωγτ ; 
where τi is one plus the tariff rate t,  and ( )rnji ~1−−γ refer to the extra share of rent 
earned, which corresponds to the individual's extra ownership share of total capital stock. 
                                                 
17 The formulation of models here is based on chapter 4 of this book. 
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In a direct democracy model,  voter j chooses τi that maximizes vj, that is, by 
differentiating equation (2) with respect to tariffs and setting it to zero, equilibrium tariffs 
are derived:                        
(3) ( )
( )tI
X
t
m
im
i ∂∂
−
−=
1γ
. 
                                                                                         
Under the political structure assumed by Magee, Brock and Young, trade policy is 
determined by the strategic interaction of  pressure groups in their choice of contribution 
spending and the electoral competition between parties.   A two-stage game is depicted 
wherein parties first choose the policies which maximize the probability of their being 
elected, followed by the response of pressure groups in the form of financial support for 
the campaign of the party whose electoral platform carry the desired policy of the 
lobbies.    
The model is set in a modified Heckscher-Ohlin world of 2 factors and 2 goods, 
capital-extensive X   and labor-intensive Y.   There are two competing political parties 
waging an electoral campaign and two lobby groups offering financial support in order to 
influence the electoral victory of their favoured parties.  While lobbies are divided by 
factor ownership (i.e., capitalist and labor lobby), political parties are distinguished by 
their trade policy orientation (pro-trade and pro-protection).  The probability of winning, 
q, rises with the amount of campaign resources, LK ,$  at a party’s disposal, and falls with 
the amount of overall distortions the public expects from its policy interventions, given 
by the level of BA,τ .  The problem faced by parties is therefore to choose BA,τ , that 
maximizes ),,,$($ BALKqq ττ= .   
Interest group lobbies, on the other hand, have to decide on the level of 
campaign contributions that maximize their expected incomes net of these financial 
contributions.   Formally, the optimal $ level is the attained Nash equilibrium of a non-
cooperative game played by lobbies, and is derived by solving: 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] KBKBALKAKBALK
C
WqWq
K
$,,,$$1,,,$$max −−+ ττττττ , 
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where  )( AKW τ  is the benefit function of lobby K when τ A prevails.  A reduced 
probability function, ( )BAq ττ ,  is then derived by substituting the solution above to q 
(⋅).  Each party then chooses  a trade policy in order to maximize their probability of 
winning, i.e., party A   chooses τ A to maximize ( )BAq ττ ,   while party B chooses τ B to 
maximize ( )BAq ττ ,)1( − . 
Parties, by pre-announcing their platform and policy intervention assume the 
Stackelberg leadership.  The lobbies subsequently move in a two-stage sub-game perfect 
equilibrium.  The outcome of the Nash game played by the political parties produces the 
equilibrium tariff rates.  
In the political support function approach largely attributed to Hillman (1989), 
Government is a distinct part of the bargaining process, and hence, the preferences of 
politicians are explicitly described.  While policymakers are still influenced by lobbying, 
they likewise weigh the profit gains of particular industries against the efficiency losses 
borne by society as a result of protection.  Political support therefore rises with profits, 
but fall with the upsurge in deadweight losses. 
The policymaker’s welfare function is expressed by Hillman as follows: 
(5) ( ) ( )( )** , iiiiiii ppppPW −Π−Π= , 
where p stands for the relative price and Π (p) for the lobby’s profit function.  Political 
support is increasing in the first argument, representing protection-induced profit gain, 
and declines with the second.  Government must therefore choose a tariff level that 
maximizes its aggregate support. 
The summation of individual welfare functions over the entire population gives the 
aggregate welfare function, which can be expressed in a similar fashion as in (2): 
(6) GrV ~~~)( ++= ωτ . 
The political support function of the government described above can then be 
expressed as:  
 
(7) [ ]))1(~)1(~)1(~())(~)(~)(~()]1(~)(~[1)( GrGrrr
a
V iiii
pi
++−+++−= ωτττωττ ; 
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with pia  representing the weight government attaches to overall welfare, or the marginal 
rate of substitution between aggregate welfare and industry profits.  The optimising 
behaviour of the government leads to a tariff rate that maximises its political support, 
that is,  
(8) 
( )tI
X
a
t
pi
i ∂∂
−=
1
. 
In the electoral competition approach put forward by Magee, Brock and Young, 
contributions are committed by the groups after parties have made their policy stance 
known.  Financial transfers are therefore used to increase the election chance of the 
parties of their choice.  In the political contributions approach, financial contributions 
are meant to directly influence the policy choice of an incumbent government, or to 
acquire some influence over policies once the sponsored party wins.  Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) model lobby groups as announcing their contribution commitment 
before the decision on policy is made, but paying only after the policy is actually chosen. 
In this game, the lobbies move first by presenting the incumbent with a donation 
contract of contribution schedules that state the level of donation for each possible 
policy stance taken.  Lobbies aim to maximise their member's net welfare which can be 
expressed as: 
 
(9) [ ] iiiiiii rGrV $)(~)1()(~)(~~~ −−++++= τφττωφω ; 
i$ , being the contribution of lobby i to the electoral campaign funds.  In the welfare 
function, iφ is the fraction of the population who own the sector-specific input, so that 
the second term in (9) represents their share in tariff revenues and consumer surplus.  
The lobby group's selection of $i is made in anticipation of the policy stance of the 
government, and after having taken the contribution schedules of other lobbies as given. 
The incumbent in turn, take these contributions as given and proceeds to maximise 
its welfare which is linear in campaign donations and welfare:   
 
(10) [ ])(~)(~~$ ττω GraV G +++= ; 
where a is again the weight placed on the welfare of voters or consumers relative to 
campaign contributions.  
  49 
The lobby group's selection of $i is made in anticipation of the policy stance of the 
government, and having taken the contribution schedules of other lobbies as given.  This 
implies that it must offer a contribution function that provides the right level of  
incentive for  government to implement τ, and at the same time take into account that 
other lobbies have also contributed to gain some policy influence.  It must therefore 
offer a contribution schedule such that: 
(11) ( ) ( )[ ]))(~)(~~($$ ττωττ GraV iGii +++−≥ ∑− ; 
In turn, the trade policy that maximises the lobby's welfare function is: 
(12) ∈iτ arg max [ ]∑ ++++ ))(~)(~~()($)( ττωττ GraV ii ; 
The model then considers all the contribution schedules that are differentiable 
around the equilibrium, and restrict that equilibrium to the form specified by the 
Berheim and Whinston (1986) notion of a "truthful Nash Equilibria".18   The equilibrium 
tariffs therefore take the following form: 
(13) 
( )( )tI
X
a
t
i
i
i ∂∂−+
−
=
α
α1
. 
In this formulation, protection is increasing in the level of organisation of a sector, the 
amount of sectoral output relative to imports, and decreasing in the ownership of the 
sector-specific input and in the price elasticity of the corresponding trade flow. 
 
                                                 
18  The adjective "truthful" comes from the fact that in the principle-agent set up, these contracts imply that 
the principles pay the agent her full marginal product minus some fixed amount.  This means that the 
incentives of the agent to change her behaviour on the margin truthfully reflect the worth of such changes 
to the principles.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
Agglomeration and Endogenous Protection∗ 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  We analyze general equilibrium relationships between trade policy and the 
structure of production in the presence of agglomeration effects, also known as industry-
wide scale effects.  Scale economies at the sector level imply multiple equilibria in the real 
markets for factors of production and goods.  This in turn implies a potential multiple 
political equilibria as well.  In both median voter and lobbying models, this leads to 
linkages between concentration of asset ownership, the dynamics of shifting production 
patterns as an economy industrializes, and the potential for low-level development traps 
anchored both economically and politically. 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The shortcomings of import-substitution and heavy government industrial intervention 
have all been well documented, and as development strategies, they have long fallen into 
disgrace.  Nonetheless, the attraction of pursuing some form of industrial policy, of 
'targeting' certain industries, or of creating 'national champions'  persists even today, and 
not only among the developing world, but also among  industrial giants such as France 
and Germany. The means certainly differ from those employed 50 years ago, but the 
basic notion that some production activities are more conducive to growth than others, 
and that governments may have a role to play in steering comparative advantage towards 
these sectors, still manage to inspire a good number of policy architects.  
From a political economy perspective, the inclination to intervene and/or protect 
key industries then and now is largely attributed to the politicians' pursuit of self-interest, 
                                                 
∗ This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by J.F. Francois. 
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making them particularly vulnerable to lobbying pressures.   Government intervention is, 
in fact, seen as anti-growth, so that the creation of an industrial policy, often packaged to 
the public as a means to pursue higher national ambitions, actually serves to cloak 
government's real intent to extract rents.  The same cynical view greets the politician's 
attempts to justify protection as a means to expand markets, increase productivity and 
improve overall economic performance.  In the constant-returns-to-scale world of 
standard endogenous protection models, the marginal rise in profits is, after all, neutral to 
any change in industry size. 
It is well known, however, that once the role of scale economies is acknowledged, 
the government’s propensity to intervene can no longer be interpreted solely in rent-
seeking terms.   At the competitive equilibrium, prices are known to exceed the private 
valuation of marginal costs resulting to the underproduction of the increasing-returns-to-
scale (IRS) good.  At constant terms-of-trade, any stimulus that pushes up production 
therefore improves overall welfare, prompting the view that an activist government 
policy may have a useful and beneficial role.  Moreover, nonconvexities in production 
technology that typically accompany IRS output imply the presence of multiple equilibria 
that have very clear welfare ranking. In such a context, the popular practice of 
governments to pick industrial winners or 'jump-start' the economy could at least be 
theoretically seen as being consistent with overall national interest.   
More often than not, however, the policy prescriptions associated with the IRS 
literature, eventually turn back towards the old and trusted road of free trade.  The 
notion of a benevolent, Bergsonian-social-welfare maximising government is after all, a 
figment of the theorist's imagination, and the prospect of government failure is seen as a 
far greater menace than the market failures which policies claim to address.  The 
informational requirements for effective intervention are also often out of the 
policymaker's reach, while lobbyists are only too eager to supply the data beneficial to 
their specific causes.  Even if one assumes away the infirmities of government, the 
constraints of small and weak domestic markets might preclude less developed 
economies from taking off via interventionist industrial regimes, while 'de-industrialise-
your-neighbour' policies might lead larger countries towards a zero-sum game of pure 
conflict.  Still more importantly, the virtue of intervention hinges on a host of variables, 
in particular, on the source and scope of externalities.  It is amply known that the merits 
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of industrial policy and protection of IRS sectors only apply whenever the benefits of 
expansion can be contained within national boundaries (Francois, 1992).  As these 
sectors integrate into global production and scale economies become international in 
scope, the optimal policy, especially for small or developing countries, is free trade and 
zero subsidies. 
Despite such warnings, industrial policies remain established in many governments' 
menu of priorities.  For developing countries, in particular, the historical examples of the 
Asian tigers who have industrialised through the unorthodox mix of  export subsidies, 
directed credit and selective protection, fuel even greater ambitions for growth, while the 
prospect of  getting stuck in a low-equilibrium trap makes a laissez-faire approach 
unattractive.  Rodrik (2001) also points to the historical fact that most of today's rich 
states who now maintain low levels of protection, attained their industrial ascendancy 
behind tariff fortresses.  On the other hand, global integration is likewise seen as a 
channel to enlarge markets and 'leap' over several stages of industrial development.  As 
earlier mentioned, whenever externalities are international of origin, the opportunity 
costs of adhering to a low-yield nationalist growth path magnifies the standard costs of 
protection associated with mere deadweight losses.   
These competing visions and strategies reflect the complexities surrounding the 
joint themes of industrial growth, economies of scale and policy-making.  The impact of 
policies on welfare in the presence of scale economies depend on a host of variables: 
such as the nature of the products: final or intermediate; on the scope of externalities:  
national or international; or whether intermediates are traded or not. The policy 
formation process, in turn, accommodates goals other than those assumed in standard 
trade theory, and give rise to policy sets that are influenced by the preferences of key 
private political actors.   Clearly, the dynamics of the product and political market 
interact. Analytically, however, they are often studied in isolation of the other.  For 
instance, the aim to improve productivity by enlarging markets regularly features in 
popular debates on trade policy, yet in standard political economy literature, scale 
economies play no role in the determination of government choice.   Studies on IRS 
production and the welfare effects of  policy instruments, on the other hand, rarely pose 
the issue of whether such policies would be politically feasible to begin with. 
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The present chapter argues that some added value might be generated by 
investigating the political economy underpinnings of industrial and trade policies in the 
context of increasing returns to scale. Of particular interest is the manner in which 
multiple equilibria in  IRS goods production impact on the political market, and how the 
political equilibrium in turn, constrains the real sector. Understanding such interaction 
then enables one to examine some of the aspects of the role of politics in the process of 
industrial transition. We know for instance that scale economies magnify the income 
effects of price changes in standard models, and hence can be expected to push up the 
level of equilibrium tariffs.  But whether protection pushes the country over the 
threshold of agglomeration or not, may depend on the relative strength of the forces of 
demand and supply in the political market. This line of reasoning seems to suggest that 
the nature of political interactions may alter the growth trajectory of an economy, so that 
an understanding of such process could provide additional information as to how a 
certain equilibrium is selected in the presence of multiplicity. 
One of the key arguments in the literature against interventionist policies even when 
scale economies would justify it, is the ominous presence of private sector lobbying.  The 
implicit assumption is that (import-competing) producer interests are most likely to run 
counter to that of the general public, so that their influence on government policy could 
not possibly be anything but detrimental to overall efficiency.  But even if there exists a 
case for protection in welfare terms, lobbying can still shield and/or deviate scarce 
resources to the wrong  (non-IRS) industries.  However, one immediate effect of scale 
economies on lobbying behaviour, especially in the early stages of manufacturing growth, 
is to increase the capacity and incentives to expend resources in influencing policy.  It is 
thus conceivable that lobbying helps signal government attention towards the sectors 
where IRS are strongest, so that once again, a virtuous form of lobbying can be 
envisioned, at least in theory.    
Needless to say, taking into account the multifaceted and complex process of both 
industrialisation and policymaking is a difficult task.  The ambitions of this paper are 
therefore modest, and its scope is initially limited to the national external economy 
formulation and final goods-only trade. It addresses the above issues by combining a 
standard model of specific factors under IRS, with modified versions of the political 
economy models of Mayer (1982) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). A brief survey of 
  54 
the effects of trade policies on welfare under variable returns to scale is given in the 
following section, to be followed by an illustration of an IRS   production model in 
section three. The endogenous protection models with externalities are set out in section 
four, while section five discusses the implications of politics on the production structure 
and vice-versa. The last section provides a summary of results and concludes. 
 
3.2 Economies of scale, trade policies, welfare and endogenous 
protection 
 
In the presence of scale economies, the welfare and efficiency gains due to commercial 
policies are associated with the expansion of the production of the IRS sector.  Even in 
autarky, some form of direct subsidies may be called for to close the gap between the 
private and social valuation of marginal product, enabling the country to realize the 
pareto-optimal level of output.  Once markets are opened to trade, however, further 
intervention may be needed to address the scale and price advantage of the trading 
partner, if the contraction of the IRS sector is to be prevented.  Under national IRS, 
Panagariya (1981) argues that particularly for small countries, welfare maximization 
entails a permanent production-tax subsidy scheme.  The intervention required is greater, 
the more capital abundant the partner relative to the home country. But even if capital-
labor endowment ratios are similar, a smaller scale of production imply higher (lower) 
costs of manufacturing the IRS (DRS) good, so that subsidies also need to correspond to 
the size differential between the trading countries.  As for the large country, Eaton & 
Panagariya (1979) stress that since the negative price-output response is likely to be a 
stable equilibrium, such adverse supply behaviour must be taken into account in 
evaluating the welfare impact of any price policy.   It is conceivable, however, for terms-
of-trade gains to exceed the cost of inefficiency, so that countries large enough to 
influence world prices could still see their welfare improve despite the contraction of the 
IRS industry. 
Ethier (1979, 1982) asserts the view that scale economies generated by international 
specialisation are particularly significant in a world where trade in producers' good 
dominate and where the ease in transport and communications over the years have 
further facilitated the globalization of production.  Once externalities become 
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international in origin, the relevant point of reference is no longer the size of the 
domestic market but the scale of IRS production worldwide. This implies, for instance, 
that the smallness of a country is no longer as vital in determining the welfare 
consequences of openness and trade policies.  Francois (1992) illustrates that contrary to 
the conclusions reached under national IRS, small countries gain nothing in subsidizing 
the productive sector, as benefits merely spill-over to other foreign producers.  
Protection, on the other hand, obstructs the integration of local producers to higher-yield 
production processes abroad, and therefore reduces efficiency.  For large countries, the 
optimal amount of intervention would depend on the balance between the benefits of 
expansion and the possible adverse terms-of-trade effects.     
The presence of multiplicity implies that welfare effects must be gauged not only on 
efficiency grounds, but on the basis of growth as well.  As Markusen (1990) points out, 
the optimal government intervention is dependent on which point of the production 
frontier a country may find itself in.  While traditional Pigouvian taxes and subsidies may 
be appropriate in the neighbourhood of high level equilibrium, a more dramatic 'big 
push' undertaking may be needed to propel the economy towards industrialization.  
Matsuyama (1991) considers an economy's dynamic process of adjustment over real time 
and examines the role of history and expectations, on one hand, and the policy 
implications of being in a high or low manufacturing growth path.  With low initial 
industry employment and weak scale economies, history is the driving force, and without 
government intervention the economy is trapped in a zero level stationary state of 
industrialization. If the initial level of manufacturing activity is sufficiently large, however, 
then expectations play a vital role, and intervention should then be centered on the 
coordination of agents' expectations.  The problem when the initial employment is small 
but scale economies are strong, is essentially that of coordination failure, so that the 
promotion of confidence and animal spirits is more crucial than any government 
subsidies or heavy intervention.  
As earlier mentioned, politics, too may affect the set of equilibria, such that one 
could speak of either creating a politically desirable equilibrium or deleting one that is 
seen as being politically unacceptable. Clearly, the existing political economy literature, 
being CRS-based, can offer very little guidance in this regard. Another obstacle pertains 
to Rodrik's (1996) critique about the assumption of myopic behavior on the part of 
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political players implicit in many political economy models. That is, firms and 
policymakers often fail to take the effects of inefficient policies on long-run profits and 
re-election chances.  A consistent application of these models to an IRS case would 
imply that agents act locally, thereby reducing or eliminating the ability of politics to 
'choose'   the pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
In a recent paper by Baldwin, et al (2003), the political economy of protection in an 
IRS economic geography model is highlighted.  They show how costless and free foreign 
entry can eliminate the incentive of domestic firms to lobby for protection since capital 
incomes are driven down to pre-protection levels.  Their results suggest that special 
interests at home, resources permitting, do have the incentive to lobby for entry 
restrictions and increase in protection, as this combination will always raise real capital 
rewards.  However, they take productivity levels constant and as a result, the expansion 
of domestic output due to foreign entry does not lead to a shift towards a higher 
production equilibria and thus, higher profits for all.  Once again, the presence of 
externalities is not fully accommodated in the private assessment of benefits, and hence 
plays no significant role in policy determination.  
The present paper is thus an attempt to examine how variable scale returns alter the 
standard results of endogenous protection models, and how politics in turn, impact on 
the pace and nature of industrial agglomeration.  The succeeding section takes the initial 
step of portraying a basic two sectors specific factors model with scale economies, similar 
to the autarky versions of Ethier (1982) and Francois (1992). By fixing the income effects 
of price changes, the IRS repercussions can then be instilled in the structure of 
preference of political actors. 
 
3.3   Production 
Consider an internationally small economy, with three factors of production, mobile 
labour, L and two types of capital, Kb and Ky, each specific to the two sectors, 
manufactures and agriculture, respectively.  Agriculture produces a homogenous 
commodity, Y, under perfectly competitive conditions and using constant-returns-to-
scale technology.  Manufactures, M, is likewise homogeneous and uses CRS technology, 
but is produced using specialised inputs, x. These intermediates are in turn manufactured 
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using composite factor services; the employment of which gives rise to increasing returns 
to scale, thus making the intermediates sector monopolistically competitive.   
  Let intermediates be costlessly assembled to produce the final manufacturing 
output, M, through a CES production function: 
(1)  
ρρ
1






= ∑
n
i
ixM  
where ρ  measures the extent of product differentiation, that is, σρ 11−= ; 
10 << ρ ; with σ, being the elasticity of substitution among different varieties.  As shown 
in appendix 1, symmetry across the intermediates, xi (demand consists of parameters and 
constant across firms), linear relationship between number of varieties, n and the 
intermediate composite bundle, B, and letting  ρα 1= , permit (1) to be reduced to : 
(1)'  αBM = . 
The productivity of specialisation is now indicated by α , that is, the greater is 
product differentiation (lower values of ρ  and σ) , the stronger are the gains of division 
of labour.   
Letting the production of B likewise take the CES form, the price of bundles is 
determined by factor prices, that is, )(ωfPB = , where f(ω) is just the unit price of the 
resource composite, and ω is the vector of factor incomes. Thus, the relative supply price 
of the final manufactures, M, in terms of the numeraire, Y, is,  BPMP BM =  , and using 
(1') , this can be alternatively stated as: 
(2)  α−= 1BPP BM . 
The supply price of M  is expressed by equation (3) as a function of B, so that an 
increase in the employment of the composite factor leads to a rise in the final M price.  
However, a so-called scale effect is also introduced since greater specialisation in the 
production of intermediates brings about reduction in costs.  
The impact of scale economies on factor incomes and voters’ welfare can be gauged 
by first deriving the equilibrium in the goods sector.  As earlier said, intermediate bundle, 
B,  is produced according to a CES production function: 
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(3) ( )( ) bbb bbbbB KgLgAB ρρρ 11−+= . 
The production of the numeraire good, Y, can be similarly expressed: 
(4) ( )( ) yyy YyYyY KgLgAY ρρρ 11−= . 
Setting TPP MM
*
= , where *MP the foreign price of manufactures and T is equal to 
one plus the tariff rate, t, and using equation (2), the price of bundles can be written as: 
(5) 1* −= αTBPP Mb . 
Substitution of eqn. (3) into (5) and using the equilibrium conditions for 
competitive markets, bb PMPLw = , bb PMPKr = , one can derive the equilibrium factor 
incomes in terms of inputs and tariffs: 
(6)  ( )( ) ( ) TPLgKgLgAw Mbbbbbbbb bb bbb *11111 σσ σαρρα −−−+−+= ;  
(7) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) TPKgKgLgAr Mbbbbbbbb bb bbb *1111 11 σσ σαρρα −−−+ −−+= . 
Agricultural wages and capital incomes can be derived in a similar fashion: 
(8) ( )( ) yyyyyyyyy PLgKgLgAw yyyy σσρρ 1111 −−−+= ; 
(9) ( )( ) ( ) yyyyyyyyy PKgKgLgAr yyyy σσρρ 111 11 −− −−+= . 
Figure 1 illustrates, along the lines of Mussa (1974), the determination of optimal 
labour allocation between sectors given the value of the marginal product of labour 
(VMPL) in B and Y (defined by eqn. 6 and 8, respectively), with wages being measured in 
terms of the numeraire good, Y.  As expected, the introduction of scale economies 
results in nonconvexities and spillovers which give rise to multiple equilibria.  Closer 
examination of the slope of the VMPL curve for bundles reveal the competing forces 
that account for the three equilibrium, 1L , 2L , 3L , observed  in figure 1: 
(10) 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 

















 −+
+






−+−
=
−
−
+−
−
−+
2
1
1
1
11
*
11
11
α
σ
ασ
σ
σ
σ
σα
ρρ
α
σ
σα
σ
bb
b
b
bbbbbb
b
Mb
b
b
Lg
LgKgLg
TPA
dL
dw
b
b
b
b
b
b
bb
. 
  59 
The region to the left of L1, region I, displays the expected inverse relationship 
between the marginal productivity of labour and the labour-capital ratio.  This is 
mirrored by the negative term in the RHS of eqn. 10,  the so-called ‘factor-intensity 
effect’, or the ‘intersectoral effect’ as referred to by Ethier (1982).  In region II, however, 
the positive second term which captures the ‘scale effect’ begins to dominate.19  In a 
small country setting, 1L  and 3L  are stable equilibria. 
Vb , w
Ob
L1
L2
L3
Vb
Vy
Vy , w
Lb
Oy
Figure 1
 
As far as return to capital, r, is concerned, any increase in labour employed in 
bundle production, or the reduction in the capital-labour ratio can only lead to a hike in 
rb, with the slope of VMPK further  rising with the strength of scale economies.   
With L1 as the starting point, consider now the effect of tariffs on overall welfare.  
The ambiguous effect of a price rise on real incomes is well known:  real wage rises in 
terms of Y and falls in terms of B,  but changes in welfare change depends on the 
composition of the individual’s consumption basket; in contrast, rental income rise for 
                                                 
19 This scale effect may eventually be so strong, i.e. 2≥α , that the slope of Vb exceeds that of Vy, in which 
case, a negative price-output relationship arises.  Thus  region III is reached, and lower prices lead to 
greater output and thus, higher wages. 
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Kb, but fall for Ky.   Departing from the other stable equilibrium L3, however, wage rises 
proportionately more than the rise in Pb, so that tariffs augment wages in both sectors. 
 
3.4 Political economy of protection 
 
Consumption & Individual preferences 
We turn now to the structure of the political market, keeping the assumption of a small 
economy, with individuals sharing identical, homothetic preferences. Every individual is 
endowed with the same fraction of labor, jil  , and a varied fraction, jiγ , of capital, ki . 
Labor is perfectly mobile while capital is sector-specific.  Tariff revenues are equally 
redistributed by government in a lump-sum fashion. 
With preferences assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, an expenditure function can be 
specified of the form: ( ) ( )[ ]iiiii rklXPYuPe ~~min),( +−+= ω ; for ),( XYuu = .  
Similarly, revenue functions can also be defined in terms of Pi , and factor endowments, 
Ψ , so that: XPYTP ii +=Ψ max[),,(ς (Y, X, Ψ ) feasible]. 
The small-country faces exogenously given world prices which are then set to one, 
so that equilibrium can be summarized by: 
(11)   )1(),,(),( −+Ψ= TITPuPe ii ς ; 
where I , represent imports and defined as:  pp reI −=  , and T, stands for tariffs. 
Total income in the economy is therefore the sum of real wages, ωω 1~ −= ue , real 
capital returns, rer u
1
~
−
= , and total government revenues, )(~ 1 IteG u−= .  
In a direct democracy model,  the optimum tariff is entirely determined by the median 
voter’s preferences, which can be represented by an indirect utility function specified in 
the form of: 
(12)   21),( Ζ+Ζ=jij Tv γ , 
where ]~~~[11 Grn ++=Ζ − ω ; and ( ) rnji ~12 −−=Ζ γ , which refers to the extra share 
of rent earned, corresponding to the individual's extra ownership share of total capital 
stock.    As in Mayer (1984), changes in welfare occur through shifts in the value of 
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imports and the capital income share of the specific factor, over and above the average 
ownership. In equilibrium, the marginal cost of protection to the median-voter, in terms 
of dead-weight losses, should just be compensated by the marginal benefits in terms of 
any rise in income. That is, 21 tt ZZ = , where 
 (13)  ( )IdtPZ mt )(1 −= ; and  
(14) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]
b
b
t
mbit k
tBBB
PgZ ρ
α αγ
−Γ
++
−−= 1
2 11/11 ;  
with ( )( )bb bbbb KgLg ρρ −+=Γ 1 . 
Solving for t, the level of optimal protection is derived: 
(15)   
( )( ) ( )[ ]
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1 . 
As expected, tariffs rise with the median voter’s ownership share of the specific 
factor, the capital intensity of, and the degree of scale economies realized in B 
production.  On the other hand, tariffs are dampened by level of imports, the elasticity of 
import demand, the level of capital stock and the extent of scale economies. Note that in 
the absence of scale economies, that is, 1=α , equation (14) is simply 2tZ = 
( ) bbmbi ktBPg ργ −Γ+−− 1)1()1(1 , and equation (15) is transformed into the median-
voter equilibrium tariffs which approximates the formulation found in Helpman (1995): 
(16)    
( ) ( )
( ) BdIk
g
t i
b
bm
CRS b )(
11
1
−
−−
=
−
γ
ρ . 
Equilibrium protection in the presence of scale economies is therefore higher 
relative to the constant-returns-to-scale case due to larger marginal income gains. 
However, as equation (15) shows, there is a critical level of scale economies which could 
tip the political equilibrium towards free-trade or export subsidies.  This would suggest 
the presence of multiple equilibria in the political market, which will be discussed in the 
succeeding section. 
Trade policy is thus completely determined here by the median-voter’s evaluation of  
the tariff’s net effect on her income.  However, Mayer also took note of the possibility of 
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participation costs altering the identity of the median-voter.  In the tariff-formation 
function and political contributions  approaches,20 for instance,  where ‘voting’ can take 
the form of offering campaign contributions to an incumbent government, the median-
vote belongs to the individual or group of individuals who provide the highest possible 
financial bid for their desired policy.  Owners of sector specific factors, in fact, possess a 
powerful incentive to pool their votes and raise the funds that could induce politicians to 
set the tariff policy that maximizes the group’s joint welfare.  However, the effectiveness 
of the median-vote also depends on the willingness of government to represent the 
interests of consumers that are non-participants in this lobbying game.  
The political support function (Hillman, 1989) and the political contributions 
approaches assume that governments do attach some weight to overall welfare, perhaps 
originating from the politicians’ sense of civic duty, or from the political calculus that its 
electoral future ultimately depends on the voting support of this group in the general 
election. 
In a generalized form, the government is thus formally depicted as one that sets the 
trade policy that maximizes its preference function consisting of aggregate welfare 
(weighted by a) and campaign contributions, $, (weighted by b): 
(17)   $baWG += ;  
where, W is defined over the utilities of all individual as given by equation 12, and the 
level of lobbying-induced political support; $, is equal to the welfare gains accruing to 
lobbies due to the shift from  free trade to a protectionist regime, 0,, LtL WW − .  
Equation (17) can therefore be rewritten as: 
(18)   )( 0,, LtL WWbaWG −+= . 
The greater is the weight attached to overall public well-being and the greater the 
deadweight loss attached to a given policy, the weaker is the power of the cash-sustained 
median-vote.  In the political contributions approach, however, the analysis proceeds as 
if the opposite is true, that is, that protection is in fact, for sale, thus assigning a far 
                                                 
20 The tariff-formation approach is associated with the works of Findlay and Wellisz (1982), Brock and Magee 
(1978) and Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982), while the political contributions model is pioneered by 
Grossman and Helpman (1994). 
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greater weight to political contributions.21  Still, the concern for overall welfare implies 
that the government incurs a cost in the supply of protection so that in equilibrium it 
must be true that the marginal increment in $  just compensates the marginal rise in 
social costs: 
(19)  TT aW−=$ . 
Lobbies, on their part, recognize the welfare-maximizing behaviour of government 
and anticipate that other interest groups likewise have the motive to contribute.  Taking 
the financial offers of these groups as given, the optimum contribution schedule of 
sector i’s lobby therefore allows government to maximize equation 18, which then 
induces it to produce the policy that maximizes the joint net-of-contribution welfare of 
lobby i: 
(20)    ( ) LLtLL WWV $0,, −−= ; 
where: 
(21)    ( ) ( ) iiiL rGrtW ~1~~~)( φωφ −+++= . 
A critical assumption made in this model is that of high concentration of the 
ownership of the specific factor, iφ , in the non-numeraire sectors, so that the share of 
the lobby in total deadweight loss is negligible.  This implies that groups are interested 
only in maximizing  income r, and have no incentive to influence the prices of the other 
consumption goods with the view of reducing deadweight loss. Despite non-competition 
among lobbyists to influence ti, total contributions remain positive due to the threat of 
free trade in sector i. If lobby i chooses not to contribute, for instance, then with 
∑
=
=
n
i
i
1
0$ , government will set the level of tariffs that maximizes overall welfare, that is 
0* =it . 
In equilibrium, the marginal cost of protection incurred by government, must be 
compensated by contributions, and the marginal level of contributions, in turn, must just 
be equal to the marginal benefits accruing to the lobbies.  That is,  
                                                 
21 Grossman-Helpman (2002) provides a discussion of the determinants of a, citing for instance the number 
of informed relative to the uninformed  voters in the population, and the effectiveness of campaign 
expenditures in influencing the choice of the impressionable voters. 
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 (22)   LTT W=$ . 
The marginal cost and benefits could thus be expressed in a similar way as equation 13 
and 14: 
(13)’ ( )IdtPaZ mt )('1 −= ; and 
(14)’  ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]


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

Γ
++
−−+=
− b
b
t
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tBBB
PgdItPbZ ρ
α αφφ 12
11/11' . 
In the special case presented by Grossman and Helpman, contributions are 
assumed to be “truthful” in the Bernheim and Whinston (1986) sense, so that campaign 
contributions, $, reflect the full and true worth of protection for the lobbies, that is, 
(23)   0,,$ LtL WW −= . 
Consequently, one can arrive at a closed form solution, where political rents are 
passed on fully to government who then sets the tariff that maximizes its welfare.  
Government welfare can now be expressed as the sum of aggregate and lobby group’s 
welfare: 
(24)  ( )tLGH WbaWG ,+= . 
Substituting equations (12) and (18) into (21), the government’s objective function 
can now be stated as: 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]rGrbGraTV iijiGH ~1~~~~~~),( φωφωγ −++++++= . 
The first-order conditions produce the following equilibrium tariffs: 
(26)   
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As in the CRS case of the original Grossman-Helpman model, equilibrium tariffs 
are higher, the greater is the concentration of ownership of the specific factor, the bigger 
is output, the less government care about aggregate welfare,  and the smaller are the 
deadweight losses as implied by the import elasticity of demand.  And similar to the tariff 
equilibria in the Mayer model, the presence of variable returns to scale leads to higher 
equilibrium levels of protection relative to the CRS case. 
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3.5       Political equilibrium with economies of scale 
The presence of scale economies is known to magnify the standard impact of goods 
prices on  incomes. These income effects, in turn, are central to the shaping of voters’ 
preferences in the political economy literature.  Hence, increasing returns to scale in B 
production can only be expected to shift the political equilibrium upwards.  This is 
evident in equation 15 and 26, with political tariffs being positively correlated with the 
scale parameter, α , and the size of output B.  The scale effect works to increase the 
marginal productivity of factors as output expands, thereby boosting the marginal 
benefits of protection, and reducing its marginal costs. 
Beyond stating the obvious, however, the exercise of allowing variability in returns 
to scale enables us to observe the effects of tariffs on the growth trajectory of the 
economy, which in turn, feeds back into the determination of the voting equilibrium.  
Scale economies can reach a critical point, for instance, where any upward movement in 
tariffs can usher the economy towards a break point, catapulting it to a higher level of 
industrialization.  Once there, the valuation of political pay-offs can also be expected to 
change, leading to another optimal policy set.   
 To examine the impact of IRS manufacturing on both the real and political sectors, 
figure 2 presents a graphical composite of the production and political equilibria as 
described in sections 2 and 3. 
The lower left quadrant of figure 2 yields the equilibrium employment level as 
function of tariff, t.  As we impose tariff on the system, the VMPL curve shifts leading to 
greater allocation of labour in the B manufacturing sector. The labour allocation curve A 
and B, correspond to the Mayer (median-voter) political equilibria depicted in the upper 
right hand quadrant of figure 2. Recall that in the region around L1, scale effects are weak 
so that the economy moves along the production possibility frontier only marginally with 
protection. The marginal benefit curve, 12
LΖ , slopes upward due to Stolper-Samuelson 
effects, but at a falling rate, as expansion of B output results to diminishing returns in the 
increased employment of Lb.  The marginal cost curve, 
1
1
LΖ , is also positively sloped to a 
degree dependent on the elasticity of demand of imports and the intensity of factor use 
in both B and Y production.  Exactly where the marginal cost curve is positioned relative 
to the free-trade origin depends on the share of the IRS good in overall consumption.  
  66 
1
2
Lz
1
1
Lz
3
2
Lz
Vi , w L1
L2
z1’, z2’
t
L1A
L3A
L3
t*
E
'
1z
E’
*32
Lz
-t
Figure 2    Median-voter tariffs and IRS
 
To the left of t *, any interior solution in the political market corresponds to a stable 
production equilibrium.22 Note that beyond t *, any rise in tariff leads to a break in real 
equilibrium which brings the economy to L3 and along the allocation curve AL3 .  Scale 
economies begin to dominate at this point, causing an economic take-off, and pushing 
the economy further up in its production frontier, towards a high-manufacturing output 
equilibrium.  Once import-substitution gives way to production for exports, political 
preferences could be expected to shift towards trade liberalisation and/or export 
subsidies.  This coincidence of multiple production and political equilibria can be shown 
by the Mayer and Grossman-Helpman equilibrium tariffs in eqn. 15 and 26.  There is a 
high tariff equilibrium coinciding with weak scale economies, and a low tariff 
equilibrium, whenever scale effects exceed the product of import demand elasticity and 
the amount of capital stock, bbk
ρξ −Γ 1 .   
The political and production break-points, however, need not necessarily occur 
simultaneously.  The tariff equilibrium, E, depicted in figure 2, for instance, assumes that 
                                                 
22 Marshallian stability conditions requires that the marginal benefit cuts the marginal cost curve from above. 
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the IRS good remains an import good, despite the leap into the high-growth path, L3.  
The result is therefore a further rise in equilibrium protection since every hike in tariffs 
yields higher marginal benefits due to scale economies. At point, E’, on the other hand, 
the political break-point is attained simultaneously with the manufacturing take-off, so 
that the median-voter produces for exports and her political preferences are reversed in 
favor of free-trade, or in favor of export subsidies at the limiting case.  As in the previous 
setting, the marginal benefits of subsidies are increasing but at a decreasing rate in this 
case. The marginal cost curve is also positively sloped as the tax burden rises with the 
level of optimal subsidies, which in turn, is a function of the elasticity of demand for the 
country’s exports.   
Notice, too, how higher concentration of capital ownership, ( ) bi rn 1−−γ , shifts 
demand, 32
LΖ , upwards, pushing the political equilibrium more quickly through and past  
the breakpoint.  This may imply that greater deviation in capital endowments among the 
population correspond to a faster pace of agglomeration.  Country size also does matter; 
it shifts 32
LΖ  so that protection becomes more effective in transforming a bigger 
economy from an agricultural to a manufacturing good producer.  Moreover, one can 
also imagine how a terms-of-trade shock could, for instance, shrink the resource base to 
finance the expansion of the IRS sector, increasing the slope of the VMPL curve (eqn. 
10), and reducing equilibrium tariffs (eqn. 15). 
The conjunction of  the real sector equilibria with lobbying-driven optimum tariffs 
is shown in figure 3.  As in the Mayer direct-democracy model, the demand and supply 
of protection is derived from the tariff’s marginal benefits and costs (eqn.s. 13’ and 14’), 
but in this case, the demand schedule represents the lobby’s willingness to contribute or 
bribe for every level of tariffs, while that of supply depicts the weighted marginal 
increment of societal costs.  We depict here the special Grossman-Helpman case where 
lobbies are assumed to be truthful in their contributions, thereby allowing politicians to 
capture the rents produced by the ‘sale’ of  government policies.  
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Figure 3 Grossman-Helpman tariffs and IRS
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Size is once again crucial in determining whether protection keeps the economy in 
the status quo or moves it to a higher growth path.  A bigger industry is obviously more 
likely to realize the scale economies that amplify the impact of higher prices on incomes, 
hence, raising the productivity of every single dollar spent on lobbying and shifting its 
demand curve, $t, upwards.  Producers could also be seen as acting with foresight, that is, 
they increase their level of contributions knowing that the jump to L3  would result to an 
income level still higher than that earned at *t .  Once again, the interior solution in the 
political market is ambiguous once the production break-point is reached, since the 
reversal of policy preferences depends not only on where in the production possibility 
frontier the economy is catapulted, but also on the weights attached by government on 
overall welfare relative to industry profits.  As in the Mayer case,  a high-manufacturing 
output equilibrium could sustain an even higher level of protection if local production 
costs remain higher than world prices, and free trade or negative tariffs whenever the 
composition of politically powerful lobbies is dominated by exporters.    
Politicians may likewise attach a political value to agglomeration.  In practice, in fact, 
governments often cite the creation or maintenance of  a critical industrial base an 
important policy objective.  It is a source of prestige and economic stimulus which 
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augments the welfare of the policymaker, so that even in countries without active private 
sector lobbying, high industrial tariffs can still be explained by government welfare-
maximizing behaviour.  In this case, the incumbent politician could be described as being 
vision-growth-prestige oriented, attaching a weight on manufacturing incomes, 
independent from the desire to accumulate financial receipts.  Equation 17 can thus be 
modified to: 
(27)    $21
~
bNICaWaV G ++= . 
The imposition of positive protection even in the absence of campaign 
contributions in Figure 3, takes the industrialization motive, NIC,  of politicians into 
account.  Alternatively, there may be significant political costs attached to a free trade 
policy that embeds the economy into a low-growth poverty trap.  Rationality dictates that 
lobbies, who are perfectly informed about the motives of politicians, will begin paying 
for tariffs only beyond that minimum level of protection which is voluntary and 
independently supplied by government due to reasons cited above.   
An alternative interpretation of the Grossman-Helpman model in the presence of a 
growth-minded incumbent, is to consider the level of protection as being positively 
linked to the level of investments domestic firms are willing to undertake for expansion.  
One can thus maintain the original formulation in equation 17, but re-label contributions 
as investible funds.  Such a view is parallel to political economy models where the 
provision of protection is dependent on a foreign firm’s readiness to invest on the local 
economy.  It is likewise consistent with several recent episodes of reform, where 
governments agree to maintain protection, or exclude sectors from liberalisation on the 
condition that firms display their growth potential by means of immediate investments or 
by tapping foreign alliances that would ensure the availability of investment capital.23  
Clearly, the strength of scale economies would in turn determine the ability of lobbies to 
meet such demands.  Under these circumstances, a tariff-ridden equilibrium augments 
IRS production, and lobbying is virtuous as it moves the economy towards pareto-
optimality.   
                                                 
23 The Philippine government, for instance, agreed to place petrochemicals in the temporary exclusion list of 
AFTA.  
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The conclusion reached so far should however be tempered by the likelihood that 
protection may still lodge the economy into a low-growth path.  Some of the critical 
factors determining whether this takes place or not, are the nature of the political 
interactions that brought about the policy choice, and the inherent structure of the 
economy.  Whenever the political equilibrium, for instance is solely or predominantly 
demand-driven, the probability of being trapped in the no-industrialisation path is likely 
to be greater.  This is simply because national scale economies thrives in an environment 
where public resources are invested in activities, such as infrastructure, human capital 
formation, creation of an efficient bureaucracy, etc.,  that facilitate, or lower the costs, of 
private enterprise.  Clearly, such an environment is forthcoming only when national 
growth and industrialisation ranks highly in the preferences of public leaders.  On the 
other hand, even if the policy suppliers possess the proper attributes, the production 
structure and size of the economy may be such that only with great and costly leaps in 
tariffs can the breakpoint be reached.  This may not be the case when industrial 
ambitions are proportional to the nation’s means.  There are historical illustrations 
however, of over-shooting industrial targets (i.e. development of an aircraft building 
industry in Indonesia, or the space program of China) which have had crippling effects 
and diverted scarce capital resources away from activities less incompatible with the 
country’s comparative advantages. 
  
3.6  Summary and conclusions 
Scale economies have always featured prominently in the public debate surrounding the 
desirability and the conduct of industrial and trade policies.  Yet the way policy choice is 
traditionally depicted in political economy literature seems to negate the importance of 
returns to scale and its weight on voters’ and leaders’ preferences.  This paper is an 
attempt to capture at least some aspects of the policymaking process in the presence of 
economies and diseconomies, looking at how the behaviour of political players changes 
and the potential role of politics in industrial transition.  The analysis shows the manner 
in which political interactions can comprise as a shock in the real sector, pushing the 
economy towards a breakpoint and into a higher level of manufacturing activity.  
Multiple equilibria, however, imply that the political equilibrium may not be global, so 
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that no guarantee exists that the lobbying that leads to higher tariffs leads to higher 
incomes as well.  The larger is the initial size of employment, and/or the higher the 
returns to scale (i.e. via higher public expenditures in infrastructure, etc.), the greater is 
the likelihood of lobbying-driven agglomeration.  Changes in the real sector, on the other 
hand, such as a terms-of-trade shock may likewise lead to permanent political changes.  It 
reduces the net returns of lobbying (through lower scale effects) and raises the costs of 
higher protection, causing a reduction of equilibrium tariffs. 
One trajectory possible in our model fits Rodrik’s (2001) observations.  Countries 
may be endogenously protectionist as they industrialize, shifting from a protectionist to a 
free trade stance as they become exporters of manufactured goods.   
The distribution of factor endowments across the populace seems to matter, too, 
with a greater concentration of ownership potentially spurring a faster pace of 
agglomeration.24 In addition, the results imply that larger countries can be expected to be 
more protectionist in manufacturing sectors where they remain net importers.  Some 
attention is also placed on the crucial role of the supply side of the political market.  The 
nature of the incumbent government,  that is, whether it is vision-growth-oriented, or 
passive/kleptocratic, on one hand, determine the level of public investments poured into 
overall nation-building, and consequently, the potential scale economies that can be 
generated by domestic entrepreneurs.   On the other hand, it sets the pattern of, and the 
rules governing the political interactions between lobbyists and public officials.  
Lobbying may come in the form of investment pledges, for instance, whenever a 
government has a predominantly industrialist agenda.  This is because the decision to 
protect an industry could be conditioned on the ability of firms to display its growth 
potential or its contribution to industrial employment. 
What the results also illustrate is that although the presence of scale economies 
could intensify the demand and supply of higher industrial tariffs, it may also help ensure 
that protection stays temporary.  As production and productivity expands, the economy 
could shift to a higher growth path but with lower or zero incidence of protection.  The 
model discussed here shows that even when strong industrial lobbies are politically 
                                                 
24 However, the distributional burden then faced by the government is also likely to rise, so that public 
resources are diverted away from IRS-enhancing investments, stifling overall growth in the process. 
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active, one could expect downward shifts in tariffs, as soon as the critical industrial scale 
is reached, and the role of trade policies in output expansion is reduced or becomes 
redundant. Put in an alternative way, while tariffs may finance industrialisation, growth in 
manufacturing could eventually exert a downward pressure on protection.  This 
corresponds to historical trends of higher manufacturing growth and lower levels of 
protection through time, not only in industrialised economies  but also recently among 
the  newly-industrialising countries, or NICs.  The period of rapid liberalisation in 
ASEAN countries in the late ‘80s, for example, was preceded by almost two decades of 
significant growth in manufacturing.25   The increased pace of international specialisation 
and foreign direct investments clearly played critical roles as well, so that the natural 
extension of the present analysis points towards the implications  of international scale 
economies on the political determination of industrial protection.                                    
                                                 
25 Indonesia’s share of manufacturing in total GDP rose from 11% - 21% from 1975- 1992, while that of 
Malaysia and Thailand  increased from 16% to 29% and 20% and 28%, respectively (ADB, Key Indicators, 
1994, Manila). 
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Appendix 3.1 
It is commonly assumed in literature that there are a large number of  (symmetrical) 
intermediate firms (i.e. nIxxi ∈∀=  ) so that equation (1) can be simplified to: 
(1)  xnM ρ
1
=  . 
The production of x involves a fixed, F,  and a variable, h,  component, so that the 
total cost function is given by: 
(2)  )()()( ωfhxFxc += ,  
where ω is a  vector of factor returns and f(ω), is the price per unit of the composite 
factor services. Firms set marginal set marginal revenue to marginal cost, and free entry 
drives profits to zero, hence, the profit maximising price: 
(3)  ρω hfPx )(= . 
The assumption of symmetry across x producing firms, implies that Px is the price 
of each  variety of input that is produced. Using (1.c), one can then derive the supply of 
x: 
(4)  ( )( )1−= σhFx  . 
Since each variety of intermediates is produced by only one firm, the variations in 
industry size is caused by the entry and exit of firms producing identical output of x. 
Let B denote the bundle of intermediate produced by each firm, that is, 
(5)  ρnxBB
n
i
i ==∑
=1
. 
Using (1.b), (1.d), and (1.e), one can derive the unit cost of producing the intermediate 
bundle B: 
(6)  ))(()( σωω Ffc = . 
With equation (1.e) and (1.f), the model can be expressed in reduced form, so that it 
is possible to rewrite equation (1.a) as: 
(7).  ZZ BxnM == ; where Z = ρ1 . 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of Protection in a Customs Union: What Drives the 
Tariff Structure of the EU?* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  We examine the political economy underpinnings of EU import 
protection.  This includes the relatively standard approach of examining the pattern 
of tariffs.  However, we also introduce the use of general equilibrium estimates of 
the direct and indirect marginal impacts of protection at the sector level for 
econometric estimation of the revealed pattern of policy weights.  This GE 
approach yields estimates of political weights based on economic effects.  The 
resulting weights lend insight into relative protection of agriculture and 
manufacturing.  We also find that the strength of downstream linkages matters for 
policy weights and rates of protection, as does the national posture of industry. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The current structure of trade protection in the EU has several determinants that can be 
traced to historical factors, resource constraints, and political economy arguments.  
Analyses involving the latter, however, have been relatively scarce due to the 
complexities inherent in a process that engages a multitude of actors not only from 
Member countries, but also from the central institutions such as the European 
                                                 
* This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by J. F. Francois and D. Nelson. 
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Commission.  The literature has instead focused attention on the determination of trade 
policy in the US. 
In the context of the European Union, policies are influenced by both national and 
regional factors in ways which are hard to detect.  Explicit lobbying behaviour in the 
Union, for instance, is particularly difficult to track. Unlike in the US, campaign 
contributions in most EU countries are heavily restricted, if not forbidden, so that 
lobbying comes in much less overt forms.  This is crucial because in standard 
endogenous protection models, the amount of lobbying directly translates into weights 
attached by government to industry interests.  As government choice hinges essentially 
on the issue of trade-off between competing societal and private interests, these weights 
determine where the policy chips will fall. 
Even when data on campaign contributions are available, recent empirical work on 
US trade protection illustrates the various problems involved in capturing the extent of 
lobbying activities. In a survey of empirical approaches on endogenous protection, 
Gawande and Krishna (2001) discuss the Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay (2000) tests of the Grossman-Helpman model, where data on political 
contributions of corporate institutions are used as lobbying indicators.  Problems pointed 
out by Krishna and Gawande include the difficulties inherent in isolating that part of the 
total financial support particularly aimed at influencing trade policy, and the exclusion of 
non-corporate sources of electoral financial support, such as labor unions.  This may 
have resulted in misspecifications and underestimation of the political strength of private 
interests, and thus may account for some curious results found in the literature.  One 
such result is the extremely high estimate of the weights government attaches to overall 
welfare relative to industry rents, spanning from 100 to 3000, and the other is the very 
low value of total political contributions (in the range of $30 million) relative to the large 
deadweight loss and producer surplus stemming from protection.  The former counters 
the expectations of the theoretical model while the latter hints to the magnitude of 
underreporting of private sector lobbying, and to the amount of indirect influence 
peddling never observed directly at all.   
Given the prominent role assigned to lobbying, attempts must nonetheless be made 
to indirectly craft acceptable lobby indicators if the Grossman-Helpman test is to be 
extended to more countries.  Several approaches emerge.  One is to simply assume that 
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industries fulfilling a certain set of criteria are more likely to be politically organized than 
others.   In Gawande, Sanguinetti and Bohara (2001) work on Mercosur, for instance, 
they take industries whose imports surpass the sample mean as actively lobbying for 
protection.  Another method is to equate membership in any industry-related 
organization with lobbying, as in Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2004) in their study 
of Turkey. Cadot, Grether and de Melo (2003) instead illustrate an approach where the 
classification of industries as being politically active or passive is endogenized in a multi-
stage iterative procedure. Here once again, the extent of import penetration faced by 
sectors takes central stage.   
One problem raised by Eshafani and Leaphart (2001) refers to the manner in which 
the coefficient of the output-import ratio is specified as function of political organization 
alone, thereby giving the lobby indicator all the chances to prove significant.  It becomes 
even trickier in cases where certain industry characteristics such as industrial 
concentration and import penetration are used as proxies for lobbying activity, given the 
many alternative channels by which these variables may affect the policy preferences of 
government.  Also, the dilemma posed by the high weights attached to overall welfare 
remains, because even taking the lowest estimates derived by Cadot, Grether and de 
Melo,26 the weights are such as to make any lobbying prohibitive.  The question then 
lingers, what drives protection?  
We re-examine this problem in this paper, and follow an alternative route to our 
goal of assessing the relative importance of industry against overall interests in the 
determination of trade policy in the EU.   We adopt the Hillman (1989) and Grossman-
Helpman (1994) notion of a government trading-off the industry rents stemming from 
protection against the losses accruing to the general population, and attempt to 
approximate this ordering of preferences by looking at the economic impact of actual 
government action as revealed by the structure of protection.  Specifically, we back out 
the weights implied by the marginal welfare effects of the set of import policies in the 
EU, building on the partial equilibrium approaches of Gardner (1987), Tyers (1990) and 
                                                 
26 They find, for instance, that the weight given by government to social welfare relative to contributions is 
5.1.  This implies that each lobby should contribute $5 for each dollar of deadweight loss. 
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Anderson (1980), as well as the general equilibrium approach of Tyers (2004).27  
Employing a numerical general equilibrium model of the EU, we estimate the direct 
marginal effect of sector-level protection on protected industries, the indirect effect on 
upstream and downstream industries, and the effect on overall welfare.  With these 
marginal effects as a starting point, we then econometrically calculate the apparent 
weights of industry in policymaking given the current tariff structure. We also aim for a 
more detailed view of the EU political market by further deconstructing these weights 
along the lines of industry nationality and other related sector characteristics. Unravelling 
national preferences is particularly important in the EU context, because while the supply 
of regional protection obviously corresponds to the sum of individual national demands, 
the common trade policy in the EU and the complexities surrounding it conceal the 
interplay of private, national and aggregate regional interests.    
This approach has a number of clear advantages.  First of all, the effects of 
protection on overall welfare are fully captured, and are not solely limited to tariff 
revenue effects as implied by import demand elasticities.  Hence, the valuation of the 
marginal costs and benefits of protection more adequately takes into account the 
economy-wide repercussions of sectoral policies.   The policy weights are also backed by 
data.  Consequently, unlike previous empirical studies, the values we obtain for these 
weights tie in with theoretical expectations:  revealed policy weights given to industry 
profits, in general, tend to be around 2 to 3 times that assigned to national income or 
welfare.  We also find that the high protection received by an industry is not necessarily 
always explained by greater political value attached to that sector.  Indeed, our results 
show that the policy weights of less protected sectors are comparable to those that enjoy 
high protection.  Once again, these outcomes may have been the product of a better 
coverage of aggregate welfare effects, so that tariffs are not only explained by sectoral 
profit gains but by the societal costs of protection as well.  In the context of a customs 
union such as the EU, we also find that nationality matters, so that industries important 
to certain Member States in terms of  relative output shares, consistently acquire higher 
levels of protection.  Finally, the agricultural bias of EU protection emerges as a by 
                                                 
27 In general, the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium computational literature has used numerical 
models to calibrate policy weights for use in numerical modelling.  In contrast, here we use a numerical 
model to estimate raw marginal policy impacts, but then turn to econometrics for analysis. 
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product, in part, of a tendency to assign importance to the strength of intermediate 
linkages,  with upstream industries receiving relatively lower tariffs weights for a given 
policy weight.  
We have organized the paper as follows.  Section 2 provides background.  In 
Section 3 we examine basic patterns of EU import protection, using a relatively standard 
political economy framework for testing the relationships between sectoral tariff 
variations and selected industry characteristics identified as determinant by theory.  In 
Section 4, we then examine what drives the observed patterns by employing a 
computational model to produce estimates of the general equilibrium marginal income 
effects given the actual rates and pattern of protection and production across the EU. 
From these marginal estimates, we estimate econometrically the implied weights for 
individual sectors relative to the weight assigned to overall economic welfare. This allows 
a ranking of industries according to the assigned relative weights.  In Section 5 we 
explore how national and EU-wide industry characteristics, especially the nationality of 
various industries, bears on the determination of the EU-wide industry coefficients.  This 
provides some indication of the individual policy preferences of Member States.  In 
Section 6 we offer some final observations, and then conclude. 
 
4.2 Background 
The evolution of European tariffs, as shown in Figure 1, reveals not only trends in trade 
protection, but also gives some indication of the liberal and protectionist forces at play 
across the continent.  The 1968 common external tariffs (CET) of 10.4% is the 
arithmetical average of the Italian and French high tariffs (16.8% and 15.3%, 
respectively), and the lower ones of Germany  and the Benelux countries (5.8% and 
8.7%).   The same differentiation can be seen in the old EFTA as well, with the UK and 
Austria being relatively more protectionist (14.9%, 11.4%), compared to their 
Scandinavian counterparts (Sweden, 6.3%; Denmark, 5.2%).   
After four and one-half decades, tariff protection in industrial goods has markedly 
declined in importance, with the simple average CET posting at a historically low 4.1% in 
2001.  However, aside from tariff peaks in chemicals, footwear, transport vehicles, more 
opaque protectionist instruments have been introduced, so that when these non-tariff 
  79 
barriers are accounted for, the rate of overall protection almost doubles to 7.7% 
(Messerlin, 2001). 
Agricultural protection is typically a different story, and in the European case, it 
even merits a distinct Community-wide sectoral policy, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(a.k.a. the CAP).  Free internal agricultural trade has been accompanied by a substantial 
increase in external protection that for years has proven to be resistant to any reform.  
Liberalization did make some headway in the 1990s28, but Messerlin still reports a high 
overall protection rate of 31.7%.   
 
Figure 1  Evolution of tariffs for selected EU-12 countries 
(Simple Average MFN tariffs for industrial goods) 
 
Table 1 in the Appendix presents data on EU applied import protection, import 
shares, and output shares for 2001.29  Processed sugar and dairy products, which were 
excluded from the 1992 CAP Reform, register some of the highest rates of protection, at 
110%, and 38% respectively. Processed rice production is likewise heavily protected 
                                                 
28 See Pelkmans (2001), chapter 11, pp. 219 -222. 
29 The source of these data is discussed below, in Section 3. 
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(108%), as is beef (46%).  Tariff peaks in the manufacturing sector are fewer in number 
(and except for trucks, mostly agro-related: processed foods, beverages and tobacco) and 
at much lower rates.   
In terms of output shares, services dominate the EU, with 62 percent of output by 
value.  In manufacturing, the four largest sectors in the EU, in terms of the sectoring 
scheme of our data, are chemicals, other machinery, motor vehicles, and electrical 
equipment. They account for almost 50% of manufacturing output value and 16% of all 
output.  In each of these sectors, Germany is the largest producer.  However, Germany is 
likewise a major producer of some important agricultural sectors:  it supplies 22% of total 
production of milk and dairy products, 44% of oil seed oils, 25% of other grains and 
23% of the most politically sensitive product, sugar.  Italy’s interest is particularly 
concentrated in textiles (supplying 24% of output), apparel (35%) and leather (includes 
footwear, 43%).  However, compared to other EU Members, these industries account 
for a greater share in Portugal’s total output.  In other tariff peak products such as rice, 
Italy (supplying 54%) and Spain (31%) greatly benefit, while in meat, the four big 
members: France (18%), UK (16%), Germany (16%), and Italy (12%), receive the most 
producer surplus from protection. 
Early empirical tests on the European pattern of protection have shown that despite 
the differences in the market and production structures across members, the level of 
Community tariffs did not significantly change the relative protection between different 
sectors. Constantopoulos (1974) noted that while European countries have followed 
different tariff regimes, the national structure of protection in the 6 original EEC 
countries did not actually differ very much.  Her results also show that extra-EEC 
protection displayed positive correlation with the relative share of unskilled labor and the 
level of R&D content.  This implies that regardless of differences in specialization, the 
same Stolper-Samuelson effects seemed to be at play in the determination of trade 
regimes, and that some congruence of industrial policy goals existed among the original 
Members.  
More recent analytical and empirical work also underscores the role of political 
economy determinants.  Viewing trade protection from a political economy standpoint 
entails not only an understanding of individual preferences over a range of policy 
choices, but also information on how these preferences are aggregated and conveyed 
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through actions or interventions in the political arena.  Since most endogenous 
protection models are demand-driven, this characterization of the manner in which 
competing interest groups wield influence and express their political demands is a critical 
element in any analytical exercise.  In the absence of sufficient factual data, the approach 
often taken is to refer to readily observable industry characteristics that may influence the 
effectiveness of lobbying behavior or strengthen the political weight of sector interests. 
Examples of properties that map well with political influence, and hence, with protection 
trends, are those that facilitate collective action among producers.  A high concentration 
of ownership, for instance, implies few players and thus less likelihood of free-riding.  
Greater industry size, on the other hand, raises the stakes involved in cooperation among 
producers to secure protection.   
There are models of endogenous protection that instead stress the supply 
incentives, such as the electoral need of governments to win as many votes as possible.  
In this instance, total employment (i.e. voting strength) of the sector is key.  Still others 
draw attention to the (conservative) politicians´ aversion to changing the prevailing level 
and distribution of income, so that tariffs are used to compensate for the income shifts 
brought about by unemployment or surges in import penetration.  Thus, it is the 
changes, not the composition or the absolute levels of employment and imports, which 
explain the supply of protection.  However, evidence on the extent and direction of tariff 
effects associated with some industry characteristics is ambiguous.  Consider for example 
the case of the role of industry size.  Larger industries are said to be politically important 
because of the votes they deliver.  Hence, one can expect to find higher rates of 
protection in larger industries.  (Finger, Hall & Nelson, 1982; Lee & Swagel, 1997).  On 
the other hand, these sectors face more collective action problems, so that tariffs are 
likely to be lower (Trefler, 1993).  Cadot, de Melo & Olarreaga (1999) also predict 
protection to drop in these industries as a result of general equilibrium adjustment in the 
labour market30.  In the Grossman-Helpman model (1994), industry size is not at all 
important if sector lobbying is zero.  There is also an endogeneity problem, as industries 
that receive protection will then expand. 
                                                 
30 Wages, and production costs rise because of the output increase initially triggered by tariffs, so that 
eventually the demand for protection falls. 
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In recent empirical work on the EU, Tavares (2004) tests the explanatory power of 
political economy determinants cited in the literature but embeds these in alternative 
political economy modelling frameworks in order to determine which model works best 
to explain the level of regional protection.  He formulates different model specifications 
that reflect the degree of European integration, with lobbying activity being more 
regionally oriented the more the policymaking process resembles that of a unitary state. 
The author finds that external tariffs from 1987-1999 correlate highly with the number of 
firms (-), wage rate (-), labor cost share (+), the import penetration ratio (-) and the 
export share (-).  Results also support the hypothesis that the movement towards deeper 
integration, ushered in by the 1987 Single Market programme, did lead to a more 
centralized tariff-setting process.  Technically, this means that the specification wherein 
national size or influence do not play a role (i.e. industry characteristics are merely 
summed up or averaged to form the EU characteristics used for estimation), would seem 
to explain the structure of protection better than those where the preference of the 
decisive country voter is what counts.   In an earlier work however, Tavares (2001) 
reported opposite results.  He then reported that policymaking reflects bargaining 
between members who are themselves influenced by national lobbies.  In fact, the best 
specification the author finds in that paper is one where the exogenous variables are 
weighted according to the share of votes accorded to each country in the Council of 
Ministers.  This implies, for instance, that the preferences of larger countries, having 
more votes, are given more weight in decision-making. 
 
4.3 Tariffs and Industry Characteristics 
As a preliminary step, we now revisit the basic approach of the existing literature with 
regard to tariff patterns. We focus on relationships between protection and some of the 
political determinants earlier mentioned, testing for the importance of nationality on the 
sectoral variation in tariffs.  In particular, we examine the role of industry size both EU-
wide and with respect to the 12 individual national economies31 making up the EC12.  In 
                                                 
31 Namely: Belgium (Bel), Denmark (Den), Finland (Fin), France (Fra), Germany (Ger), Great Britain (GBR), 
Greece (Gre), Ireland (Ire), Italy (Ita), Luxembourg (Lux), Netherlands (Ned), Portugal (Por), Spain (Spa), 
and Sweden (Swe).  As Austria, Sweden, and Finland were outsiders when current rates were set, we leave 
them out of the present assessment. 
  83 
both the adding-machine and in the Grossman-Helpman models, size is expected to 
enhance the political value of industry rents to national leaders, who collectively exercise 
tariff-setting powers in the Council of Ministers.32  In theory, large industries are 
hindered only by free-riding in launching an effective lobby.  In practice, as long as the 
stakes are high enough, even with many firms, the collective action problem is solved 
through industry associations, cooperation across lobbies, and leadership by the very 
large firms,  so that rent-seeking activities extend to influence the regional agenda-setting 
body (European Commission) as well. Tavares quotes Lehmann’s (2003) report that in 
2000, about 2,600 interest groups were active in Brussels, composed of European trade 
federations (±30%), commercial consultants (± 20%), European companies (±10%), 
national business (10%), European NGOs (±10%), labor organizations (±10%), regional 
representations (±5%), international organizations (±5%), and think tanks (±1%). 
We also include a variable for strength of downstream linkages, INT_SHARE.  
This variable measures the share of output that goes to intermediate rather than final 
demand, and is based on the intermediate use matrix included in our social accounting 
data.  As pointed out by Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004), input-output linkages 
introduce inter-sectoral rivalries, and it thus becomes a point of interest how government 
weighs the welfare of upstream against downstream industries. 
 
Tariff and protection data sources 
For our estimates, we work with a set of integrated social accounting data that combine 
import protection with input-output structures, intermediate and final demand, bilateral 
trade flows, and tariff protection.  These are the global social accounting data organized 
by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a research consortium that includes 
international organizations like the World Bank, OECD, European Commission, and 
several UN and national agencies.  We use the GTAP version 5 and version 6 databases, 
which are for 1997 and 2001 respectively. (See Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002).  
Within this database, European industrial production and employment flows are based 
on sets of Member State social accounting data originating, ultimately, with Eurostat.  
                                                 
32 Industry size also impacts on the government objective function through its effect on aggregate welfare, so 
that protection imposed on larger industries also leads to larger deadweight losses.  
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These are supplemented by data on bilateral import protection, including adjustments for 
non-reciprocal preferential import protection and bilateral free trade agreements. In the 
case of agriculture, the data also include ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. The 
2001 protection data are based on Bouet et al (2004). The 1997 protection data are from 
the World Bank and UNCTAD.  In the case of both the 1997 and 2001 data, tariffs are 
drawn from the WTOs integrated database of tariffs and bindings, and well as the 
UNCTAD TRAINS dataset and national schedules.  
A great advantage of these data is that we have a consistent mapping of economic flow 
data (intermediate demands, final goods production, imports, exports, and final demand) 
to corresponding trade policy data.  In the case of the EU, our focus here, the pattern of 
protection vis-à-vis external trading partners will, overall, reflect the politics that has 
driven the EU to leave out sensitive sectors in bilateral negotiations on free trade areas, 
and also the sensitivity of these same sectors as reflected in MFN tariff schedules. 
  
Results  
We rely on the data as outlined above for the 12 European Union Members in 2001. As 
a measure of protection we use extra-EU trade weighted tariff rates that reflect the 
pattern of preferential trade arrangements, WTO concessions, and the exclusion of 
sectors from these arrangements.33  Industry size is measured by shares in total EU 
output value, and denoted as EU_SHARE. To gauge for the intensity of unskilled 
labour use, we include it here as UNSKL, using the shares of unskilled wages in total 
wages by sector as a proxy.  To capture the nationality of each industry, we once again 
use industry size, but this time take the deviation of national sectoral output shares 
relative to the EU average  ( Member∆ ).  We assign a dummy to agricultural products, 
FOOD, given the special historical and political circumstances surrounding its protection 
that cannot be captured in our estimation.   
Variations in sectoral tariffs are tested against the above-mentioned industry 
characteristics in a straightforward fashion: 
                                                 
33 Alternative measures of protection exist, one being the Trade Restrictiveness Index as proposed by 
Anderson & Neary (1996).  
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(1) ln(1 + τ )i = C + β1EU _ SHAREi + β2FOODi + β3UNSKLi
+β4 INT _ SHAREi + βm∆Member
m
∑ + ε i  
Our dataset contains observations for 12 EU countries, and for 41 agricultural, 
manufacturing and extraction sectors, and taken for 2001.  Robust regression results are 
reported in Table 2.  The results at this stage can be summarized as follows: 
• Large sectors have lower rates of protection. 
• Controlling for size and nationality of industry, food sectors are not 
disproportionately protected. 
• Unskilled labor-intensive sectors do not receive higher protection rates.  
Indeed the opposite seems to hold. 
• The intensity of downstream linkages matters for protection levels. 
• Nationality does matter. 
 
Table 2 Tariffs – ln(1+t) regressed on structural and regional variables 
RHS variables coefficient t-ratio 
Sigma -0.001 -(0.82) 
Size*** -20.110 -(2.79) 
FOOD -0.001 -(0.28) 
UNSKL -0.027 -(1.59) 
INT_SHARE -0.693 -(6.07) 
BEL 0.941 (0.15) 
DNK 0.272 (0.39) 
FRA** 4.931 (2.50) 
DEU** 4.589 (2.37) 
GBR** 4.429 (2.43) 
GRC 0.199 (0.90) 
IRL -0.057 -(0.30) 
ITA 1.529 (1.33) 
LUX** 1.201 (5.23) 
NLD 1.135 (1.51) 
PRT** 1.923 (3.39) 
ESP* 1.664 (1.90) 
Intercept 0.067 (5.58) 
Estimates are based on robust regressions    
OLS R-sq: 0.48, obs: 42    
F(16,25): 7.96, Pr>F: 0.00 
  
**: significant at the .05 level 
  
***: significant at the .01 level. 
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Our results support the notion that larger sectors are harder to organize in Europe.  
All other things equal, the sectoral demand for protection is less likely to be 
accommodated, the larger is the size of its output. Intermediate linkages imply that more 
deeply integrated sectors receive less protection than do final goods sectors.  Contrary to 
previous results in the literature, however, sectors where unskilled earnings are important 
do not appear to invite higher tariffs. What is clear from the table is that the nationality 
of industries is highly correlated with the extent of protection received.  For instance, 
sectors where Germany, Britain, and especially, France, have higher output shares relative 
to the EU average, also get relatively higher protection, holding importance across other 
Members constant.   
The results in Table 2 represent the standard approach, prior to the recent empirical 
literature that has emerged following Grossman and Helpman’s (1994).  In a Grossman-
Helpman lobbying framework, tariffs are positive for industries that lobby successfully.  
They receive the tariff: 
(2) 
     τ i = γ
X j
−M j
'
+ ε i  
where γ is positive for protected industries and identical across protected industries,  and the 
tariff is higher the greater output X and the flatter the import demand curve, represented 
here by the slope M’.  Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2) in logs.  Even at our 
level of aggregation, we have sectors with zero protection.  Therefore, we report both 
equation (2) estimated using OLS, and using a Heckman selection framework to allow 
for the fact that industries must receive protection first before the level is then 
determined, in the Grossman-Helpman framework.  In the table, the variable SIGMA is 
the elasticity of import demand (represented by Armington elasticities, as taken from our 
CGE model data).  Broadly speaking, the results are consistent with the mixed results in 
the literature.  As predicted by almost all endogenous protection models, the elasticity of 
demand has a positive sign.  Industry size has a negative sign, which may be more 
consistent with Olson-type models of organization challenge than the Grossman-
Helpman model.  We also find that intermediate linkages matter in this setup.  This is 
consistent with Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004). 
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4.4 Estimating Industry Weights 
We now take a step away from current practice, focusing on explaining observed patterns 
by explicitly estimating the objective function of the reduced-form regional policymaker, 
say for simplicity, an EU Über-Commissioner.  Our goal is to express the level of EU-
wide protection as the outcome of the Commission’s maximization problem with respect 
to this objective function.  This has the advantage of capturing the general equilibrium 
effects of protection, where for example steel protection may hurt motor vehicles, 
thereby providing more insight into the interaction of policy choice and the cost and 
benefits that this choice implies.   
We proceed by employing a stylized Grossman-Helpman political influence model, 
specifying the objective function for the Commission as follows: 
(3) ∑+=Ω
i
iiWbaW  
where a and b correspond to the weights attached by the Über-Commissioner to 
Community (W) and industry welfare (Wi ), respectively. 
Assuming that tariffs (and potentially other policy instruments) are set to maximize 
this function, the equilibrium tariff rates will map to the following set of first order 
conditions34: 
(4) 
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Rearranging, we then have, 
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Our data for the left- and right-hand sides of equation (4) come from the marginal 
shocks to tariffs in our model of the EU economy for 1997 and 2001.   We derive this by 
applying small (1%) changes in EU external tariffs sector by sector within a general 
equilibrium model incorporating the data outlined above, and using the model to then 
                                                 
34 Note that while we are working with tariffs, one could add other industrial and tax policies to the mix.  In 
theory, for each policy in isolation, the corresponding version of equations (3) and (4) should hold. 
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estimate the direct and indirect impact of each tariff on overall economic welfare 
(measured as equivalent variation) and also on capital income within each sector.   
The basic modelling framework, as implemented, is quite complex, and we refer the 
reader to Hertel et al (1997) for the blow-by-blow on algebraic structure.35  For our 
purposes, the key features of the numerical model can be summarized as follows.  First, 
we define composite or aggregate goods in each region r that are either purchased as 
intermediates or consumed as final goods.  The set of prices for these composite or 
aggregate goods within a region PA
r will be a function of the set of prices for domestic 
goods within a region Pd
r and the set of prices for imported goods Pm
r  
(6) PA
r
= fAr Pdr ,Pmr( ) 
Equation (6) involves a CES composite of domestic and imported goods.  The internal 
price for imports will in turn be a function of the set of tariffs, where T = 1+ τ , and 
also the set of world prices for imports. 
(7) Pm
r
= T 'Pm
*  
The domestic price will depend on the price of primary inputs indexed over factors v, 
Pv
r , as well as the price of composite goods used as intermediates, PA
r .  This is shown as 
equation (8): 
(8) Pd
r
= fdr Pvr ,PAr( ) 
The cost function in equation (8) follows from CES technologies for value-added, 
combined with a Leontief-nest between intermediate goods and value added.  Given 
domestic prices for inputs and outputs, the demand for primary inputs v will be a 
function of unit input coefficients (determined by relative input prices) and by total 
demand for domestic output Q. 
(9) vr = Qr( )' cvr Pvr( )( ) 
The input coefficients c follow from the CES production technology for value added.  
Demand for goods will be a function of the entire set of global incomes I and prices P, 
                                                 
35 The actual model files used to estimate the marginal effects are available for download. 
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(10) Q = fq P,I( ) 
where incomes are an outcome of the full general equilibrium solution across final and 
intermediate demands within the model.  Incomes in each region are the sum of factor 
incomes and taxes collected Γ.  Tax collections are a function of tax rates γ. 
(11) I r = Pv
r( )' vr( )+ Γ Pm* ,Pvr ,γ( ) 
 
Finally, welfare u is then defined in terms of an aggregate consumer with standard 
preferences, such that we can write an expenditure function e ( . ) defined over consumer 
prices and welfare. 
(12) e ur , PA
r( )= I r  
 
We apply the model with a two-region version of the dataset, the two regions being 
the EU and the rest of the world. Conceptually therefore, if we take one of the regions r 
as the European Union, and we differentiate the entire system with respect to a given EU 
tariff, we will arrive at a marginal impact of this tariff on reduced form national income 
(equation 11) and also factor incomes (equation 9).  Operationally, we apply 1% changes 
in the power of the tariff T = 1+ τ to estimate such marginal changes.  In the context of 
the model, this yields changes to capital income to each sector (where we treat capital as 
fixed to a sector) as well as changes in overall national income I.  This in turn lets us 
calculate the corresponding marginal impact in social welfare, measured by equivalent 
variation. Our sectors are those in Table 1.  Equipped with an assessment of welfare 
effects, we are then able to evaluate econometrically the relative weights, abi , given the 
actual pattern of tariff protection in the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  90 
Table 3  Relative Industry Weights 
Industry weights t-ratio Applied tariffs 
rice -3.07 -(2.62) 53.49 
wheat -2.06 -(6.22) 0.90 
grains -2.07 -(5.78) 17.95 
horticulture -1.85 -(8.31) 16.55 
oilseeds -2.04 -(5.87) 0.00 
cane_beet -1.17 -(1.36) 9.08 
plant fibres -2.21 -(1.58) 0.00 
other crops -1.58 -(7.37) 2.54 
cattle -1.94 -(6.39) 11.55 
other livestock -1.28 -(4.59) 1.25 
dairies -1.46 -(6.07) 0.00 
animal fibres -1.79 -(0.78) 0.00 
forestry -0.13 -(1.03) 0.04 
fish -0.64 -(4.02) 2.60 
coal -0.08 -(0.24) 0.00 
oil -0.28 -(0.16) 0.00 
gas -1.59 -(1.61) 0.00 
other minerals 0.43 (1.90) 0.00 
beef products -3.50 -(7.14) 46.32 
meat products -2.74 -(5.82) 18.77 
vegetable oils -0.95 -(5.96) 11.89 
milk products -2.25 -(6.64) 38.05 
processed rice -2.91 -(2.01) 108.43 
processed sugar -1.95 -(5.19) 110.09 
other foods -2.33 -(7.90) 8.16 
beverages_Tobacco -0.63 -(3.53) 7.43 
textiles -4.21 -(6.08) 3.76 
apparel -3.02 -(7.07) 4.70 
leather -4.48 -(8.10) 5.04 
lumber -1.25 -(3.15) 0.35 
paper, pulp, plastics -1.15 -(2.35) 0.23 
petrochemicals -0.91 -(1.35) 1.13 
chemicals, rubber, plastics -1.03 -(3.69) 1.68 
non-metallic minerals -0.56 -(2.34) 2.09 
iron, steel -3.27 -(4.72) 4.67 
nonferrous metals -2.77 -(5.45) 0.75 
fabricated metals -1.36 -(4.26) 1.28 
motor vehicles -1.64 -(2.39) 4.00 
other transport -1.96 -(6.81) 1.41 
electric machinery -0.62 -(1.27) 0.78 
other machinery -1.55 -(2.92) 0.90 
other manufactures -1.54 -(4.72) 1.22 
Iterated SUR based ;   chi2(57,49): 91836.61, Pr>F 0.00 ;  obs: 106 
Joint test that all negative coefficients are equal: Chi2(18): 1113.46, 0.00 
Joint test that all primary coefficients are equal: Chi2(9): 61.5, 0.00 
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 The estimated relative industry weights for our 33 commodities are reported in 
Table 3.  The full estimating equation also includes indirect service sector effects (not 
shown).36 Several points are striking from the results.  First, unlike the recent literature 
based on U.S. political contributions data, we do not get unbelievably high national 
income/welfare weights.  Indeed, in general, industry weights tend to be around 2 to 3 
times the corresponding weight on national income/welfare.  In other words, special 
interests receive a higher weight than Community welfare does. 
Another striking point is that while manufacturing sectors all receive considerably 
less protection compared to agriculture, their policy weights are actually comparable.  
This implies that there is not much correlation between tariffs and weights, a rather 
counter intuitive result underscored by Figure 2.  In the Figure, we map estimated 
weights against 2001 tariff rates.  As noted earlier, agricultural protection in Europe has 
deep political and historical roots, and results here seem to suggest that tariffs are now 
currently high in   agriculture, not strictly because of the political power of farmer 
groups, but because of the low economy-wide effects that agricultural protection implies. 
To anticipate the econometric results reported below, giving in to the demands of the 
food industry carries relatively little negative implications for other industries compared, 
for example, to steel.37   However, in manufacturing, tariffs and weights move in a more 
congruent way.  The higher weights attached to iron and steel, apparel, textiles, and 
leather are reflected in the higher protection they receive relative to other non-farm 
products.  Still, tariffs are considerably lower in manufacturing to begin with, and hence, 
so are their contributions to overall equilibrium distortion patterns. 
The bottom of table 3 also reports test statistics for Chi-squared tests on linear 
restrictions across parameters.  In particular, if the EU is working like a strict Grossman-
Helpman world, with agents playing locally truthful strategies, then the estimated political 
weights, when significant and with the correct sign, should be zero.  We reject this 
restriction quite strongly.  
 
                                                 
36 Out of curiosity, we also experimented with including a measure of rest-of-world welfare effects.  The rest 
of world receives no significant weighting, based on those regression results. 
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Figure 2 
 
4.5 Deconstructing the Industry Weights 
We now proceed by once again inspecting the influence of individual members, this time 
on the determination of the implicit policy weights assigned by the EU on various 
industries from Table 3. This is done by regressing the estimated relative industry 
weights, abi , against the same political determinants employed in section 2, and the 
industry size indicator per EU-12 country.  In addition, we also estimate tariffs as a 
function of revealed policy weights from Table 3, and as a function of the importance of 
intermediate linkages – INT_SHARE – and whether or not the sector is a food sector – 
FOOD.  In formal terms, we estimate equations (13) and (14) as a system of two 
equations using iterated SUR least squares: 
(13) 
b i / a( ) = C + β1EU _ SH ARE i + β 2 FOO D i + β 3UN SK L i
+ β 4 IN T _ SH ARE i + β m ∆ M ember
m
∑ + ε i
 
                                                                                                                             
37 Put another way, heavy protection for steel would have heavy ramifications for construction, motor 
vehicles, and the machinery sector, whereas protection of rice only hurts consumers, and not so much 
competing industries. 
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(14) 
ln(1 + t)i = α1WEIGHTi + α2INT _ SHAREi + α 3FOODi + ei  
Regression results are reported in Table 4.  The results further underscore the 
findings of low weights being attached to agricultural products, and greater value 
assigned to larger sectors.  This time, however, the negative correlation between 
unskilled-labour intensity and the policy influence of an industry registers as statistically 
insignificant.  Basically, in terms of policy weights, skill intensity does not appear to 
matter.  Neither does sector size.  What does matter is nationality, agricultural 
orientation, and also the strength of intermediate linkages.  In particular, sectors that are 
important for downstream production receive lower policy weights.   
 
Table 4  Iterated SUR regressions for tariffs ln(1+t) and industry weights 
LHS variable RHS variables coefficient z-ratio 
tariff WEIGHT**** 0.055 (2.96) 
 
INT_SHARE*** -0.095 -(2.04) 
 
FOOD**** 0.130 (3.06) 
weight EU_SHARE -409.290 -(1.11) 
 
INT_SHARE**** -2.054 -(3.49) 
 
FOOD** 0.530 (1.73) 
 
UNSKL 0.674 (0.77) 
 
BEL**** 107.995 (3.37) 
 
DNK* -54.612 -(1.53) 
 
FRA* 158.951 (1.57) 
 
DEU 26.427 (0.27) 
 
GBR** 185.084 (1.97) 
 
GRC -8.353 -(0.74) 
 
IRL**** -32.219 -(3.34) 
 
ITA*** 130.452 (2.20) 
 
LUX 15.784 (1.34) 
 
NLD* -51.403 -(1.33) 
 
PRT** 52.427 (1.79) 
 
ESP**** -151.807 -(3.38) 
  intercept**** 2.87 (4.51) 
tariff iterated SUR R-sq: .4769 
  
 
chi2(3,39): 4067, Pr>F 0.00 
  
weight iterated SUR R-sq: .6592 
  
 
chi2(16,26): 81.13, Pr>F 0.00 
  
****:signifies significance at the .01 level. 
  
***:signifies significance at the .05 level. 
  
**:signifies significance at the .10 level. 
  
*:signifies significance at the .15 level. 
  
 
obs:42 
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Turning next to tariff rates themselves, we get as good a fit using the industry 
weights, INT_SHARE, and FOOD as we did with the full specification in Table 4.  In 
other words, the weights do a good job catching the impact of variations in national 
influence within the EU when the overall rate of protection is set.  In addition, as we 
would expect if our Über-Commissioner cared about direct and indirect effects, we find 
that the intensity of intermediate linkages matters, and with the expected sign.  The 
INT_SHARE term also provides insight into agricultural protection.  Processed foods 
are not inputs to industry.  They are consumed directly.  As such, they are easier to 
protect, in a political sense, than sectors like steel and chemicals. 
 
Figure 3   1958 (pre-CET) Tariffs and National Weighting Coefficients 
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  coefficient t-ratio 
intercept -110.79 -(2.11)
1958 tariff 14.72 (3.56)
   
OLS R-squared:  0.678 
F: 12.673, Pr>F: 0.01 
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One final appeal of this exercise is an examination of how the stance of protection 
in 1958 (Figure 1) maps to the influence on EU tariffs in 2001 (Figure 3).  In Figure 3, 
we have plotted actual and predicted weights against 1958 tariff rates prior to the CET 
for the EC12 countries in Figure 1.  It is clear that the countries with the highest revealed 
policy weights in 2001 (France, Britain, Italy) are the ones that had the highest tariffs in 
1958, while the general pattern is one of more protectionist Members continuing to 
influence the policy process in Brussels.    
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The applied literature on political economy determinants of important protection is 
largely focused on the US.  Yet the EU offers a contrasting model.  Both are customs 
unions, though they differ in age.  They also differ in that national governments play a 
more direct role in the EU than do state governments in the US.  There are numerous 
difficulties one can expect in directly observing the political economy underpinnings of 
trade policy in such a Union, where overt lobbying and political contributions can be 
illegal, and where the policy mechanisms themselves have evolved in both ambition and 
complexity.  We work around this problem by using general equilibrium estimates of the 
impact of EU trade policy to then directly estimate the relative political weights assigned 
to industry.  
As a preliminary step, we have explored basic correlations found and discussed in 
the literature.  Results show that industry size may cause coordination problems, leading 
to less protection.  The country origin of industry also matters.   Looking at the revealed 
policy preferences of the individual EU-12 countries, it is possible to make a distinction 
between high- and low- tariff countries.  What is interesting is that this mirrors more or 
less the early classification of countries even before the CET was established in 1968.38  
This suggests that trade policy preferences of countries relative to each other, have 
remained fairly constant in almost 5 decades of European integration.     
                                                 
38 An exception is Germany, which appears to have increased its preference for protection.  However, the 
statistical significance of the German coefficient is rather low in our estimates, thereby making it difficult 
to pose any definitive judgement. 
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To further understand how sectoral interests are valued by policymakers, we have 
estimated the marginal effects of protection on overall and industry incomes as they are 
specified in the objective maximization problem of an influence-driven government 
model.   Using a general equilibrium framework to explicitly derive these estimates, we 
are then able to extract the apparent weights of various industries in the policy process. 
This also allows us to further deconstruct these weights along the lines of industry 
nationality, and other related characteristics.  
Results show several factors reflected in the estimated political weights. First is the 
role of output size.  Standard political economy models, working under the assumption 
of constant-returns-to-scale, consider the marginal impact of protection on factor 
incomes to be neutral to size. Hence, the importance attached to industry size is 
conditional on the amount of lobbying in the sector, as in Grossman & Helpman, or 
conditional on the amount of nominal votes it can deliver.  Our estimates show that the 
specification where output plays a focal role provides a very good fit, suggesting the role 
of size supports the notion in the literature of coordination problems.  Second, the depth 
of intermediate linkages matters.  In particular, in the complex dance of interests that 
defines the pattern of tariffs, and the resulting political weights, the likelihood of 
protection if lower (and net influence is weaker) if special consideration leads to negative 
consequences downstream. 
A third point is that national priorities and industry characteristics matter not only 
for tariffs, but also for the assignment of policy weights.  Explaining why the 
experiments done here consistently point to both the French and British as the most 
prominent players in EU trade policymaking (at least on the import protection side) is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  However, the French result confirms popular beliefs.  
The British (and Italian) results are fully consistent with the original tariff stance in 1958, 
before the birth of the common external tariff.  Indeed, the history of European 
integration is replete with political ordeals related to efforts to cope with British, French 
and Italian insistence on special treatment (the British rebate) and resistance to protection 
(France at the end of the Uruguay Round and during the Doha Round). The most 
infamous example is perhaps the adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy, 
commonly regarded as a condition tied by the French government in 1964 to the second 
round of liberalization in intra-EC manufacturing trade. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that tariff protection, at least in manufacturing, has indeed 
become less important for the EU as compared to the past.  Only non-Europe OECD 
and non-WTO countries39 now face the MFN and tariff peak rates, and even in 
agriculture, further reforms are being introduced (i.e. in sugar).  Still, what our results 
illustrate is that the political economy bedrock of policy making is more complex than a 
more simple analysis would suggest.  Moreover, due to the general equilibrium approach 
taken here, trade policy can be used to deduce the political weights that could be 
reflected in other policies as well.  Hence, while direct evidence on national and regional 
preferences might not be in place, this exercise does convey some indications of the 
general industry weights behind a wider range of policies. 
                                                 
39 Non-Europe OECD: USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, Hong-Kong; 
non-WTO:  Russia, Ukraine, and other State-trading countries. 
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Table 1: Extra-EU Import Shares, Extra-EU Import Protection, and EU Output Shares 
 
Extra-EU import 
shares  2001, (%) 
Extra-EU import 
duties 2001, (%) 
EU output shares  
2001, (%) 
Agriculture 2.830 7.363 1.603 
rice 0.024 53.494 0.005 
wheat 0.084 0.899 0.070 
other grains 0.052 17.951 0.079 
horticulture 0.919 16.551 0.313 
oil seeds 0.383 0.000 0.039 
cane and beet sugar 0.001 9.081 0.027 
plant fibers 0.099 0.000 0.007 
other crops 0.918 2.542 0.323 
Cattle 0.064 11.547 0.164 
other animals 0.202 1.246 0.311 
raw milk 0.006 0.000 0.263 
animal fibers 0.078 0.000 0.002 
Other Primary 8.700 0.052 0.718 
forestry 0.216 0.044 0.126 
fisheries 0.168 2.599 0.234 
coal 0.652 0.000 0.048 
oil 5.224 0.000 0.133 
gas 1.603 0.000 0.058 
other minerals 0.837 0.004 0.119 
Manufactures 61.497 2.556 34.836 
beef products 0.210 46.318 0.422 
other meat 0.224 18.770 0.667 
vegetable oils 0.150 11.888 0.301 
dairy products 0.119 38.054 0.757 
processed rice 0.034 108.427 0.015 
processed sugar 0.111 110.094 0.135 
other processed food 1.744 8.156 1.817 
beverages & processed tobacco 0.375 7.429 0.980 
textiles 2.596 3.765 0.859 
wearing apparel 3.459 4.699 0.668 
leather 1.504 5.041 0.353 
lumber and wood products 1.840 0.347 0.942 
paper, pulp, and publishing 1.406 0.229 2.276 
petrochemicals 1.427 1.131 0.917 
chemicals, rubber, plastics 7.212 1.676 5.189 
non-metallic minerals 1.281 2.087 1.490 
iron and steel 1.294 4.674 1.263 
non-ferrous metals 2.498 0.750 0.719 
fabricated metal products 1.694 1.276 2.079 
motor vehicles 3.987 4.001 3.420 
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Extra-EU import 
shares  2001, (%) 
Extra-EU import 
duties 2001, (%) 
EU output shares  
2001, (%) 
other transport equipment 3.164 1.415 0.736 
electrical machinery 9.861 0.783 2.541 
other machinery 11.940 0.900 4.822 
other manufactures 3.367 1.218 1.468 
Services 26.971 n/a 62.842 
Source: GTAP 6.0 database.  Protection data are from the WTO WITS database.  Trade and output 
data are from UNCTAD-COMTRADE, and from Eurostat. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
Clothes without an Emperor  : 
Analysis of the preferential tariffs in ASEAN* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This chapter examines the current state of intra-ASEAN trade under the 
preferential regime of the AFTA.  It partly addresses some data problems and employs a 
gravity model to arrive at alternative ways of gauging the importance of preferences in 
the absence of data on the actual utilisation of AFTA preferential tariffs.  Our results 
confirm the wide-spread notion that the AFTA preferential scheme is of very little 
consequence to  intra-regional trade.  However, in that limited range of products where 
AFTA might have an influence, preferences seem to matter only when the differential 
margin between the MFN and preferential tariff rates reaches a critical amount, allowing 
regional exporters to cover the costs of requesting preferences.     
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Ambitions of regional integration are steadily increasing in Southeast Asia, especially after 
having seen the completion of an ASEAN40 Free Trade Area (AFTA) in January 2002.  
The next project is no less than the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) by the year 2020, and possibly even earlier, by 2015.41  Yet,  the view is wide-
spread that the most basic of instruments offered by AFTA,  namely, the preferential 
tariffs, are hardly ever used in practice,  with the utilisation rate purportedly reaching  
                                                 
* This chapter is based on a paper co-authored by Miriam Manchin. 
40 Association of South East Asian Nations, established by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand in 1967. Membership was expanded to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), 
Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999).    
41 In the most recent ASEAN Summit of December 2005, the Heads of States discussed the possibility of 
advancing the target date.  The proposal will be subjected for further study.  
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merely 5% of total intra-ASEAN imports42.  The significant fall of MFN tariffs, partly 
explains the diminished importance of preferences, while others point to the high 
administrative costs of utilisation and other non-tariff measures (NTMs) which raises the 
effective price of intra-regional imports. 
Unilateral liberalisation can favour the creation of more trade, reveal the strong 
intent of transforming the region into an attractive production base, and indeed, gives 
substance to the rhetoric of open regionalism.   On the other hand, the hurdles posed by 
NTMs, and other high costs implied by administrative and rules of origin compliance, are 
obviously more malign, casting doubts on the sustainability of future regional efforts.  
ASEAN has been or currently negotiating a series of FTAs with third parties, which 
includes an FTA with China by 2012, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership (including 
elements of a possible FTA) with Japan, also by 2012, and an FTA with India at the 
earliest by 2011, latest by 2016.  Bilateral FTAs between individual members and non-
ASEAN are numerous: 8 WTO-notified agreements and a total of 26 non-reported 
initiatives (ADB, 2006; pp. 277- 278).  If the obstacles of free trade within ASEAN can 
not  be sufficiently addressed,  then the prospects of new agreements which permit an 
even more limited market opening can only be pessimistic. 
While considerable work has been done on estimating the probable impact of 
AFTA, as well as its possible trade diverting and creating effects43, there is no study 
known to the authors, which sought to evaluate the actual impact of preferences and the 
extent of the chilling effects of NTMs on intra-ASEAN trade.  This is hardly surprising 
given the numerous data problems that would draw against any such attempt.  Data 
sharing is merely voluntary in ASEAN, and so is the reporting on the incidence of 
preference utilisation.  According to the Bureau of Economic Integration of the ASEAN 
Secretariat, there is not one single year since the CEPT Scheme began in 1993, where 
data from the so-called Form D44 is available for all 6 original AFTA countries45, and if 
some data exist for some countries, the information is often on a quarterly basis and 
                                                 
42 See for instance: Baldwin (2006), Severino (2006), The Economist (07/29/04), Cuyvers et al (2005). 
43 See for instance Frankel and Wei (1996), Soloaga and Winters (1999), Cernat (2001), Clarete, Edmonds, 
and Wallack (2002), Gosh and Yamarik (2002), Dee and Gali (2003), Elliot and Ikemoto (2004), Lee and 
Park (2005). 
44 The total amount of intra-ASEAN imports granted preferential rates under the CEPT Scheme can be 
extracted from the Form D certificates. 
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incomplete for the relevant year.  This means that existing estimates, such as the 5% 
utilisation rate often quoted in the literature is based on interviews or extrapolation but 
not on actual utilisation data.  Another problem stems from the fact that product codes 
used in the submission of trade and tariff data are inconsistent, and even differ across 
some member countries, making the actual trade coverage of various rates of preferential 
tariffs impossible to track and compare across all AFTA participants. 
The evaluation of AFTA’s success or failure is thus often based on the number of 
tariff lines covered by the liberalisation scheme, and on the extent of tariff reduction 
under the preferential scheme.  On both grounds, a rather positive judgement could be 
rendered.  From the very start of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
Scheme in 1993, product coverage was already as high as 88.1%, and at present, 
preferences are applicable to 98.8% of the tariff lines.   In terms of tariff liberalisation, 
average tariff rates imposed on ASEAN imports, fell from an average of 12.76% in 1993 
to 1.87% at present, while unilateral tariff reduction among ASEAN-6 has also been 
substantial, as seen from the drop of MFN tariffs from 20% in 1994 to 8.16% in 2003 
(ASEAN Secretariat, CEPT tariff database)46.  
The critical question is clearly the extent to which AFTA has induced more trade 
among its members.  In absolute terms, trade within the region is low, with intra-
ASEAN exports and imports in 2004 accounting for only 22.55% and 21.96% of total, 
respectively.  Relative to 1993 figures, this is an improvement of only 1.4 percentage 
points for exports and 4.6 for imports.    
AFTA must not be judged in the traditional Vinerian sense, but seen as part of a 
regional competitiveness strategy, especially in the context of the spectacular rise of 
China and the emerging dynamism of India.  It is therefore FDI and MFN liberalisation 
that matters.  In a series of recent studies and policy recommendations internal to the 
ASEAN Secretariat, it has nonetheless been strongly noted, that the key threat to 
competitiveness is the continued fragmentation of the regional market, which hinders the 
full exploitation of the complementarities of member economies, and increases the costs 
of doing business in the region (Schwarz and Villinger,2004).  To make ASEAN an 
                                                                                                                             
45 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
46 See Consolidated CEPT Package data: http://www.aseansec.org/12025.htm.  
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attractive FDI destination, there is therefore a renewed thrust to assess the remaining 
tariff and especially, non-tariff barriers, and identify the principal constraints limiting the 
use of the AFTA preferential scheme.   
The absence of key facts about the actual impact of preferences on intra-ASEAN 
trade is one of the most important obstacles faced by analysts and policymakers alike.  
Without complete reporting of preference utilisation by Member countries, one can only 
rely on the actual trade and tariff data.  Further problems arise from the data due to the 
lack of congruence between the product codes used. Moreover, detailed comparison of 
individual country trade patterns is hampered by lack of uniformity in data submissions 
at the most disaggregated level.  
This chapter is therefore a tentative attempt to examine the current state of intra-
ASEAN trade under the preferential regime of the AFTA.  It partly addresses some data 
problems and explores alternative ways of gauging the importance of preferences in the 
absence of actual data on its usage.  The incidence of non-tariff measures will also be 
scanned, focusing on the products carrying high preferences but which are revealed to be 
underexploited.  Our results confirm the wide-spread impression that the AFTA 
preferential scheme is of very little consequence to  intra-regional trade.  However, in 
that limited range of products where AFTA might have an influence, preferences seem 
to matter only when the differential margin between the MFN and preferential tariff rates 
reaches a critical amount, allowing regional exporters to cover the costs of requesting 
preferences.     
The chapter is organized as follows:  the following section provides a brief overview 
of the literature quantifying the possible trade and welfare effects of AFTA.  The third 
section discusses data sources and methodology, while the fourth section lays out the 
results.  Section 5 give gives a summary and concludes. 
 
5.2  Regionalism Effects in ASEAN 
Empirical work carried out on ASEAN is largely focussed on the trade creation and trade 
diversion impact of preferential trade regimes in the region.    While net trade creation is 
clearly the superior result in efficiency terms, the fact that policies are produced in the 
political market shifts expectations towards a trade-diverting  outcome.  In this context, 
the predominantly trade-creating result of ASEAN regionalism that emerges from 
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various empirical studies (see Table 5.1) may seem unusual, but it is hardly surprising if 
one is reminded of the heavy external orientation of ASEAN trade.   
The most commonly-used approach in empirically testing the trade effects of 
regionalism is the gravity model which attempts to establish what would have been the 
natural bilateral trading pattern one may expect based on income, distance, language and 
other country characteristics.  Policy shocks, such as the formation of a discriminatory 
grouping is often  introduced to the model through the use of dummy variables, in order 
to determine whether or not these have led to a concentration of trade among members 
at the expense of trade with the rest of the world. 
Using this approach, Frankel and Wei (1996) found the intra-ASEAN bias to be 
significant for every year of the period under study (1970 – 1992)47.  This means that 
though simple trade shares portray regional trade to be less significant relative to 
ASEAN’s external trade, two members trade 600% more than two otherwise identical 
economies.48   This bias persists even if the entrepot role of Singapore is addressed, 
through the addition of an additional dummy for bilateral trade that involves Singapore.  
Moreover, the intra-ASEAN orientation is only slightly reduced when the openness of 
ASEAN, which is significantly more than what is predicted by the model, is accounted 
for.   The ASEAN effect, however, disappears when the East Asian bloc is tested 
simultaneously.  This would imply that the earlier observed bias may not be due to 
preferentialism within ASEAN itself, but part of a more prevailing propensity to trade 
within the larger East Asian bloc.  This  is consistent with the finding of Lee and Park 
(2002), who likewise find ASEAN regionalism to have a significantly positive effect on 
intra and extra-regional trade, but find the statistical significance of the AFTA bloc also 
fading out when estimated with the ASEAN+3 grouping (China, Japan and South 
Korea).  In terms of extra-bloc openness, Frankel and Wei found some (albeit 
insignificant) indication of  decline due to the 1991 decision to form an AFTA.  
                                                 
47 However, this is close to the median and mode of the yearly estimates from 1965 - 1992 made by Frankel 
(1996) of the 6 FTAs considered: EC, EFTA, US-Canada FTA, Mercosur, Andean Group and ASEAN 
(Frankel, 1996).  
48 They do issue a reminder, however, that for groupings with fewer members, the estimate of regional bloc 
bias is rather imprecise as suggested by the accompanying large standard error.  Extra-bloc measures, 
instead, are more accurate and reveal a strong outward orientation by members. 
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Compared to 1980, though, external openness has increased in 1992, the last year of the 
sample. 
Table 5. 1  Gravity model estimates of the effect of AFTA  
                   on intra and extra-bloc trade  
Authors Results 
 intra-bloc extra-bloc 
Frankel & Wei, 1996 + + 
Soloaga & Winters, 1999 - + 
Cernat, 2001  + 
Clarete, Edmonds, & Wallack, 
2002 
0 - 
Gosh & Yamarik, 2002  + 
Dee & Gali, 2003 - + 
Elliot & Ikemoto, 2004 + + 
Lee & Park, 2005 - 
(but coef. insignificant) 
+ 
Note:  A positive sign in the intra-bloc column refers to an intra-ASEAN bias, that is, ASEAN 
tending to have higher trade within the region beyond what can be expected from their economic, 
geographic, or cultural characteristics.  A positive or negative sign in the extra-bloc column 
indicates the propensity to under- or over-import from non-members, relative to the normal 
import rates indicated by the gravity model. 
  
A slightly different picture emerges from the gravity estimates produced by Soloaga 
and Winters (1999).  Investigating 9 major blocs over the period of 1980 to 1996, they 
find a highly significant increase in the extra-bloc coefficients, together with a fall in 
intra-ASEAN trade.  In an Asian Development Bank study by Clarete, Edmonds and 
Wallack (2002), which extends the analysis up to 2000, they instead showed that AFTA 
might have reduced extra-ASEAN trade, and found no evidence of an effect on the 
pattern of intra-regional exports and imports.   The inclusion of the new ASEAN 
members, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam in the 1990s, may have 
diluted the impact of regionalism, being less outward oriented and less developed relative 
to the rest of ASEAN. 
The overall welfare effects of bloc formation, on the other hand, is better addressed 
employing a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which can simulate real 
income effects as well as changes in sectoral production and factor prices.  Earlier studies 
using the ASEAN linked CGE model49 point to a positive but minimal effect of an 
                                                 
49 See for example Adams & Park (1995), Nadal de Simone (1995), Imada, Montes & Naya (1991), Felipe and 
Wescott (1992) 
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AFTA on overall income and trade flows.  Adams and Park (1995), for instance, report a 
welfare change of 0.6% for Indonesia  and 0.67% for the Philippines, and 1.34% for 
Thailand and 1.6% for Malaysia (1.6).  Results from more recent CGE Studies using the 
GTAP model and data base also range around the same magnitudes.  Park (2000) using 
the GTAP 3 version,  find a percentage change in GDP of only 0.65% for ASEAN, with 
Indonesia experiencing the lowest gain (0.1) and the largest increase accruing to the 
Philippines (1.54).  However, the results of Ando and Urata (2005) show that 
transforming AFTA into East-Asian FTA that would include China, Japan and South 
Korea, leads to a significant rise in ASEAN output, especially in chemical products 
(12%), machinery (6%), and electronic machinery (10).  These findings reflect the weight 
of East-Asian trade for ASEAN, and the importance of capital accumulation, 
institutional convergence and trade facilitation, which Ando and Urata  (2005) attempted 
to take into account in their work.   
 
5.3  Structure of ASEAN trade under the Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff Scheme 
 
Data Sources 
Although trade and tariff data are available at the most disaggregated level for ASEAN 
through the ASEAN Secretariat database50, they can not be combined for regression 
purposes due to frequent changes in the product codes used across countries and years.  
A harmonized product nomenclature in ASEAN, the AHTN,  has only been recently in 
force51, and is used only for the reporting of the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) rates. Trade values and MFN tariffs, however, are not reported with the same 
ASEAN nomenclature, but with the 9-digit HS classification instead. Thailand further 
adds to the unevenness of the data by employing a 7-digit HS classification in its 
submissions.  To address these problems, it has been necessary to limit the number of 
                                                 
50 See http://www.aseansec.org/12025.htm.  
51 The ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature (AHTN), that took effect in 2004, is at an 8-digit level of 
classification for over 10,000 items, and is consistent with the 6-digit HS classification of 2002. 
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years and countries under study,  and to converge the preferential tariff rates sourced 
from the ASEAN secretariat with the MFN and trade data base of WITS52. 
 
Sectoral and country structure of AFTA preferences  
Table 5.2 describes the structure of AFTA preferences per sector for the periods 2001 to  
2003, given the data assembled for this study.  Both MFN and CEPT tariffs are relatively 
higher in plastics, footwear, textile & clothing, and machineries sectors than in other 
sectors.   The average CEPT rates fall within the allowable range of 5% and below53, 
while for most sectors, the average difference between MFN and CEPT tariff rates hover 
around the 10-15% range, with the exception of stone (7.7%) and metals (5.2%) sectors. 
However, using a more disaggregated breakdown of sectoral trade (HS6), it 
becomes immediately apparent that for most of intra-ASEAN products, the margin 
between MFN and CEPT rates is actually zero.   On one hand, 94.3% of tariff lines 
already fall within the 5% AFTA limit54, covering 90.9% of total intra-ASEAN imports 
in 2003 (see Table 3.2).55   Half of intra-ASEAN imports in terms of trade value are also 
covered by duty-free tariffs under the AFTA.  But since MFN tariffs have also fallen 
rapidly in the last decade56, the low CEPT rates do not translate into significant 
advantages or benefits for regional traders.   In fact, for about 84%57 of total trade in 
2001 and 2003, the difference between MFN and CEPT rates is merely 5 percentage 
points and below.  While ASEAN has fulfilled its agreement to eliminate import duties 
on 60% of the products in their normal inclusion lists by 200358, the continuing process 
                                                 
52 WITS is a combined database from UN’s COMTRADE, UNCTAD’s TRAINS and the WTO’s database. 
53 Under the AFTA, members are allowed to impose up to 5% tariffs on  ASEAN imports, and higher than 
5% tariffs for products recently transferred from temporary exclusion and/or the list of sensitive products 
into the normal liberalisation track.   
54 Under the CEPT Scheme, tariffs must be brought down to the range of 0-5%. 
55 Including Singapore, whose trade is 100% duty-free, the coverage slightly rises to 95.7% of tariff 
lines and 93.2% of total value of imports.  Thailand, however, is not included given the 
incompleteness of data for 2003.  The rates of 94.3% and 90.9% are derived by summing the first 
two columns of the CEPT rates in Table 3.2 for ASEAN. 
56 Zero MFN tariffs are applied to slightly more than a third of imports for Indonesia, Philippines and 
Thailand, and two thirds for Malaysia and 99.8% for Singapore.  See table A.1 in Annex for more details 
on the breakdown of MFN tariffs. 
57 Sum of first two columns of Preference Margins in Table 3.2. 
58 This target was reached in 2004 when Thailand and the Philippines have complied with their commitment 
under the Protocol to eliminate intra-ASEAN import duties.  As of writing, 64.19% of products in the 
inclusion list are duty-free within ASEAN (AFTA Council, 2005).  
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of  unilateral liberalisation of MFN tariffs, has led to the redundancy of preferences for a 
large range of products.  
With the exception of  Malaysia and Singapore, most of the CEPT tariff lines is 
pegged at the maximum AFTA rate of 5% tariffs.  In terms of trade values, however, it is 
the zero CEPT  rate that covers  most of imports for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Singapore in 2003.  As far as the top imports (in value terms) of these countries (see 
table 5.1 in Annex) are concerned,  all carry zero or low CEPT and MFN rates so that 
for the most important products traded across ASEAN, preferential rates have negligible 
impact.    
Table 5.2  Average MFN, preferential tariffs, and difference between 
MNF and preferential tariffs, 2001 - 2003 
Sectors Ave 
MFN 
(%) 
Ave  
CEPT 
(%) 
Ave. 
diff. 
(%) 
Max 
diff. 
(%) 
Min 
diff. 
(%) 
Standard 
deviation of 
diff. (%) 
Import 
value 
($million) 
Other 12.7 2.7 10.0 52.5 0.2 7.3 0.3 
agriculture 14.2 2.5 11.7 153.9 0.1 11.0 6.5 
minerals 13.9 2.7 11.2 32.5 0.0 7.3 1.4 
chemicals 16.5 2.9 13.7 45.0 0.3 10.0 0.4 
Plastics 18.4 3.1 15.3 35.0 0.5 9.3 0.05 
Leather 17.2 3.0 14.2 60.0 0.3 9.4 0.8 
Wood & 
paper 
14.2 2.8 11.4 35.0 0.2 8.1 0.9 
Textiles & 
clothing 
17.4 2.9 14.5 40.0 0.2 10.4 0.3 
footwear 17.5 3.1 14.3 30.0 0.3 8.7 1.4 
Stone 9.7 2.0 7.7 87.5 0.2 8.2 1.2 
Metals 6.4 1.2% 5.2 27.5 0.2 5.2 0.6 
machinery 16.9% 2.6% 14.3% 170.0% 0.1% 18.7% 1798039 
Total 
trade 
14.6% 2.6% 12.0% 64.1% 0.2% 9.5% 15782071 
 
Table 5.3 also illustrate that the product space where preferential tariffs could 
stimulate intra-ASEAN trade is indeed quite  limited.  The ASEAN trade value shares of 
products having preferential tariff margins of above 5 percentage points is only 14.86% 
(12.62%) of  total imports in 2001 (2003)59.  Given the high documentation and other 
administrative costs incurred in complying with the requirements of the preferential 
scheme (Schwarz and Villinger,2004), one would expect that only sufficiently high 
                                                 
59 Sum of trade value shares of products having preferential margins of 6% and above. 
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differentials between MFN and CEPT rates would prompt regional producers and 
traders to take up the preferences accorded by AFTA.    As shown in Table 5.2, products 
where margins go over 10 percentage points account for only 10.77% of total imports in 
2001 and 7.13% in 2003. 
 
5.4  Empirical Analysis 
Analysis at aggregate level 
We initially conduct an experiment that tests the importance of preferential tariffs, 
employing data at the aggregate level.  As earlier mentioned, data availability constrains us 
to limit the analysis to the period of 2001 – 2003.  Reporting (importing) countries in the 
analysis include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. Annex A.3 lists all partner 
countries which comprises all available trading partners. The decision to focus on only 
four countries, is due to the fact that preferences no longer matter for Singapore and 
Brunei given the predominance of zero MFN tariffs.    The new members, on the other 
hand, are yet to fully implement the CEPT scheme60, and together account for a small 
share in intra-ASEAN trade.  
To measure the importance of trade preferences on intra-ASEAN trade flows we 
use a gravity model which explains the volume of bilateral trade flows between countries. 
The origins of the model date back to Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhonen (1963) and the 
theoretical derivation of the gravity model has been further developed by Anderson 
(1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff (1995), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003). Anderson and Wincoop (2003) argue that bilateral trade flows 
depend on the destination and origin price effects, which are themselves related to the 
existence of trade barriers, which they call “multilateral resistance”. They propose a 
method which consistently and efficiently estimates gravity equations by controlling for 
price effects in both the destination and origin markets (and for other regional 
specificities which would be omitted) by including origin and destination fixed effects in 
all equations. Since our dataset ranges over time, prices should also change over time. To 
                                                 
60 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have later deadlines to implement the CEPT scheme: 
Vietnam by 2006, Laos and Myanmar by 2008 and Cambodia by 2010. 
  110 
control for these changes, we therefore include origin and destination fixed-effects, 
interacted with time dummies.61 
For the analysis at the aggregate level we estimate the following equation: 
(1) 
ijkttjtit
ijtitjijijtijt
uTIE
LanguageColonyDtariffX
++++
++++=
765
4321 lnlnln
βββ
ββββα
 
The dependent variable is Xijt,  is the aggregate bilateral import from country i to 
country j in period t.  The variable tariff measures bilateral tariffs between country i and j 
in period t. Dij is distance between the partner countries which proxies trading costs. To 
capture historical linkages between trading partners a zero-one type dummy variable was 
included in the regression for colonial links (Colony). Common language can also greatly 
reduce transaction costs, hence the inclusion of a dummy for the trading partners having 
a common language. Tt are time fixed effects, while Eit and Ijt are exporter and importer 
time varying fixed effects.  
Gravity models often include GDP for both reporter and partner countries 
capturing the size of the economy. In our specification the time varying country fixed 
effects capture among other things the impact of the size of the economy on trade. 
Moreover, including time varying reporter and partner fixed effects together with GDP 
data would give rise to a multicollinearity problem; therefore we adopt the specification 
proposed by Anderson and Wincoop (2003), dropping the GDP data in the estimation.  
The objective of the econometric analysis at the aggregate level is to estimate the 
effects of preferential AFTA tariffs on trade flows of AFTA member countries. The 
available trade data does not distinguish between products imported under MFN tariffs 
and those where the privilege to avail lower preferential tariffs was invoked. Even though 
in principle AFTA member countries apply preferential tariffs between each other, there 
can be several restrictions, such as rules of origin or other non tariff barriers, which 
would limit the use of the preferential tariffs within AFTA reducing the importance of 
AFTA’s preferences on its member states. To proxy the importance of preferences for 
trade between AFTA members the results of two specifications are compared. The first 
specification uses MFN tariffs between ASEAN and their partner countries while the 
second specification uses preferential tariffs for trade between ASEAN countries and 
                                                 
61 See Francois and Woerz (2006) using similar specification. 
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MFN for the rest of the countries. If preferential tariffs indeed exert an impact on intra-
ASEAN trade flows, then we should expect the second specification to have a greater 
explanatory power relative to the first model, as revealed by higher R-squared. 
 
Table 5.3  Importance of preferences in 2001/2003: shares of total intra-ASEAN 
imports and shares of total tariff lines (in italics) covered by the CEPT 
Scheme  
0 0.5 - 5 6 - 10 11- 15 15< excl 0 0.5-5 6 - 10 11- 15
Indonesia
2001 40.6 53.1 2.9 0.4 0.0 3.2 52.3 37.5 5.2 0.4
29.4 66.6 3.2 0.7 0.6
2003 38.4 44.4 3.2 4.2 0.0 9.9 51.4 25.2 7.0 1.5
28.6 66.6 3.9 0.9 0.0
Malaysia
2001 68.6 27.9 1.8 0.5 0.1 1.1 80.2 5.4 4.3 5.4
49.3 7.3 2.3 0.7 0.0
2003 66.8 28.9 1.7 0.4 1.4 0.9 78.7 4.9 4.7 5.8
49.1 43.5 4.3 2.0 0.9
Philippines
2001 43.6 52.1 2.5 0.8 0.2 0.9 64.3 27.0 4.9 1.2
17.9 77.5 3.9 0.4 0.3
2003 52.6 41.8 3.5 0.2 0.3 3.0 66.0 24.4 4.8 2.6
18.5 76.5 4.1 0.5 0.5
Thailand
2001 35.9 59.2 2.4 2.4 0.1 0.0 54.3 13.3 2.0 19.4
4.7 84.7 5.9 4.6 0.3
ASEAN-4
2001 47.2 48.1 2.4 1.0 0.1 1.3 62.8 20.8 4.1 6.6
25.3 59.0 3.8 1.6 0.3
2003 52.6 38.3 2.8 1.6 0.6 4.6 65.3 18.2 5.5 3.3
32.1 62.2 4.1 1.1 0.5
CEPT Rates Preference Margins
Note:   Shares in terms of total tariff lines (HS6) are reported in italics.   
Data for Thailand is incomplete for the year 2003. 
 
Results of Aggregate Regressions 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the OLS regressions performed using the two different 
model specifications discussed earlier. The first column carries the results of the first 
regression, which uses the preferential CEPT rates between AFTA countries for the tariff 
variable, while the results shown in the second column refer to the experiment using 
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MFN tariffs, also for country pairs which are eligible for AFTA preferences. Both 
specifications use time varying country specific dummies and time dummies.  
The results in Table 5.4 indicate that the coefficient of the tariff variable is high and 
significant for both specifications.  This is consistent with the usual expectations with 
regard to the negative trade effects of tariffs.  In this case, a one per cent rise in tariffs 
would decrease trade by around 180%.  More importantly, the results indicate that taking 
the preferential tariffs between ASEAN members into account does not significantly 
change the outcomes, with coefficients of all the variables remaining almost the same, 
and  the R-squared of the two different specifications being almost identical. We also 
implemented a Hausmann specification test to assess if the two specifications are 
significantly different from each other and the results of the test indicate that the two 
specifications are not significantly different from each other. This leads us to conclude 
that preferences applicable between ASEAN countries,  have indeed not wielded any 
important influence on their trade flows during the period under study.  
Table 5.4  OLS regressions using aggregate trade flows 
 With preferential tariffs Without preferential tariffs 
Ldistance  -0.811 -0.804 
 (0.259)*** (0.259)*** 
Common language 0.292 0.289 
 (0.189) (0.189) 
Colony 0.485 0.485 
 (0.542) (0.542) 
LTariffs -5.263 -5.186 
 (1.205)*** (1.201)*** 
Constant 10.671 10.600 
 (3.021)*** (3.021)*** 
Observations 1770 1770 
R-squared 0.8834 0.8834 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8181 0.8180 
Notes: Time fixed effects and time varying reporter and partner fixed effects are included in the 
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Analysis at disaggregated level 
We now focus the analysis on the disaggregated trade flows in order to further explore 
the effects of preferences on trade flows and to provide an approximate estimate of the 
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costs of requesting preferences under the AFTA. Since the data at hand does not 
distinguish between trade flows using MFN tariffs and those that utilized preferential 
tariff rates, we carry out the present analysis using normal trade flows. While the obtained 
estimates do not provide a precise quantification of the costs of preferences because of 
these data constraints, we nevertheless are able to obtain an indicative estimate of the 
importance of preferences for trade flows and of the  minimum level of preferences 
needed in order to have a positive trade stimulating effect on intra-AFTA trade flows.    
The disaggregated analysis is conducted at 6-digit HS level and includes Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand as reporting countries and the same four countries 
and Singapore as partner countries. Thus we excluded those trade flows for which the 
third country tariffs were zero or equal to the preferential tariff. The disaggregated trade 
data covers the period 2001-2003 which yields a database of 42,268 observations on 
bilateral trade flows.62  Data on geographical variables were obtained from the Paris 
based Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
The analysis at the disaggregate level also requires a variable which would capture 
the otherwise omitted price effects. Prices are expected to be different in each sector, 
thus to correctly account for price effects we include time varying country specific fixed 
effects interacted with sectoral dummies.63 The following specification is used for the 
disaggregated regression:  
(2) 
ijktktjtkitk
ijtijijktijkt
uSTIE
LanguageDPREFX
++++++
+++=
7654
321 lnlnln
ββββ
βββα
 
The dependent variable Xijkt, is the bilateral import from country i to country j in period t 
of product k. Country i and j are limited to 5 ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and products k are limited to those for 
which there is an applicable preferential tariff according to the AFTA. The specification 
is very similar to those of the aggregate regressions. The main difference is that instead of 
using bilateral preferential tariffs or MFN tariffs, we include the preference margins (the 
difference between MFN and preferential tariffs relative to MFN tariffs) in the 
                                                 
62 Data for Thailand for the year 2001 is not available.  
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regressions. The variable PREF captures the impact of different preference margins on 
bilateral trade flows, and is constructed in the following way: 
(3) 
Difference
MNF
PTMFNPREF *)1(
)(ln
+
−
=  
where PT is the preferential tariff, MFN, the third country tariff, and Difference stands for 
several dummy variables which capture the difference between MFN and preferential 
tariffs. A total of fifteen dummy variables were interacted with the preference margin, 
each created for every 5% differential in MFN and preferential rates, all the way up to 
50% margin, after which dummies correspond to margins of 10%.64 The coefficient of 
the preference margin interacted with these dummy variables, thus indicates the region of 
tariff differentials where an impact on bilateral trade flows can be expected to take effect. 
Etik and Iitk  are time varying reporter and partner fixed-effects interacted with sectoral 
dummies, while Tt  and Sk, correspond to time fixed effects and sector specific fixed 
effects, respectively.  
 
Results of disaggregate regressions 
While the results from analyzing aggregate trade flows showed that preferences offered 
under AFTA did not have a significant effect on trade flows of beneficiary countries, we 
nonetheless intend with the subsequent analysis to determine the margin of preferences 
relative to MFN rates, where AFTA might have a stimulating impact on trade. 
From the results based on disaggregated data presented in Table 5.5, it is apparent 
that distance has a smaller negative effect on intra-ASEAN trade than on ASEAN 
countries’ trade with the rest of the world.  Although high internal land transport costs 
are said to characterize much of ASEAN, port logistics between the main regional trade 
routes (largely involving Singapore) are believed to be cost efficient.  
Turning to the role of preferences, fifteen variables were included in the regression 
to capture the importance of preference margin on trade flows. Results reveal that the 
                                                                                                                             
63 Chen (2004) also uses sector and country specific fixed effects to capture price effects in each sector and 
country, however she has a cross-section data and therefore she does not use time varying fixed effects.  
64 In other words the fifteen dummies capture when the difference between third country tariffs and MFN 
tariffs are 0-5%, 5-10%, 10-15%, 15-20%, 20-25%, 25-30%, 30-35%, 35-40%, 40-45%, 45-50%, 50-60%, 
60-70%, 70-80%, 80-90%, or more than 90%. 
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preference margin has a negative significant effect on trade when the difference between 
third country tariffs and preferential tariffs are lower than five per cent. This might be 
because the costs of requesting the preferences, such as administrative costs, and the 
costs of complying with the rules of origin requirements of AFTA are higher than the 
benefits expected from obtaining the  preferential treatment. When the difference 
between preferential and MFN tariffs are between five to 10 per cent, the coefficient 
remains negative but becomes insignificant. While margins of 10 to 25 percentage points 
register a slightly positive effect, the coefficient is insignificant.  Preferences start to have 
a trade stimulating effect only when preferential tariffs are at least 25 percentage points 
lower than the MFN rates. These results suggest that the costs of requesting preferences 
within AFTA might be in the range of 10-25%. Nevertheless, one has to bear in mind 
that these results are not based on actual utilization rates but normal intra-regional trade 
flows which do not take into account whether preferential tariffs were actually applied or 
not.   
The cost estimates obtained are somewhat larger than those found in the literature 
for other preference schemes. Herin (1986) estimates that in EFTA countries, the costs 
of documentation and the administration of origin rules, which is the principal part of 
increased costs for preferential trade, add some 3 per cent of the value of the goods 
traded to total exporter costs. Manchin (2006) finds that costs of requesting preferences 
for ACP countries under the Cotonou preference scheme of the EU is around 4-4.5 per 
cent of the value of goods traded. More recent work on NAFTA by Carrère and de Melo 
(2004) finds that average total compliance costs were 6.2% in 2001. Using double-
censored tobit estimation techniques, they obtain a compliance cost estimate of 3.9% for 
products where the utilization rate is below 100%.65 Estimating the costs for NAFTA, 
Cadot et al. (2005) measure the trade-weighted compliance (administrative) costs to be 
6.8% (1.9%) and for the Pan-European preference scheme to be around 8% (6.8%).   
Interestingly, for products with very high preference margins, the impact of 
preferences is reversed and turns negative.  The immediate explanations that come to 
mind are the presence of NTMs that inhibits trade, the negligible supply of the product 
                                                 
65 See also Anson et al. (2005), who estimate that in the case of NAFTA average compliance costs are around 
6 percent, offsetting the preferential tariff differential of about 4 percent... Administrative costs chewed up 
about half of the value of preferential access for Mexican firms. 
  116 
within the region, or redundancy due to other regional import substitution instruments in 
place.  
Table 5.5 OLS regressions using disaggregated data 
Difference between preferential and MFN tariffs 
(in % points) in parenthesis 
Limportsvalue Limportsvalue 
Ldistance -0.211 -0.214 
 (0.041)*** (0.041)*** 
Common language 0.188 0.188 
 (0.055)*** (0.055)*** 
Difference1 (0-5) -0.059 -0.057 
 (0.026)** (0.026)** 
Difference2 (5-10) -0.034 -0.031 
 (0.036) (0.036) 
difference3 (10-15) 0.018 0.018 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
difference4 (15-20) 0.045 0.049 
 (0.057) (0.056) 
difference5 (20-25) 0.092 0.094 
 (0.070) (0.070) 
difference6 (25-30) 0.194 0.197 
 (0.081)** (0.081)** 
difference7 (30-35) 0.392 0.392 
 (0.119)*** (0.119)*** 
difference8 (35-40) 0.339 0.337 
 (0.181)* (0.181)* 
difference9 (40-45) 1.080 1.085 
 (0.333)*** (0.333)*** 
difference10 (45-50) 0.968 0.934 
 (0.277)*** (0.277)*** 
difference11 (50-60) 0.700 0.695 
 (0.352)** (0.351)** 
difference12 (60-70) -0.310 -0.300 
 (1.119) (1.119) 
difference13 (70-80) 4.020 4.044 
 (2.259)* (2.258)* 
difference14 (80-90) -11.106 -11.067 
 (4.455)** (4.451)** 
difference15 (90- -5.155 -5.176 
 (2.329)** (2.327)** 
Substantial transformation  -0.932 
  (0.112)*** 
Observations 42268 42268 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 
Time fixed effects; sectoral dummies and time varying sector-specific reporter and partner fixed 
effects are included in the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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A dummy variable was included in the regression (see second column in Table 5.5) 
capturing the effects when traders can choose between satisfying the value-added 
requirement or an alternative rule requiring specific production processes to be 
performed in order to obtain the originating status for the product66. The variable is 
significant and the coefficient is negative indicating that trade in these products is lower 
than what would be normally expected. The results imply that despite the provision of a 
more flexible origin rule, the requirements for obtaining originating status for these 
products might still be too restrictive. It is also true that ASEAN sources its textiles 
imports largely from outside the region such as China, US, EU and South Asia.  This 
would imply that the amount of preferential margins given to textiles, are insufficient to 
alter the competitive position of regional producers vis-à-vis their non-ASEAN 
counterparts. 
Table 5.6 examines in detail some of the products that register the highest margin of 
preferences, looking at the incidence of non-tariff measures, and the value of imports as 
a share of total intra-ASEAN trade. For Thai imports of women’s / girls’ silk blouses 
(HS 620610) from ASEAN, for instance, a preference margin of 60 percentage points is 
applicable, but out of the total imports of Thailand for this product, only 5.58% is 
sourced from ASEAN.  In fact, for half of the product groups in this list, trade shares 
hover around the 1 percent range.  This propensity to extend high preferences on 
products where little or no intra-ASEAN trade takes place is sometimes  referred  to  as  
the  ‘snow-plough’ effect (Menon, 2005), referring to the failed ASEAN Preferential 
Trading Arrangement67 where preferences are given mostly to trade-irrelevant products 
such as snow-ploughs.  Incidentally, a remnant of this proverbial example can still be 
seen here: (HS 870310), vehicles especially designed for travelling in snow.  
Countries that confer the highest margins also appear to be the ones that impose 
non-tariff measures on these same products.  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand, for instance, offer high margins for vehicles in the HS 870310 category, but all 
four countries likewise impose non-tariff measures on that product.  Malaysia, also 
imposed quantity control measures on vehicle products, some of which register the 
                                                 
66 Since 1995, an alternative change of tariff heading (CTH) rule is allowed for textiles and clothing products. 
67 The ASEAN Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA) was instituted in 1977. See Cuyvers and Pupphavesa 
(1996) for discussion of the pre-AFTA economic cooperation policies of ASEAN.  
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highest margins found in ASEAN (148%).    The coincidence of large tariff discounts 
and NTMs, clearly reveal the remaining areas of import substitution which are resistant 
to liberalisation even if limited to AFTA countries.   
The only high margin item in Table 5.6 with a large share in total  intra-ASEAN  
imports is vehicle bodies (HS 870710), 97% of which consists of Malaysian imports from 
Thailand.   Here, imports are mainly driven by an industrial complementation scheme68, 
wherein the buyer, source, and brand are pre-specified under the terms set by the said 
regional program.  Other than tariff preferences, products included in this program also 
enjoy local-content accreditation, and other non-tariff incentives.   The large margins 
observed here for vehicle bodies are therefore likely to be redundant, and moreover, they 
originate not from the importer, which is Malaysia, but from the principal exporter, 
Thailand.   The  substantial differential in preferences in this case therefore merely 
reflects Thailand’s import substitution policy in this sector, as shown by the high MFN 
rates  of 80% . 
One important reason for preference underutilization in ASEAN may be found in 
the nature of the regional production chains where non-ASEAN import content could 
be very high.  Significant part of the manufacturing sector in ASEAN has been 
established  through FDIs by multinationals who bring in major components from 
parent companies outside the southeast Asian region.  Although the rules of origin of 
AFTA requiring at least 40% cumulative regional content could be considered relatively 
liberal compared to some other regional agreements due to full cumulation and the 
relatively lower value-added required, exporters of heavily traded goods such as 
electronics, may be unable to cumulate the necessary local / regional content. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 The Brand-to-Brand Complementation Scheme was set in 1988 to encourage joint production in ASEAN.  
This was later phased out in 1995 and incorporated into a new ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO) 
Scheme.  See for example Yoshimatsu (2002) and Lecler (2002), for analysis and examples of Industrial 
Cooperation Agreements of ASEAN. 
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Table 5.6 Incidence of Non-tariff measures on products with high preferential margins  
(2003) 
high margin products HS6 
code 
preference 
margin of  
 (in %) 
share of 
intra-A4 
-trade 
NTM incidence* 
Compound alcoholic 
preparations 
 
330210 87.5      IDN 
(0   SGP, MYS) 
(1  PHL) ; 
(5 THA) 
10.96 
(2.06)** 
 
women’s/girls’ silk blouses 620610 60.0      THA 
(0 SGP;  13.75 
IDN; 15 MYS) 
5.58 
(5.48) 
Thailand – import 
license 
Vehicles specially designed for 
travelling on snow, golf cars & 
similar vehicles 
870310 70.0       IDN 
(23.36   MYS) 
1.7 
(0.0) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6170 
Vehicles w/ spark-ignition 
internal combustion 
reciprocating piston engine, of a 
cylinder capacity exceeding 1,500 cc 
but not exceeding 3 000 cm3 
870323 100.6    MYS 
65.0      THA 
36.67    IDN 
25.0      PHL 
10.74 
(10.7) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6100 
Philippines – 6100 
Thailand – 6170 
Vehicles w/ spark-ignition 
internal combustion reciprocating 
piston engine, Of a cylinder 
capacity exceeding 3,000 cc 
870324 148.85  MYS 
57.5      THA 
40.0      IDN 
0.7 
(0.6) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6100 
Philippines – 6100 
Thailand – 6170 
Vehicles w/ compression- 
ignition internal combustion 
piston engine (Diesel 
/semidiesel),  Of a cylinder cap. 
exceeding 1,500 cc but not 
exceeding 2 500 cm3 
870332 36.67   IDN 
25.0     PHL 
1.4 
(1.4) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6100 
Philippines – 6100 
Thailand – 6170 
Vehicles w/ compression- 
ignition internal combustion 
piston engine (Diesel 
/semidiesel),  Of a cylinder 
capacity exceeding 2,500 cc 
870333 148.33  MYS 
40.0      IDN 
25         PHL 
0.9 
(0.9) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6100 
Philippines – 6100 
Thailand – 6170 
Components, parts, accessories 
for assembly of motor vehicles 
870390 100.6   MYS 
 75.0    IDN 
10.3 
(9.6) 
Ind – 6100 , 8100 
Malaysia – 6100 
Philippines – 6100 
Thailand – 6170 
Bodies (incldg cabs), for the 
vehicles of hdg. 8703 
870710 75.0     THA 
25.0     MYS 
45.69 
(45.69) 
Malaysia – 6170 
Bodies (incldg. cabs), for the 
vehicles of hdg. 8701 to 8705, excl. 
8703  
870790 75.0     THA 7.3 
(6.0) 
 
Motorcycles w/ reciprocating 
internal combustion piston 
engine   
870020 67.0     THA 
36.45   MYS 
25.0     IDN 
25.0     PHL 
7.3 
(7.3) 
 
*  Source:  ASEAN Secretariat database of Non-Tariff Measures 
* *Share of intra-ASEAN10 trade in parenthesis 
Note:  NTM codes:  6100 – non-automatic licensing (quantity control measure); 6170 – non-
automatic licensing (discretionary import license); 8100 – Technical regulations. 
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Table 5.7a Import content of selected sectors in East Asia, 2001 
  Sectors 
country text.l cloth. leather chem 
motor 
veh.les 
transp 
equipt. 
elect. 
mach. 
mach & 
equipt 
other 
mfg, 
Ind 27.4 6.6 8.4 29.3 25.1 40.1 23.1 56.9 9.4 
  7.8 15.5 5.5 4.5 6.0 3.3 6.8 2.5 2.1 
Mal 38.0 39.2 73.2 27.4 36.0 29.5 44.1 34.1 40.0 
  10.0 9.4 4.7 5.0 7.2 5.6 2.8 8.0 6.1 
Phil 37.8 40.7 26.7 38.7 45.0 23.7 70.2 56.6 18.7 
  13.0 14.3 8.5 13.2 17.1 7.3 45.0 31.3 4.1 
Sing 51.1 44.3 34.6 42.2 41.7 36.2 83.2 58.2 46.3 
  6.6 5.7 6.3 3.1 4.7 7.4 1.4 2.5 0.00 
Thai 23.3 13.0 26.1 22.7 38.1 64.0 57.2 48.9 27.6 
  6.6 10.5 5.1 2.3 8.6 5.7 5.2 3.8 0.0 
ASEAN 35.5 28.8 33.8 32.1 37.2 38.7 55.6 50.9 28.4 
  8.8 11.1 6.0 5.6 8.7 5.9 12.3 9.6 2.5 
rest of 
ASEAN 23.3 13.0 26.1 22.7 38.1 64.0 57.2 48.9 27.6 
  5.4 6.1 4.3 2.9 5.1 5.5 3.8 2.4 3.3 
 
 
Table 5.7 a/b provide an indication of the extent of this problem, showing the 
import content and the local value-added of key manufacturing sectors in ASEAN.  
Calculations are based on data    taken   from the   GTAP  6  data  base for 2001,  the  
latest year available.  As expected, the import content of electronics and machineries are 
the highest for ASEAN, the sum of the direct and indirect import content (reported in 
italics in Table 5.7 a/b)69  being 67.8% and 60.6%, respectively.  The share of imports is 
particularly high in these sectors for Singapore and Malaysia.   The figures reported here 
are most likely understated (for import content) and overstated (for value-added) since 
the data do not differentiate between output destined for local consumption and output 
for exports.   One would expect the import content for exports to be higher than for 
                                                 
69 Direct import content and value-added are computed as shares of the value of imported 
intermediate inputs, and value-added (labor, capital, natural resources, land) over the total value of 
output per sector.  Indirect import content and value-added (reported here in italics) are the sum 
of the import content and the sum of value-added shares contained in the local intermediate 
inputs used in output production. 
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those sold in the local market because of various  fiscal incentives (i.e., import duty 
drawbacks), which is available for export production in most countries. In terms of 
value-added, AFTA members appear to be unable to meet the 40% (for AFTA) regional 
value content (RVC) rule for most of the key sectors featured here.  
 
Table 5.7 b  Value-added of selected sectors in East Asia, 2001 
  sectors 
country textiles clothing leather chem 
motor 
vehicle 
transp 
equip 
electr 
mach 
mach. & 
eqpt 
other 
mfg 
Ind 31.2 25.0 46.2 26.4 39.0 28.3 30.1 23.7 31.3 
  14.6 2.8 9.3 10.0 14.7 12.5 12.0 12.2 2.8 
Mal 20.2 27.0 10.1 32.0 34.1 36.0 33.0 22.8 24.0 
  11.3 13.0 10.3 11.6 18.8 12.5 14.1 12.2 10.2 
Phil 17.5 28.7 25.6 27.8 3.7 31.1 9.8 17.7 41.4 
  5.4 4.8 2.9 4.1 15.3 23.3 5.9 135.8 3.9 
Sing 21.0 29.0 32.5 33.6 24.5 32.0 10.3 23.7 23.6 
  18.0 14.4 11.2 12.2 9.1 13.1 9.7 10.2 8.9 
Thai 30.2 27.4 34.4 22.7 26.0 14.1 20.5 20.7 31.0 
  17.7 22.6 9.8 10.8 100.7 8.6 21.6 20.2 5.6 
ASEAN 24.0 27.4 29.8 28.5 25.5 28.3 20.8 21.7 30.3 
  13.4 11.5 8.7 9.7 31.7 14.0 12.7 38.1 6.3 
rest of 
ASEAN 36.3 25.0 30.7 25.8 40.6 24.0 36.7 29.4 34.7 
  16.4 20.9 11.9 7.1 51.1 6.6 10.7 8.3 5.0 
Source: Manchin and Balaoing, 2006 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
While the potential gains offered by a fully implemented free trade area in ASEAN has 
been examined in both theoretical and empirical literature,  the nature and magnitude of 
actual trade and production effects are unknown.  This paper aims to provide some 
indication of the extent of influence preferentialism might have in ASEAN given the 
trade and tariff data converged for the years 2001 to 2003.  The results confirm the 
popular notion that the preferences offered under AFTA do not exert any apparent 
effects on intra-ASEAN trade.  The gravity model specified using MFN tariffs display 
the same explanatory power as a similar model where CEPT rates are instead used.   
  122 
A closer look at disaggregated data offers some probable explanations underpinning 
this result. Although the empirical analysis could not be carried out using data on 
utilization of preferential tariffs, the results, nevertheless, suggest that CEPT tariffs might 
be expected to be exploited when difference between third country tariffs and 
preferential tariffs are higher than 10-25 per cent.  According to our estimate the positive 
effects of preferences becomes significant when the preference margin is higher than 25 
per cent which covers 9.2% of total sum of tariff lines in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand, and accounts for 7.8% of the aggregate value of their joint imports.   The 
rough utilisation rate estimate of 5% (of total import value) based on firm interviews, 
thus comes rather close to the regression estimates derived here.   
The effects of margins below 5%, and those above 80% have a significant negative 
effect on trade flows; the former implying that administrative and other costs related to 
obtaining preferences exceed the benefits due to margins; and the latter due to the larger 
incidence of NTMs in these products,  or the simultaneous implementation of a regional 
program which is exerting a more determinant role on production and trading patterns. 
Although preference underutilisation is not unique to ASEAN, the rates envisaged 
here is certainly low relative to the known record of other discriminatory schemes.   
Brenton and Manchin (2003), for instance,  reported that 35% of eligible exports from 
the CEEC countries enter the EU using the available preferential rates.  Inama (2003), 
examined the utilisation of the General System of Preferences (GSP) of the QUAD 
countries,  and found that of the 62% of imports of Quad countries originating from all 
beneficiaries of GSP schemes covered by preferences, 39% of these were effectively 
traded under the lowest available rates.   
It must be pointed out, however, that the total import value shares of products with 
margins above 5%, are only 14.86% in 2001 (and 12.62% in 2003).    Utilisation rates 
must therefore be measured not against the total imports eligible for preferences, but 
against that product range where utilisation can be considered rational.  Assuming that in 
about 5% of total imports, CEPT privileges were indeed requested by ASEAN traders, 
then the real take-up rate of AFTA preferences would actually be in the neighbourhood 
of 30% -40%.   Moreover, as shown in the analysis of the tariff and trade structure of the 
CEPT scheme, even if preferences would have been fully utilized, no matter how 
marginal, the maximum amount of trade that could potentially  be affected  would only 
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be in the neighbourhood of  35% - 37%70 of total intra-ASEAN imports.  Assuming that 
the costs of documentation and the administration of origin rules are comparable to the 
(EU-based) estimates of  3 – 4.4.5% of total value of goods imported, as indicated by 
Herin (1986) and Manchin (2006), then the relevant shares fall to around 16% of the 
total value of regional trade for ASEAN. 
It is true that there exists small pockets of intra-ASEAN trade  where preferences 
are important (especially for Thailand71).  Overall, however, the fact that discriminatory 
tariffs now influence only a small area of regional trade may mean that attempts to 
enhance the utilisation of AFTA preferences may not yield sizable results in terms of  
further increasing  regional trade.  Current efforts linked to the harmonisation of custom 
procedures and other trade facilitation measures, which affect both ASEAN and non-
member products may yet prove to be more effective in extending the frontiers of intra- 
and extra-ASEAN trade.    
                                                 
70 As shown in Table 3, products where the difference between MFN and CEPT rates is zero account for 
62.78% and 65.34% of total value of intra-ASEAN imports in 2001 and 2003, respectively. 
71 The standard deviation of Thailand’s MFN rates is high relative to the rest of the ASEAN-5, which also 
leads to a higher standard deviation for its preferential margins. 
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 Annexes 
Table A.1     Top 5 Intra-ASEAN imports, 2001  (US$ millions) 
rep part product Value CEPT MFN
IDN THA acyclic hydrocarbons 1368.4 0 0.0
IDN SGP acyclic hydrocarbons 1435.0 0 0.0
IDN MYS petroleum oils  (crude) 1370.5 0 0.0
IDN SGP petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals etc. (not crude) 1158.9 0 3.3
IDN SGP light-vessels, fire-floats, dredgers etc.; floating docks 250.9 0 0.0
MYS SGP
parts and accessories for office machines of headings 8469-72, 
computer accessories 2187.8 0 0.0
MYS SGP electrical capacitors, fixed, variable or adjustable; parts 1813.2 0 0.0
MYS SGP petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals etc. (not crude) 1615.1 0 2.3
MYS SGP electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies; parts 1563.8 0 0.0
MYS SGP
semiconductor devices (diodes, transistors etc.); light-emitting 
diodes etc.; parts thereof 223.8 0 0.0
PHL SGP electronic integrated circuits and micro assemblies; parts 756.0 0 0.0
PHL SGP
parts and accessories for office machines of headings 8469-72, 
computer accessories 239.0 0 0.0
PHL MYS petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals etc. (crude) 239.0 3 3.0
PHL SGP petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals etc. (not crude) 237.9 3 3.0
PHL IDN Copper ores 126.7 3 3.0
THA MYS
parts and accessories for office machines of headings 8469-72, 
computer accessories 797.5 0 0.0
THA MYS thermionic, cold cathode or photocathode tubes & parts 383.1 5 20.0
THA MYS petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals etc. (not crude) 485.2 5 15.3
THA MYS Petroleum oils 351.1 0 0.0
THA IDN
gold (incl. gold plated with platinum) unwrought or in semimnfr 
or in powder form 160.6 0 0.0
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Table A.2.  Relative importance of preferential tariffs and duty-free MFN 
tariffs, 2001 - 2003 
 
 
MFN = zero  MFN = pref 
tariffs 
MFN > pref 
tariffs 
 value Share 
of total 
value Share 
of total 
value Share 
of total 
Total trade 
Indonesia 
no. of tariff lines 2727 20% 7238 53% 6349 47% 13587
value of imports 4049945 36% 6604567 59% 4683297 41% 11287864
Malaysia 
no. of tariff lines 12066 46% 13802 52% 12697 48% 26499
value of imports 35445289 67% 36989508 70% 15711145 30% 52700653
Philippines 
no. of tariff lines 831 4% 9736 44% 12173 56% 21909
value of imports 6059808 37% 11520174 70% 5038329 30% 16558503
Singapore 
no. of tariff lines 139808 99.97% 139808 99.97% 36 0.03% 139844
value of imports 286929741 99.87% 286929741 99.87% 372172.3 0.13% 287301913
Thailand 
no. of product codes 603 5% 2095 16% 11136 84% 13231
value of imports 6701497 35% 8945374 46% 10338585 54% 19283958
Total 
no. of product codes 156035 73% 172679 80% 42391 20% 215070
value of imports 339186280 88% 350989364 91% 36143528 9% 387132891
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Table A.3. List of partner countries 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Anguila 
Anti. & 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas,  
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
British Virg Isl 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Isl 
Centr Afri  
Rep 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Christmas Isl 
Cocos 
(Keeling) 
Islands 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo Dem. 
Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech 
Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Rep 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
El Salvador 
Equat.l 
Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Faeroe 
Islands 
Falkland 
Island 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French 
Polynesia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Gibraltar 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana  
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran,Islamic 
Rep. 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea Dem. 
Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao 
Macedonia, 
FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall 
Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montserrat 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
Neth. Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Norfolk Isl. 
N.Mariana Isl. 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Pap. New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Pitcairn 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Fed 
Rwanda 
Saint Helena 
St Pierre & 
Miquelon 
Samoa 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
 
 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Taiwan, China 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tokelau 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Turks and Caicos Isl. 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Wallis and Futuna  
Western Sahara 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
The Web of East Asian FTAs and the Resulting Labyrinth of Origin Rules 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The maze of East Asian regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)  that has 
emerged in the last few years has triggered fears of what the attendant rules and 
administrative procedures would imply for the cost of doing business in the region.  If 
these agreements are mutually consistent, particularly with regards to rules of origin 
(ROO), then obviously the marginal costs of a new agreement will be minimal for all 
parties.  The lack of coordination in rule-setting among countries, however, ensures that 
each trade route marked by preferentialism will be differentially governed, thus leading to 
mounting information and transaction costs.  Moreover, the spectre of multiple and 
overlapping agreements among countries, will only further increase the need to regulate 
trade so that preferences do not spill-over unintendedly to non-partners via the member 
with the lowest trade barriers.   
In a sea of preferential agreements, ROO are, in fact, seen as indispensable since 
they define the conditions that a product must satisfy to be deemed as originating from 
the country seeking preferential access. They are principally meant to prevent trade 
deflection, whereby products from non-participating countries destined for the partner 
country’s market are redirected through free trade partners of the partner country to 
avoid the payment of partner country’s customs duties.   However, the problematic 
intricacies brought about by ROO often work to hinder the flow of goods in the region 
and introduce new uncertainties in the conduct of trade.  
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The complexities surrounding the rules of origin could be traced from two sources.  
One is the difficulty of ascertaining origin in an age of globalized trade and at the same 
time, increasingly fragmented production processes. When goods are produced in a 
single production stage then the origin of the products should be relatively easy to 
establish. Proof that the product was produced in the free trade partner should be 
sufficient. For other cases, ROO  are used to define the methods by which it can be 
ascertained that the product has undergone sufficient working or processing in the free 
trade partner to qualify for preferential access.   However, technological progress and 
globalization have made possible the further refinement of division of labour among 
various producers, in order to exploit scale economies and cost differentials among 
various countries. Consequently, the production of a single product often encompasses 
multiple locations, compounding the difficulties of verifying its origin.   
The other reason behind the complex design of many ROOs is the convenience in 
which these rules could be used to both accommodate and conceal protectionist intents.  
ROOs, by increasing the local content of the product,  or by attaching multiple criteria 
for the satisfaction of origin, could be another avenue to effectively exclude product 
groups from a country’s liberalisation commitments.  Rules can also be made product-
specific, so that the extent of protection is hidden in the hundreds of pages of annexes, 
and coated by technical language not immediately accessible to non-specialists.   
Needless to say, the motives underpinning the creation of FTAs, have a direct 
bearing on the design and degree of restrictiveness of ROO.  For  FTAs which are 
created largely for political and foreign policy purposes, cumbersome ROO provide an 
effective means of shielding Members from the economic effects brought about by  the 
removal of tariff barriers.  If, on the other hand, the goal of regional import substitution 
dominates, then  ROO  can make the conferment of origin conditional on a set of 
minimum regional content targets, which can spur trade diversion, especially in the use of 
intermediate manufacturing inputs.  The FDI-motive, which is present in some FTAs, 
can exert two opposing pressures.  On one hand, it may lead to more restrictive ROOs, 
as a means to entice rules-evasion (‘rules-jumping’) on the part of non-partner investors.  
On the other hand, countries may actually intend to use an FTA to bring down the costs 
of transactions among members, so as to create a bigger market and a more attractive 
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production base for foreign firms.  In this case, the heavy requirements set by ROO 
become a genuine hindrance to the achievement of regional goals. 
With the proliferation of FTAs observed especially in the last 3-4 years in East Asia, 
it becomes ever more important to take stock of the implication of these simultaneous 
agreements on the integration of regional markets.  This paper aims in particular to 
provide an overview of the preferential rules of origin in East Asia, highlighting the 
aspects that might possibly generate some trade-chilling effects.   Negotiations are still 
on-going for a number of agreements, hence this survey is limited to the FTAs that have 
been signed and those whose documents have been made publicly available.   
 
6.2.  Rules of Origin:  a brief overview 
The literature on Rules of Origin has flourished in the last decade, so that there are now 
an ample amount of surveys done to illustrate the different methods used by various 
regional grouping.  This section thus offers but a brief overview of some basic features of 
origin rules.  For a more extensive treatment, the reader is referred to Krishna (2003), 
Estevadeordal & Suominen (2004), and  Lazaro & Medalla (2005);  for an application to 
NAFTA, see Anson, et. al (2005); and for a discussion on the rules of origin in EU Trade 
Agreements,  consult Brenton & Manchin ( 2003).   
There are two basic criteria used to determine the origin of products based on the 
Kyoto Convention.72  The first requires that a product be ‘wholly obtained’ from the 
exporting country requesting for preferences.  This applies primarily to agricultural 
products and other raw materials.    The second is the somewhat more vague concept of 
‘substantial transformation.’   The interpretation of what ‘substantial’ means is what 
distinguishes the various  preferential agreements from each other. There are three 
directions where these interpretations may lead.  The first is to confer origin based on the 
required domestic content, which can be defined in terms of the value-added of the 
exporting country (using either cost or price), or defined in terms of weight or other 
physical terms.  Another approach is to require a change of tariff heading (CTH) which 
                                                 
72 The Kyoto Convention or the International Convention on the Simplification and 
Harmonization of Customs Procedures entered into force in 1974, and has subsequently 
undergone several revisions.  The World Customs Organization (WCO) currently adopts the 
Kyoto Convention as it was revised in 1999. 
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stipulates that the good, for which the preference is being requested, must have a 
different tariff heading than the inputs used in its production.  Regional agreements using 
this rule could require that a product change its chapter (2 digits Harmonized System 
classification), heading ( 4 digits), subheading (6 digits) or item ( 8 – 10 digits), relative to 
the inputs used by the exporting country.  It can also be, however, that certain materials 
from a tariff classification (sub) heading / chapter is prohibited in the production of the 
preference-seeking product. 
A third method is to specify the processes that must be undertaken within the 
preferential grouping, for instance, requiring that cutting and sewing of clothing products 
must be done by the exporting countries, or that raw materials must be transformed in 
two or three specific processes into the final product.   
Rules of origin can either restrict or facilitate the trade of goods under preferential 
terms in a number of ways.  Most agreements, for instance contain a so-called ‘de 
minimis’  rule, which allows the use of a specified minimum percentage of non-
originating materials without affecting origin.  This provision introduces some flexibility 
in the CTH criteria, for instance, as it makes it easier for products with significant import 
content to qualify for preferences. 
Agreements that allow ‘absorption or roll-up,’ also relieve the process of acquiring 
origin.  Under this principle, once an input has been given origin status, the non-FTA 
import content of that input will no longer be taken into account when calculating the 
value-added of the end-product which has made use of that input.  
Finally, agreements applying the value-added rule, can further facilitate the use of 
preferences by allowing producers to use less than the domestic content required, or 
more than the maximum non-FTA import content, as long as these foreign inputs are 
sourced within the regional bloc.  This is called ‘cumulation’, which is defined according 
to three main types.  All regional agreement apply the first type, ‘bilateral cumulation’, 
which makes no distinction between inputs produced locally, and those produced by the 
partner country.  A product whose inputs are 25% sourced locally, and 25% sourced 
from the partner, for instance, is considered 50% locally/regionally-produced good, and 
would therefore qualify for origin under a domestic content rule of 50%.  ‘Diagonal’ 
cumulation applies that similar concept, extending the rule to two or more countries 
participating in the RIA.  With bilateral and diagonal cumulation, however, the inputs 
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used for subsequent transformation should be first considered originating, before it can 
be used for cumulation by a regional partner.  For some agreements, like the AFTA, 
‘partial’ cumulation is allowed,  so that inputs with less than the value-added required, but 
having at least 20% origin, for instance, can still be used in the calculation of value-added.  
However, no preferences are extended to these partner inputs when they are imported to 
the country using these products.  They are solely used for cumulation purposes.  ‘Full’ 
cumulation is the most lenient of all types of cumulation because countries within a RIA 
can use each others goods, regardless of whether they are originating or not.  Essentially, 
whatever manufacturing process performed in the regional bloc is considered as  being 
carried out in the last country of manufacture.   
Unfortunately, rules of origin have acquired a poor reputation because of the 
manner in which it can be used to restrict trade.  Rules could be coupled together, for 
instance, the value-added content rule and the CTH, thereby increasing the threshold for 
origin qualification.  Certain manufacturing activities could also be considered as being 
‘insufficient’ in conferring origin, such as packaging, transport, labelling, etc..   A product 
can also be transformed to a different heading, but not from inputs of some specified 
(sub)heading.   Finally, some agreements may prohibit the use of duty-drawback or the 
refunding of tariffs paid on intermediate inputs which are used in products subsequently 
exported to a regional partner.  Such prohibition is often justified in terms of conferring 
undue advantage to regional producers who gear their productions towards exports 
instead of the domestic market.   
Needless to say, complexity will always increase an agreement’s administrative 
burden, whether it be in terms of time lost due to compliance,  or actual cost of 
bureaucratic formalities and procedures, or in terms of production delays and spoilage of 
goods.  This explains why for all the liberal intent of a regional agreement, the end result 
hardly brings the participating countries closer to their goal of an integrated regional 
market.   
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6.3  An Overview of the Rules and Origin in East and Southeast Asian 
Agreements 
 
In a recent survey of ROOs worldwide, Estevadeordal and  Suominen (2004) observed 
that  Asian FTAs, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA)73, Singapore-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA), and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (SPARTECA) in the Asia-Pacific, stand out for their generality.   However, 
the propensity to expand the existing FTAs to new members or create new country-
combinations of FTAs, increasingly introduce product-specificities in the design of 
ROOs.  This can be seen in new arrangements such as the ASEAN-China FTA and the 
recently signed ASEAN-Korea FTA. 
The relatively ample allowance for imports in the AFTA stems from the realization 
that for many heavily-traded products in the region, like electronics, production 
processes may be so splintered that the value of local content is often a small percentage 
of  the product’s total value.  Very early on in the formation of AFTA, it was recognized 
that the 40% ASEAN origin rule may often not be met in the case of trade in textile and 
textile products.  In 1995, it was therefore decided that either the percentage value-added 
or the substantial transformation rule may be used by ASEAN exporters.  The AFTA 
ROO underwent  further overhaul, starting in 2003, when operational procedures were 
further clarified and simplified.  In the same year, the decision was reached to adopt a 
change in tariff heading rule for determining the origin of the product as a general 
alternative rule “applicable to all products which cannot comply with the 40% 
local/ASEAN content requirement, giving priority to sectors which are the subject of 
private sector requests and those sectors prioritized by the AEM for accelerated 
integration” (AFTA Council, 2003)74.  As of last year, the change of tariff heading rule is 
                                                 
73 CER (Closer Economic Relations), CEP (Closer Economic Partnership), SEP (Strategic Economic 
Partnership), are all names used interchangeably with FTA. 
74 In November 2004, 11 priority sectors were identified for deeper integration where tariffs will be 
eliminated in at least 85% of the products in 2007 for ASEAN-6, and 2012 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam.  These sectors are: agro-based products, automotive products, electronics, fisheries, rubber-
based products, textiles & apparels, wood-based products, e-ASEAN, health care, tourism and air travel.  
See http://www.aseansec.org/15070.htm for AFTA Council reports. 
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fully endorsed for four sectors: wheat-flour75, wood-based products, aluminium products 
and iron and steel76. 
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) adopts the same general value-
added rule of the AFTA of 40% local/regional content with diagonal cumulation.   The 
Agreement on Trade in Goods is currently in force, which extends the liberalisation 
commitments from the limited ‘Early-Harvest’ agricultural products (HS chapter 01 – 
08), to the rest of the traded sectors in the normal inclusion list.  As in the AFTA ROO, 
an alternative  change of tariff heading criteria can be invoked for a number of 
products.77 In the case of ACTFA, the rule applies for 424 (HS6)  textile and textile 
products items, 2 items of preserved fish, 6 items of wool, 22 of leather goods, 14 for fur 
skins and 4 item lines of footwear. It is only in 5 wool tariff items, that the change of 
tariff heading is set as the exclusive rule.78 
The ASEAN-KOREA Free Trade Area (AKFTA) is the most recent agreement 
that has been concluded (May 2006), although Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar has 
not yet signed due to the current political instabilities in Thailand79, and the unfinished 
negotiations for the inclusion lists for Cambodia and Myanmar.  The general 40% value-
added local-regional content of AFTA and the ACTFA is extended to this free trade 
area, as well as the diagonal cumulation rule.  Surprisingly, AKTFA emerges now as even 
more liberal than the AFTA because the  change of tariff heading, as an alternative rule 
to the 40% content requirement, is applicable to a greater number of products relative to 
the coverage in the AFTA and the ACTFA.  A novelty has also been introduced in the 
AKTFA, namely, the back-to-back Certificate of Origin (CO), which allows the 
conferment of preferences to the re-exports of partner A into partner B of products first 
exported by partner C into A.80 This is particularly advantageous for countries engaging 
in substantial entrepot trade such as Singapore.    
                                                 
75 For wheat-flour products, change of tariff heading is the sole origin criterion. 
76 Product-specific rules are negotiated only upon the request of private sector groups. 
77 Negotiations are still on-going for the product specific rules of other sectors.  Only the specific ROOs are 
finalized in sectors under the normal inclusion list.  
78 See Annex 3, Attachment B of the ASEAN-China FTA Agreement 
(http://app.fta.gov.sg/data//fta/file/ACFTA_Annex3.pdf).   
79 Another reason is the protest issued by Thailand due to Korea’s exclusion of rice in the agreement.  
Thailand is the world’s biggest exporter of rice. 
80 Singapore imports, say, 10 units of televisions from Korea, where the preferential duties apply under the 
AKTFA.  A back-to-back certificate allows Singapore to re-export, for instance, 7 of those units to 
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Table 6.1  Rules of Origin in East Asian FTAs 
 Change of 
Tariff 
Classif. 
Value Added 
Dom. or Import 
Content 
Specific 
Mfg 
Process 
Cumulati
on 
 
Tolerance 
 
ASEAN FTA 
(AFTA) 
Yes81  Regional (40%)  diagonal  
ASEAN-China 
(ACFTA) 
Yes Regional (40%)  diagonal  
ASEAN-Korea 
(AKFTA) 
Yes Regional (40%)  diagonal  
Singapore – 
Japan (JSEPA) 
Yes Dom. (60%) Yes  Bilateral  product 
specific  
Singapore – 
New Zeal. 
(ANZSCEP) 
 Dom. 40%  Bilateral 
 
10 
Singapore – 
Australia  
(SAFTA) 
 Dom. 
50% (30% for some 
prod.) 
  3% 
Singapore- 
Korea (KSFTA) 
Yes 45-55%  Bilateral 10%82 
 
Thailand- Aust. 
(TAFTA) 
Yes 40-45% Yes Bilateral 10% 
Thailand- NZ 
TNZCEP 
Yes, prod. 
spec. 
 Yes Bilateral 10% 
Malaysia-Japan 
(JMEPA) 
Yes, 
product 
spec. 
Dom. 40% (product 
specific) 
 Bilateral Only from 
ASEAN 
(prod.sp.c) 
Trans-Pacific 
TRANSEP83   
Yes 45-50% Yes Diagonal 10% 
Australia – NZ 
(ANZCER) 
 50%  Bilateral 2% 
Source:  Manchin & Balaoing, 2006 
For Singapore FTAs, such as the one signed with Japan (JSEPA)84, the degree of 
restrictiveness of the ROO largely reflects the sensitivities of Singapore’s partners. 
Agricultural products and textiles and apparel are characterized by particularly complex 
rules even if 384 agricultural items are excluded, constituting 90% of total Singapore 
                                                                                                                             
ASEAN, and still be able to avail of the same preferential rates any ASEAN member would impose on 
Korean-made televisions. 
81 Applicable for textiles, and wood-based products, iron & steel as an alternative rule, and for wheat & flour 
as an exclusive rule. 
82 For yarns and fibres used for clothing and textiles products 8% applies; the de minimis rule does not apply 
to agricultural products or applies with restrictions. 
83 Strategic Economic Partnership (SEP); members:  Brunei, New Zealand, Chile and Singapore. 
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exports to Japan.  ROOs are product specific, relying mostly on the  change of tariff 
heading rule85.  For some products an alternative RVC rule is allowed, albeit at a high rate 
of 60%.  In cases where RVC is an additional criteria to be satisfied, the content 
requirement is lower at 40%.  However, about half of the tariff subheadings in the 
agreement already have duty-free MFN status, so that in practice, ROOs’ effect is quite 
limited.   De minimis  is permitted, also varying across products.  Outward processing is 
recognized in all of Singapore’s FTAs, allowing it to count the value of the outsourced 
part of the production process as Singaporean production.  
The Korea-Singapore FTA follows the same pattern of product specificity of the 
JSEPA, also with the  change of tariff heading rule as the dominant origin criteria.  For 
some products an additional RVC of 45%, 50% or 55% is asked, and for a few items, the 
RVC rule alone will suffice.  The sensitivity of textiles is seen in the added details in the 
description of transformation rules, and in its exclusion from the 10% De Minimis rule. 
In contrast, a general value-added rule of 40%  is applicable to all products under 
the Agreement of New Zealand – Singapore for Closer Economic Partnership 
(ANZSCEP).  Both countries are parties to yet another FTA, the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TRANSEP), which was formed in 
June 2005 together with Brunei and Chile86.  Under this agreement, ROOs contain 
product specific  change of tariff heading rules, with some products having an additional 
RVC provisions ranging from 45% to 50%, as in the case for textiles and footwear.  Still, 
for some products, the CTC and RVC  are alternative rules.  Goods that are unable to 
meet any of the ROO criteria,  origin may still be conferred provided that the non-
partner content do not exceed 10% of the goods’ value.  In effect, the product specific 
rules apply only to the trade between Chile and the rest of the TRANSEP countries, and 
between Brunei and New Zealand, since a general value-added rule apply for the other 
                                                                                                                             
84 Japanese FTAs are incorporated in an ‘Economic Partnership Agreement ‘ (EPA), which has a broader 
scope than the typical FTA, such as e-commerce, financial services, information and communication 
technology and Human Resource Development. 
85 Heading changes are needed for HS 01- 24, HS 38 (chemical products), HS 85 (machinery), while 
subheading or value content requirements for liquor and cordials apply.  For the rest a RVC requirement 
of 60% with a combination of subheading changes is needed.  The yarn-forward rule applies for textile 
fabrics and articles (HS 59). 
86 Trans-Pacific SEP was previously known as the Pacific Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3-CEP).  Its 
negotiations was first launched at the 2002 APEC Leaders Summit by  leaders of Chile, Singapore and 
New Zealand. Brunei first took part as a full negotiating party in the fifth round of talks in April 2005. 
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pairs of countries under the ANZSCEP agreement between Singapore and New 
Zealand, and also under the AFTA between Brunei and Singapore.  
Australia’s FTA with Singapore (SAFTA), is less general than the ANZSCEP 
since a value-added requirement of 30% is imposed for some products (110 HS8 tariff 
lines mostly in  HS 84-85) while for the rest a higher 50% local/regional content is 
required.  For some 152 tariff lines an additional requirement is imposed that the last 
process in the manufacture of the product must take place within the territories of the 
party seeking the preference.   
As opposed to the generality and the broad scope of the Singapore- New Zealand 
FTA, the agreement between Thailand – New Zealand (THAINZCEP),  and 
Thailand- Australia (TAFTA)  contains specific rules for all products.  The CTC rule 
is once again predominant, with some products allowing a change in  subheading.  
Additional RVC requirement of 50% for THAINZCEP and 55% for TAFTA are 
imposed mostly for textiles and textile materials.  Clothing is further restricted by making 
origin conditional on the performance of essential processes, such as cutting and sewing.  
In the case of TAFTA, transformation from specific headings and subheadings is 
excluded for some products. 
The ROO of the Australia – New Zealand CER (ANZCER) has undergone a 
major revision early this year (to take effect in January 2007).87  The RVC rule of 50% 
previously applies to all products.  The new CTC/ change of tariff heading approach has 
been adopted, although the RVC rule of 45% is still the exclusive criteria for some textile 
sectors such as those in men’s and boys’ apparel. 
The new bilateral agreements reached by Japan  with individual ASEAN Members 
are intended to be incorporated (as annexes) in the ASEAN-Japan FTA (AJEPA), which 
will not be open to renegotiation once the negotiations for the ASEAN-Japan FTA are 
completed. The Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA), is the 
first to be concluded under this foreseen trajectory towards an   AJEPA.  It is, as the 
JSEPA (with Singapore), largely based on the  change of tariff heading rule, and with a 
high degree of product specificity.  Even the De Minimis  rule varies according to product 
categories.  Once again, for some sectors the RVC  rule (40% - 50%) is an alternative, 
                                                 
87 Under the agreement, exporters can still choose to use the old RVC rule till 2012. 
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while for some, it is the sole criterion for conferring origin. The novelty in the JMEPA is 
that for some products the  change of tariff heading rule is only valid if the non-
originating material is sourced from any of the ASEAN country.  This is most likely done 
in anticipation of possible cumulation rules under the future AJEPA. 
 
6.4  Some Problems Surrounding the Use and Implementation of ROOs 
 
The test of the efficacy of a FTA in inducing intra-bloc trade is  the extent in which 
preferences are taken up by the business sector.   In AFTA, no data on the utilisation rate 
is available because of the lack of proper reporting of intra-ASEAN imports that were 
given origin certifications (i.e. imports accompanied by Form D88).  According to the 
Bureau of Economic Integration of the ASEAN Secretariat, there is not one single year 
since the CEPT Scheme began in 1993, where Form D data is available for all 6 original 
AFTA countries89.  However, estimates based on firm interviews conducted for the 
ASEAN Secretariat, show a low utilisation rate of about 5% of total trade. Although 
preference under-utilisation is not unique to ASEAN, this estimate is certainly low 
relative to the known record of other discriminatory schemes. Brenton and Manchin 
(2003), for instance,  reported that 35% of eligible exports from the CEEC countries 
enter the EU using the available preferential rates.  Inama (2003), examined the utilisation 
of the General System of Preferences (GSP) of the QUAD countries,  and found that of 
the 62% of imports of Quad countries originating from all beneficiaries of GSP schemes 
covered by preferences, 39% of these were effectively traded under the lowest available 
rates.   
For AFTA and ANZCER that relies on the RVC rule, one reason may be traced in 
the inability of exporters to cumulate the necessary local / regional content given the 
degree of process fragmentation in highly globalized sectors such as electronics.  Tables 
5.7 a/b (Chapter 5)  provide an indication of the extent of this problem, showing the 
import content and the local value-added of key manufacturing sectors in ASEAN and 
other East Asian countries.  Calculations are based on data taken from the GTAP 6 
                                                 
88 The total amount of intra-ASEAN imports seeking preferential rates under the CEPT Scheme can be 
extracted from the Form D certificates. 
89 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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database for 2001, the latest year available.  As expected, the import content of 
electronics and machineries are the highest for ASEAN, the sum of the direct and 
indirect import content being 67.8% and 60.6%, respectively.  The share of imports is 
particularly high in these sectors for Singapore and Malaysia.    
The figures reported in Tables 5.7 a/b are most likely understated (for import 
content) and overstated (for value-added) since the data do not differentiate between 
output destined for local consumption and output for exports.   One would expect the 
import content for exports to be higher than for those sold in the local market because 
of various  fiscal incentives (i.e., import duty drawbacks), which is available for export 
production in most countries. In terms of value-added, both in AFTA and in ANZCER, 
members appear to be unable to meet the 40% (for AFTA) and 50% (for ANZCER) 
RVC rule for most of the key sectors featured here. 
Another main culprit tagged as being responsible for the under-utilisation of 
preferences is the complexity of administering and complying with the ROO.  LDC 
exporters are particularly burdened by high compliance cost, not to mention the more 
fundamental difficulty of local sourcing to meet whatever RVC requirements are 
imposed.  Brenton (2003), for instance,  partly attributes the under-utilisation of the EBA 
agreements to ROO, which are generally stricter relative to those contained in the ACP 
preferences.   
The initial trend in East Asia, as shown by the AFTA and ANZCER agreements is 
an application of a value-added content rule across all products.   In terms of 
transparency and clarity, a general rule is clearly more desirable relative to specific 
product rules.  Feedback of AFTA exporters, however, reveals the difficulties posed by 
the computation of costs, the invoicing and other documentation demands inherent in 
the RVC rule.  Customs valuation that differ across countries is another problem, and 
while continues efforts are being made to address the problem,90 it will take a 
                                                 
90 In AFTA, the different tariff classification adopted by members is a particular problem. This 
was addressed in 2004, when a common ASEAN tariff nomenclature (ASEAN Harmonized 
Tariff Nomenclature, or AHTN) came into force.  Another project is the ASEAN Single 
Window which involves the computerization of clearance procedures with common formats 
fulfilling the requirements of the international rules of WCO (World Customs Organization) 
and WTO.  The project is still currently being pilot tested between Malaysia and the Philippines.    
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considerable amount of time before the decision to harmonize, undertaken in the highest 
policy level, is translated into daily practice in all trading ports.  
The implementation of the RVC criteria is particularly problematic in the absence of 
automation, clear, harmonized rules and readily accessible conciliation or objection 
procedures.  The actual valuation of costs thus heavily depends on the judgment of 
individual customs officials, and this even more in an environment where contesting the 
rulings would imply more costly delays without any certainty of neutral arbitration.  Self-
certification is one solution, which was in fact, proposed by Australia, Korea, China and 
Japan in their respective FTA negotiations with ASEAN.  However, the notion of self-
certification is alien to the culture of customs inspection in ASEAN.   
The potentially cumbersome procedures involved in the valuation and certification 
of declared costs under the RVC rule, may have prodded ASEAN to follow the example 
of ANZCER in shifting to the CTC criteria for all products.  As mentioned earlier, the 
ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA) is now more flexible than the AFTA since the change of 
tariff heading alternative is available for all products.  For products where the preferential 
tariffs under the AKFTA approximate the levels found in AFTA, then preferences in the 
latter will be eroded by the more liberal rules offered by the former. 
This trend towards product specific rules is not without risks, however.  What may 
begin as a facilitating measure may eventually be used to introduce protectionist 
restrictions.  This can be done by excluding inputs from certain tariff headings, attaching 
an essential process in the transformation of the product or turning the RVC as an 
additional instead of an alternative rule to satisfy origin.  Bilateral FTAs with restrictive 
product specific rules will also most likely define the parameters of wider FTAs formed 
later on, as in the case of the Japan-ASEAN EPA.  Thus, instead of a race-to-the 
bottom, where countries strive to outdo each other in introducing still more open 
policies, the potential situation emerging here, is  an incipient hike-to-the peak,  where 
the erstwhile liberal policy stance is modified to accommodate the need to police the 
borders of an increasingly porous regional bloc.   
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6.5  Conclusions  
Much of the concern surrounding the surge of FTAs in East Asia in the last few years is 
centered on the practical burden brought about by the need to know, apply and adapt to 
a new trading environment characterised by more rules.  The amount of investment 
needed to adjust to this environment might perhaps be justified if  the end-result is 
indeed the creation of more trade.  Although a number of FTAs are still under 
negotiation, the hundreds of pages of annexes detailing the rules of origin in some of the 
signed agreements, do not inspire much optimism.  
One problem inherent in a preferential scheme that brings together countries with 
differing degrees of openness, is that of trade deflection.  For FTAs such as AFTA which 
group together relative high-tariff countries with a duty-free member  such as Singapore, 
avoiding trade deflection will always be a difficult challenge, given the complexities of 
verifying the origin of goods produced or assembled from multiple locations worldwide.  
The burden of proper verification becomes all the more taxing in an environment where 
the proliferation of bilateral FTAs lead to numerous potential ‘backdoors’ that need 
effective policing.  Clearly, the likelihood of trade deflection increases when relatively 
high tariff countries like Thailand or the Philippines also acquire pockets of low barriers.  
This in turn might lead to  more intensive or heavy-handed verification procedures that 
will further hike  administrative and waiting costs.  If implementation indeed becomes 
too difficult, leading to the inability to arrest a significant amount of trade deflection, 
then this may have a direct adverse consequence on the level of domestic political 
support for the FTA.   
The lack of coordination in setting ROOs amidst the proliferation of FTAs also has 
a political cost attached to it, namely the cost of choosing favourites among favourites.  It 
is not surprising that different permutations in the exchange of concessions among 
countries result to ROOs with varying degrees of restrictiveness, which in turn lead to a 
sort of hierarchy of partners not unlike the EU’s so-called pyramid of preferences.  
History is replete of examples of how differentiating partners into friends, lesser friends 
and foes has bred all sorts of animosities, and has certainly not created an environment 
conducive to the development of closer or strategic economic partnership.   The recent 
surge of FTAs in East Asia is said to be less about trade and more about issues like trade 
  141 
facilitation or regulatory barriers involving investments and services,  where negotiations 
have bogged down in the multilateral arena.  It is not unlikely that irritations stemming 
from contentious ROO negotiations, or the uneven restrictions applied to trade among 
different partners, could spill-over to more important, high-stake negotiation areas.  That 
would indeed be unfortunate and will not be unlike the proverbial ROO tail wagging the 
free-trade dog to death.   
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Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
The Benefits of AFTA: Estimating the gains due to  
the full utilisation of ASEAN Preferences 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines the potential benefits that can be expected once ASEAN traders 
take full advantage of preferential tariffs.  Since full utilisation implies the successful 
implementation of trade facilitation measures, and removal of non-tariff barriers 
(including those linked to rules of origin), the estimation of AFTA effects also provides 
an indication of the economic returns corresponding to these policy efforts.  AFTA 
simulations performed by past CGE studies assume that ASEAN liberalisation under the 
AFTA leads to the reduction of MFN tariffs all the way to zero.    In this chapter, the 
actual AFTA regime is approximated by using trade-weighted CEPT rates.  Results show 
that the gains of full CEPT utilisation are indeed marginal, so that given the various costs 
associated with the application for CEPT rates, the predominant use of MFN tariffs 
could be considered quite rational.  However, the complete removal of intra-ASEAN 
tariffs could have more pronounced welfare effects, especially for Malaysia, and to a 
lesser degree, for Thailand.  Policy-wise, this implies that the decision to eliminate tariffs 
in 2010 for ASEAN-5 and 2015 for the CMLV countries, do have positive and 
substantial economic implications for the whole ASEAN region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
The decision of ASEAN leaders in 1992 to create a Free Trade Area (AFTA) in the 
region was initially met with considerable scepticism.  Past experiments in economic 
cooperation were not perceived to have produced significant results, and the lack of 
complementarities in the economic structures of Member Countries repeatedly raised 
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fears about the competitive pressures brought about by regional liberalisation.   Weak 
institutional structures, and the  lack of clear and credible enforcement mechanisms in 
the region were also predicted to seriously dampen the prospects of the realisation of an 
AFTA. 
In 2003, however, five years before AFTA’s intended completion, 98.8% of total 
intra-ASEAN tariff lines were brought down to the targeted range of 0-5%, with average 
tariffs falling from 12.76% in 1993 to 1.87% at present  (ASEAN Secretariat, CEPT tariff 
database)91.  Although exclusions remain, the share of these products represents only 
4.15% of total intra-ASEAN imports in 2003. Another feature that defied expectations 
was the inclusion of agricultural products (with few exemptions, such as rice) in the 
CEPT liberalisation scheme.    
Despite the remarkable progress in the implementation of  tariff liberalisation in the 
AFTA,  the prevailing perception is that tariff preferences do not exert any considerable 
influence on actual intra-ASEAN exports and imports.  Although no data is available on 
the extent of preference utilisation, a low take-up rate of 5% of total regional imports is 
often quoted.92   
The apparent irrelevance of AFTA is largely due to the rapid and simultaneous 
liberalisation of MFN tariffs in ASEAN.  As shown in Table 2, products where the 
preferential CEPT rates of AFTA is just equal to MFN rates, constitute 62.8% of total 
intra-ASEAN imports in 2001 and (65.3% in 2003).93  Given the high costs of 
compliance with the rules of origin and other administrative requirements, it will take 
equally high preferential margins before AFTA begins to matter for producers and 
traders.  The total import value shares of products with margins above 5%, on the other 
hand, are only 14.86% in 2001 (and 12.62% in 2003).    Utilisation rates must therefore 
                                                 
91 See Consolidated (Common Effective Preferential Tariffs) CEPT Package data: 
http://www.aseansec.org/12025.htm.  
92 See for instance: Baldwin (2005), Severino (2006), The Economist (07/29/04), Cuyvers et al (2005), Rahan 
& Sen (2004).  According to the Bureau of Economic Integration of the ASEAN Secretariat, there is not 
one single year since the CEPT Scheme began in 1993, where data from the so-called Form D92 is 
available for all 6 original AFTA countries92, and if some data exist for some countries, the information is 
often on a quarterly basis and incomplete for the relevant year.  This means that existing estimates, such as 
the 5% utilisation rate often quoted in the literature is based on interviews or extrapolation but not on 
actual utilisation data (Balaoing and Manchin, 2006). 
93 See Appendix Table 2 for full table.  Thailand is not included in 2003 due to incompleteness in the Thai 
data. 
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be measured not against the total imports eligible for preferences, but against that 
product range where utilisation can be considered rational.  Assuming that in about 5% 
of total imports, CEPT privileges were indeed requested by ASEAN traders, then the 
real take-up rate of AFTA preferences would actually be in the neighbourhood of 30% -
40%.    
Fig. 7.1 Trade coverage of CEPT tariffs:
 shares in total intra-ASEAN imports, 2001
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Fig.  7.2 Trade coverage of preferential margins (MFN - CEPT):
shares in total intra-ASEAN imports, 2001
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Data Sources:  MFN tariffs and trade data are from the WITS data base, while the CEPT rates have 
been supplied by the ASEAN Secretariat. 
 
This chapter further investigates the trade and production effects of AFTA, using a 
CGE approach, and with data being sourced from the GTAP 6 data base.   Similar work 
done on the AFTA in the past, typically simulate the full AFTA scenario as one where 
products are traded duty-free within the region.  However, as evident in Table 7.1, about 
65% of total intra-ASEAN goods are still imported with positive tariffs.  AFTA in this 
sense, is more akin to a preferential trading agreement than a FTA, since products with a 
maximum of 5% tariffs are accommodated and considered as AFTA goods.   In this 
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chapter, the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) will be incorporated in the 
GTAP 6 data base, so as to further approximate the actual impact of AFTA on welfare, 
output and trade.  Moreover, an assessment of the impact of the full utilisation of AFTA 
gives an indication of what the potential effects one may expect from current trade 
facilitation efforts.   
The chapter is structured as follows.  The following section gives a survey of past 
CGE analyses on the AFTA.  The third section briefly describes the current pattern of 
intra-ASEAN trade and the structure of the CEPT preferences.  Data sources and the 
methodology is discussed in the fourth section, while last two sections respectively 
reports the results, and concludes.  
 
7.2  Survey of AFTA CGE studies 
In most CGE studies, the effects of AFTA are examined in broader scenarios of FTA 
formations.  Lewis, Robinson and Wang (1995), for instance, look at the prospects of an 
Asian FTA, as did more recent work by Roland-Holst, Verbiest, and Zhai (2005), and 
Ando and Urata (2005).    McKibbin (1996), Feridhanusetyawan (1997), and Scollay and 
Gilbert (2000), focus instead on the implementation of the APEC 2010/2020 Vision of 
free trade.  Still others investigate the formation of possible FTAs in the region, such as 
the ASEAN-Japan FTA (Itakura, Hertel, and Reimer, 2003), the ASEAN+3 FTA 
proposal involving Japan, China and South Korea (Brown, D., A. Deardorff, and R. 
Stern, 2001), among others. 
There are only few studies where the pure AFTA effect is separately examined.  An 
early work is attributed to Park (1995), where a CGE model was  developed that takes 
into account the macroeconomic disequilibrium features typical of developing countries 
(i.e. imbalances in government budget, current account, labour market).   He employs a 
trade-linked multi-country CGE ASEAN model, the basic structure of which was 
derived from a single-country static CGE model developed for the Philippines 
(PHILCGE).   In a later study, Park (2000) used a modified version of his 1995 model, 
this time using the GTAP version 3 database, and with 1992 as the benchmark year.  As 
in the other studies surveyed here, results show positive welfare and  trade effects for all 
ASEAN-5 countries.    
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CGE studies largely rely on the GTAP database so that the differences in the 
outcomes of various CGE analyses on AFTA, as shown in Table 1, could largely be 
traced to the varying model structure used and to the chosen design of experiments or 
counterfactual scenarios.  The relatively large (or less small) results by Adams and 
Horridge (2000), for instance, may have been due to the assumption that AFTA would 
lead to the elimination of both tariff and (tariff equivalents of) non-tariff barriers.  The 
manner in which regions and sectors are aggregated also differ according to the focus 
taken by authors.  In Hakim (2004), the highlight is placed on agriculture, so that all non-
agricultural sectors are aggregated  as either manufacturing or services.  With the 
exception of Park (1995), which simulates an AFTA scenario of 50 percent tariff 
reduction for intra-ASEAN imports, the rest of studies surveyed here equate the 
implementation of AFTA with the complete removal of regional tariffs. 
 
Table 7.1  Selected AFTA CGE analyses:  comparison of models  
 Park (1995, 2000) Adams, 
Horridge (2000) 
Hakim (2004) 
data  Own collation: international 
statistical yearbooks (1995); GTAP 
version 3 (2000) 
GTAP version 4 GTAP version 4 
model ASEANCGE – trade-linked model, 
static 
GTAP  GTAP, dynamic 
recursive 
bench-
mark year 
1989;  1992 1995 1995 
scen/ 
exper. 
(unilateral and multilateral) 50% ↓ 
tariffs with ASEAN and with ROW; 
devaluation 
Removal of all tariffs 
and NTBs within 
ASEAN 
Removal of all tariffs 
within ASEAN 
data  Own collation: international 
statistical yearbooks (1995); GTAP 
version 3 (2000) 
 GTAP version 4 
 GDP 
 
GDP* 
 
Exp 
 
Imp 
 
GDP Exp Imp GDP Exp Imp 
IDN 0.6 0.1 10.6 5.4 0.5 2.4 3.5 0.2 1.8 1.8 
MYS 1.6 0.6 26.0 4.6 5.2 9.9 11.2 3.1 2.9 3.1 
PHI 0.67 1.5 69.9 11.2 3.5 18.2 13.3 1.6 4.5 4.2 
SGP - 0.1 29.8 11.7 4.9 9.4 7.8 2.9 3.2 2.9 
THA 1.34 1.1 121 2.8 3.1 6.9 7.1 0.8 2.1 1.7 
          * in billion US dollars 
 
Although it would be inappropriate to compare the results of models with different 
specifications, the consistently small gains accruing to Indonesia is quite notable.  Park 
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(2000) attributes this to Indonesia being the country where the share of intra-ASEAN 
trade is the smallest.  However, Philippines also has rather insignificant trade shares, as 
shown in Figure 3, but fare much better than Indonesia in terms of expected welfare 
gains in AFTA.  This may be largely due to the foreseen export growth of the 
Philippines, which  is the highest among ASEAN, based on the results in Table 1.   
Malaysia consistently figure as a big beneficiary of AFTA, not surprising, given the 
relatively large share of intra-ASEAN imports and exports in its total trade.  Singapore 
likewise gains as the reciprocity its gets for its free trade regime within ASEAN, translates 
into bigger export growth. 
 
Fig. 7.3  Intra-ASEAN exports shares (%)    Intra-ASEAN imports shares (%) 
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In more recent CGE analyses involving AFTA, the effects of trade facilitation and 
other productivity (procompetitive) effects are also taken into account.  Although these 
studies simulate the extension of AFTA to the rest of Asia, as in Roland-Holst, Verbiest, 
and Zhai (2005), and to Japan, in  Itakura, Hertel, Reimer (2003), they provide an 
indication of the incrementals one may expect if the simulation of economic integration 
would not be limited to the reduction of intra-bloc tariffs alone.  In fact, Roland- Holst, 
et. al., find that the income gains due to regional trade facilitation in ASEAN far 
outweigh those triggered by tariff reductions alone.  They simulate two scenarios of trade 
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liberalisation in Asia, with and without the simultaneous reduction of trade costs,94  and 
find that the average percentage change in real income in ASEAN-5 (from 2005 in 2025) 
jumps from 8.26 (no trade facilitation scenario) to 85.36 (with trade facilitation).   This 
serves as a reminder that there are various aspects of trade liberalisation brought about 
by regional integration that simulations in standard CGE models cannot capture, thereby 
leading to potentially understated results. 
 
7.3 Structure of CEPT tariffs and intra-ASEAN trade  
The typical suspicion often voiced about AFTA, or any preferential agreement for that 
matter, is that while the product coverage of liberalisation may be substantial, the most 
heavily traded products would still be hindered by whatever tariff peaks that would be 
remaining.  Table 2, however, proves this notion to be unfounded in the case of AFTA.  
More than half of Malaysia’s imports from ASEAN, for instance, have preferential rates 
of 1.5% and below.  The preferential margins (MFN – CEPT rates), however, also 
appear to be too low to make a significant dent for most traded goods.  With the 
exception of Thailand, the tariff discount on all the big import items for the rest of 
ASEAN, hardly reach 5 percentage points.  Given that compliance to rules of origin, 
exact non-trivial costs, then the revealed preference of majority of ASEAN producers to 
trade under MFN rates, seems quite rational. 
The dominant role of electronics imports within ASEAN is also evident in Table 2.  
Indonesia is an exception, with electronics accounting only 2.8% of total imports.  But 
for Thailand (41%), Malaysia (37%) and the Philippines (31%), imports are heavily biased 
towards electronic equipments (GSC95 40).    Other important sectors are: petroleum and 
coal products (16.87% ASEAN-4 average share of total imports), other machinery and 
equipment (16.62%),  and chemical, rubber and plastic products (16.48%). 
Some tariff peaks do have an effect on key imports, but in a moderate way, because 
of the likewise relatively small import shares of these affected goods.  Textiles and 
clothing are somewhat sensitive items in Indonesia, with CEPT rates in 2001 of 7.1% 
                                                 
94 Includes removal of all import tariffs and tariff-equivalent nontariff barriers, as well as all export subsidies 
within Asia.  Trade-facilitating policies, in another scenario, are simulated by a 3 percent annual reduction 
in intra-Asian trade costs. 
95 GTAP Sectoral Classification, contains 57 sectors in GTAP version 6. 
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and preference margin of 7.3%.  For Malaysia preferential tariffs are relatively high for 
paper products and minerals, with rates of 5.8% and 5.2, respectively, while food 
products (8.6%) and motor vehicles (6.75) are well-protected in the Philippines.  Among 
all the ASEAN countries, Thailand displays the highest CEPT rates for its top imports.  
However, the equally high MFN tariffs means that Thai’s  preferential margins provide 
ASEAN traders the biggest opportunities to exploit the AFTA regime. 
Table 7.2  Intra-ASEAN imports and preferential tariffs, 2001 
top ASEAN 
imports
share in 
total 
imports
CEPT 
ave
pref. 
margins
top ASEAN 
imports
share in 
total 
imports
CEPT 
ave
pref 
margins
petroleum 27.5 3.1 0.7 electronics 37.0 1.3 3.7
chemicals 23.9 4.3 2.0 petroleum 26.5 1.5 2.6
other 
machinery 12.2 3.0 1.1
other 
machinery 10.6 2.2 3.5
transp. eqpt. 7.3 3.9 4.7 chemicals 9.1 1.9 4.2
oil 5.3 1.3 0.0 paper prod 2.0 5.8 7.8
text & cloth 3.5 7.1 7.3 other metals 1.7 3.4 4.8
electronics 2.9 2.0 2.2 metal prod 1.4 5.2 8.1
motor 
vehicles 2.5 3.1 2.0 food prod 1.3 2.6 5.4
food prod 2.3 4.5 0.6 text. & cloth 1.2 4.6 12.8
bev. & tob 2.1 3.5 58.8 other minerals 0.9 5.5 13.3
Indonesia Malaysia
 
top imports
share in 
total 
imports
CEPT 
ave
pref. 
margins top imports
share in 
total 
imports
CEPT 
ave
pref. 
margins
electronics 31.4 1.6 1.5 electronics 40.9 3.8 6.6
chemicals 15.8 3.8 1.5 chemicals 16.2 5.2 8.3
other 
machinery 10.9 3.3 1.1
other 
machinery 13.0 4.2 6.4
petroleum 9.7 3.0 0.0 other metals 4.3 4.2 4.0
food prod 3.8 8.6 6.5 petroleum 3.8 3.1 0.7
oil 3.4 2.4 0.0 oil 3.4 0.0 0.0
other 
minerals 2.8 3.0 0.0 metals 3.1 6.2 13.7
motor 
vehicles 2.7 6.8 2.2 food prod 2.6 5.0 17.6
text & cloth 2.5 4.8 7.0 motor vehicles 2.0 8.5 30.2
paper prod 2.4 4.5 2.9 wood prod 1.7 7.0 10.7
Philippines Thailand
 
Data sourced from GTAP 6 and ASEAN Secretariat for CEPT rates. 
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7.4  Experiments and Results 
Simulations will be based on the latest version (6) of the global social accounting dataset 
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)96 and implemented with the 
GTAP6inGAMS (Generalized Algebraic Modelling System) modelling package.  Tariffs 
are sourced from the WTO’s database of tariffs and bindings, as well as from the 
UNCTAD TRAINS dataset and national schedules.  For the purposes of this study, the 
data is supplemented by the Common Effective Preferential Rates (CEPT) of the AFTA, 
which is sourced from the ASEAN Secretariat database.  All tariffs are trade-weighted.   
Appendix 7, describes the CGE model applied here.  For a full treatment of the 
basic multi-region CGE model, the reader is referred to Hertel et al (1997), and 
Rutherford (2005).  
The model is calibrated using 2001 as the base year. It is aggregated to 12 regions, 
and 36 sectors (see Appendix 7.1, Table A1 for the regional and sectoral scheme used).  
The benchmark scenario takes into account post-Uruguay  protection rates, as well as the 
removal of quotas, such as those linked with the Multi-Fibre Agreement.  The AFTA is 
assumed here to be fully implemented when tariffs reach the CEPT levels, instead of the 
zero rates assumed in previous simulations  
In order to later observe the effect of using CEPT rates in the model, Table 3 also 
presents the results of the AFTA experiment involving the reduction of tariffs from 
MFN to zero tariff rates.  Although preferential tariffs under the AFTA have a maximum 
rate of only 5%,  and much of the preferences have been eroded by unilateral MFN 
liberalisation, results show that the economic effects of global and regional liberalisation 
on ASEAN and the rest-of-the-world, could still differ somewhat.  Potentially, there is 
therefore reasonable gains to be reaped from the implementation of an ASEAN 
agreement in the AFTA to further reduce CEPT tariffs all the way to zero.  This justifies 
the decision of ASEAN members to progressively eliminate tariffs, starting from the 
removal of tariff duties on at least 60% of the product lines in the normal inclusion list in 
2003.   
 
                                                 
96 See Dimaranan and MacDougall, 2002, for details. 
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Table 7.3a  Results of Simulations : Welfare, Output and Imports 
 MFN → 0 MFN → CEPT 
 Welfare Output Imports Welfare Output Imports 
IDN 0.83 0.6 7.3 0.18 7.1 -0.30 
MYS 13.93 26.5 12.8 7.10 129.5 6.63 
PHL 0.80 5.3 10.0 -0.07 10.7 -0.70 
SGP 2.18 3.3 3.5 0.01 68.0 -0.54 
THA 3.35 3.4 14.1 0.45 -2.6 -0.72 
XSE 2.32 2.3 17.9 0.61 74.1 4.12 
CHN -0.80 -0.04 -0.8 1.01 -8.0 2.84 
JPN -0.02 -0.01 -0.8 0.05 4.9 -0.56 
KOR -0.05 -0.04 -0.2 0.17 -1.0 -0.33 
XEA -0.04 -0.02 -0.3 -0.33 29.6 -3.42 
ROW 0 -0.06 -0.9 0.11 -7.0 -0.68 
 
Table 7. 3b Results of Simulations : Unskilled wages, Skilled Wages, CPI 
 MFN → 0 MFN → CEPT 
 Unsk_w Sk_w CPI Unsk_w Sk_w CPI 
IDN 0.83 0.83 0.65 0.22 0.13 0.18 
MYS 3.46 2.68 -1.20 1.92 1.60 -0.93 
PHL 0.62 0.81 0.11 -0.09 -0.27 0.24 
SGP 1.23 1.04 1.22 -0.02 0.01 0.13 
THA 2.35 1.07 0.75 0.26 -0.18 0.46 
XSE 2.52 1.37 0.45 1.06 0.47 1.58 
CHN -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 0.64 0.09 1.80 
JPN -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.20 
KOR -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.08 0.30 
XEA -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.47 -0.41 -0.11 
ROW -0.01 0 0 0.08 0.13 -0.11 
Note:  IDN = Indonesia; MYS = Malaysia; PHL = Philippines; SGP = Singapore; THA = 
Thailand;  XSE = Rest-of-Southeast Asia; CHN = China; JPN = Japan; KOR = South Korea; 
XEA = Rest-of-East Asia; ROW = Rest-of-the-World; Unsk_w = unskilled wages; Sk_w = 
skilled wages 
 
The differences in the imports growth under a MFN→0, and MFN→CEPT 
scenarios, are particularly striking.  The trade-stimulating effect of  global liberalisation 
within ASEAN is unmistakable, although some indication of trade-diversion can also be 
gleaned from the results.  All other East Asian countries experience a slight fall in 
welfare, output and imports, in contrast with the rest of ASEAN, and in particular, with 
Malaysia, whose welfare rise by 14 percent.    
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Table 7.4a Growth of Top Exports & Imports      
top  exports top imports
MFN → 0
MFN → 
CEPT MFN → 0
MFN → 
CEPT
coal, oil, gas -0.7 -0.398 coal, oil, gas 2.4 -4.5
elect. equip -6.3 -1.175 elect. equip 0.9 -0.4
wood prod -4.7 -1.172 wood prod 1.4 0.2
chem/rub / -0.5 -0.248 chem/rub / 6.6 2.6
clothing 10.4 -4.779 clothing 10.4 -2.0
textiles 25.7 14.035 textiles 19.5 8.2
services -0.6 -0.287 services 2.5 0.3
other 
machinery 1.5 -0.688
other 
machinery 0.5 -0.4
paper prod -2.3 -0.633 paper prod 1.4 0.1
leather prod
-10.9 -2.764 leather prod 4.4 -3.5
top  exports top  imports
MFN → 0
MFN → 
CEPT MFN → 0
MFN → 
CEPT
elect. equip -3.1 -1.994 elect. equip -1.4 -1.1
services -2.2 -0.782 services -4.0 -2.1
other mach. 5.5 2.2
chem/rub / 
plast 6.5 2.0
chem/rub / 4.7 2.051 other mach 2.6 0.6
wood prod -2.6 -1.679 wood prod 6.4 0.8
coal, oil, gas -0.7 -0.617 coal, oil, gas 6.4 -3.1
veg oil & fats 2.0 2.157 veg oil & fats 5.3 3.5
other manuf 5.3 2.251 other manuf 8.8 2.8
textiles 104.7 81.017 textiles 31.9 9.0
clothing 29.4 -0.617 food prod 12.9 5.4
Malaysia
Indonesia
output growth import growth 
output growth import growth 
 
 
 
Indeed, Malaysia emerged as the prime beneficiary of ASEAN liberalisation in both 
simulations.  In welfare terms, the gain is larger in a global,  relative to an ASEAN-wide 
liberalisation, but Malaysia’s over-all output rises more in an AFTA-only scenario.  
However, it is note-worthy that Malaysia’s output falls the most in its  top export 
products, electronics (↓3% ) and services (↓ 2%), under the full MFN tariff liberalisation.  
When MFN tariffs fall to the CEPT levels, the drop in output is slightly less, that is 2% 
and 1%, respectively for electronics and services (see Table 4) .  Thus, the larger welfare 
effects of a shift to a completely duty-free regime for Malaysia, could probably be traced 
from the rationalization of resource allocation, as well as the drop in the consumer prices 
of tariff peak items, such as motor vehicles, for instance. 
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Table 7.4b Growth of Top Exports & Imports       
top  exports top  imports
MFN→0
MFN 
→CEPT MFN→0
MFN 
→CEPT
electronics. -1.8 0.772 electronics 0.1 0.6
other mach 1.1 0.524 other mach 0.6 0.1
services -0.2 0.004 clothing 3.1 -3.0
clothing 11.5 -10.618 services 1.7 -0.1
food prod 0.8 0.101 food prod 2.9 -0.4
textiles 12.1 1.22 textiles 9.7 -4.9
chem / rub 2.5 0.04 chem / rub 3.3 0.2
oth. metals 1.7 0.426 oth. metals 6.8 0.1
wood prod -2.0 0.07 wood prod 2.6 0.4
veg, fruits 0.5 -0.163 veg / fruits 1.8 -0.6
top  exports top  imports
MFN→0
MFN 
→CEPT MFN→0
MFN 
→CEPT
electronics 2.8 -0.852 electronics 4.2 -0.6
services -1.8 -0.269 other mach 3.2 -0.3
other mach 3.4 -0.896 services -1.0 0.5
chem / rub -1.3 -2.297 chem / rub 6.8 1.1
food prod -1.0 -0.882 food prod 12.1 0.1
other manuf -3.1 -0.315 clothing 31.3 1.3
textiles 16.5 8.139 textiles 20.6 3.8
clothing 12.0 2.01 other manuf 5.8 1.7
other crops 4.0 5.267 paddy rice 14.6 -2.8
leather prod
-1.0 -1.412 other crops 31.0 9.2
output growth import growth 
Philippines
output growth import growth 
Thailand
  
 
The relative low growth rates posited here by Indonesia could also perhaps be partly 
explained by Table 7.4a.  In 7 out of the 10 top exports of Indonesia, output falls quite 
significantly, especially in fossils, chemicals, electronics, and wood products, which 
together comprise 41% of total exports.  In other countries, not only is the decline in 
output limited to relatively fewer products, but there are compensating increases in other 
key sectors, too.  Under the AFTA-only regime, output of all top exports fall, except in 
textiles.  There is, in fact, a marked improvement in textile production in both scenarios, 
with the rise in output surpassing import growth.   
With the exception of Thailand, which sees a slight increase in clothing output 
under the AFTA (2%↑) ,  all the rest of the ASEAN4, experience a fall in clothing 
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output and imports when liberalisation is limited to ASEAN.  In contrast, clothing 
output rise even as overall imports also increase under full MFN liberalisation.  This 
seems to imply that apart from the obvious direct cost advantage and pro-
competitiveness effects brought about by the removal of CEPT tariffs, further 
liberalisation also induces more regional sourcing for least-cost inputs, which helps boost 
overall competitiveness.  
Table 7.5 Full MFN liberalisation with export quotas 
Welfare
clothing 
output
clothing 
imports textile output
textile 
imports
IDN 3.9 42.0 66.3 22.7 50.3
MYS 45.5 62.9 69.6 79.6 61.6
PHL 2.3 60.6 32.5 31.0 48.1
SGP 5 16.2 10.5 28.7 11.7
THA 13.9 22.5 268.8 8.7 85.1
XSE 5 32.3 132.9 5.0 76.0
CHN 7.9 34.6 106.6 7.7 93.6
JPN 2 -3.9 34.1 18.2 25.8
KOR 11 30.7 49.9 36.9 66.4
XEA 3.2 22.4 10.9 34.0 14.2
ROW 0.9 -6.1 25.6 -5.2 15.2  
Among all the regions involved in the experiments, only the Philippines and the rest 
of East Asia, experience a fall in welfare as a result of the more limited liberalisation to 
CEPT rates.  This seems to be largely due to the clothing sectors of these region losing 
out to its ASEAN counterparts, with the output of the Philippines and the rest of East 
Asia falling by 10% and7%, respectively.   
In previous CGE studies on the AFTA, the Philippines is expected to fare relatively 
well, better than Indonesia, for instance, mainly because of the projected growth in its 
exports.  Indeed, if one assumes that MFA textile and quotas will remain enforced, then 
clothing output of the Philippines under a full MFN liberalisation scenario jumps from 
11% to 60%.  With the removal of quotas, on the other hand, the clothing output of 
China dramatically jumps from -0.4% to 106%, thereby potentially squeezing out other 
ASEAN clothing manufacturers like the Philippines.   
Next to Malaysia, Thailand is seen to benefit the most in both a partial and full 
liberalisation scenarios in ASEAN.   This is despite the fall in output in 9 out the 36 
sectors under a MFN → CEPT experiment, and in 21 sectors under full tariff 
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liberalisation.  The rise in welfare seems to be driven by consumer gains, Thailand, being 
the country with the highest rate of overall protection and the most number of tariff 
peak products among ASEAN-5. 
 
Figure 7.4  Welfare changes under various degrees of ASEAN liberalisation 
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(See Annex 7.1 for numerical results of the simulations presented above). 
As for the rest of Southeast Asia, namely, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam 
(CMLV countries), welfare rises both in a partial and full ASEAN liberalisation, but 
output in practically all manufacturing sectors fall, with the exception of leather  and 
wood products, whose output rise by 82.3% and 35%, respectively in a full MFN 
liberalisation scenario, and 76% and 33% under the CEPT-AFTA..  This somewhat 
justifies the more gradual implementation of CEPT commitments for these countries. 
Vietnam is expected to bring down tariffs to the CEPT maximum range of  5% by 2006, 
Myanmar and Lao PDR by 2008, and Cambodia by 2010.  About a quarter of their tariff 
lines are also still under a temporary exclusion list.  
Among the ASEAN-5 countries, it is Thailand that appears to be the most 
positively affected once the CMLV countries fully integrates into the AFTA. Thailand’s 
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welfare rises from 2.84% in a no-CMLV (full MFN ↓ ) scenario, to 3.34% with CMLV 
full participation.  Singapore also benefits, its welfare rising from 1.62% to 2.18%.  China, 
however, seems adversely affected.  Without a CMLV liberalisation, China’s welfare still 
rises  by 9.38%, and slightly shrinks by -.08% in a full ASEAN FTA.   
Finally, Figure 4 compares the economic effects of a full multilateral abolition of 
MFN tariffs, open regionalism (i.e. unilateral liberalisation of MFN tariffs on the part of 
ASEAN),  with the results reported earlier in Table 3, in order to get a glimpse of the full 
range of benefits ASEAN can expect from differing degrees of liberalisation.    With the 
exception of Malaysia and CMLV, the rest of ASEAN gain the most under a regime of 
open regionalism, while even a complete implementation of the CEPT-AFTA brings 
only marginal welfare increases.  The ASEAN agreement to fully eliminate tariffs in the 
CEPT covered goods by 2010, is therefore a step towards the right direction, although 
there is clearly much more to be gained by if ASEAN unilaterally extends the AFTA 
preferential rates to its non-ASEAN partners.   
 
7.5   Summary and Conclusions 
The speed with which MFN tariffs have fallen in ASEAN in the last decade has led to 
the erosion of preferences under the AFTA-CEPT regime.  The cost of proving origin, 
and other administrative procedures linked to the exploitation of AFTA privileges may 
also have further reduced whatever advantages lower AFTA rates may imply.  However, 
in the product range where preferential margins are substantial (i.e. 5 percentage points 
and higher),  the utilisation of preferences is about 30% - 40% of total imports.  This 
study therefore examines the potential benefits that can be expected if ASEAN traders 
take full advantage of CEPT preferences.  Since full utilisation implies the successful 
implementation of trade facilitation measures, and removal of non-tariff barriers 
(including those linked to rules of origin), the estimation of AFTA effects also provides 
an indication of the economic returns corresponding to these policy efforts.   
AFTA simulations performed by past CGE studies assume that ASEAN 
liberalisation under the AFTA leads to the reduction of MFN tariffs all the way to zero.    
In this study, the actual AFTA regime is approximated by using trade-weighted CEPT 
rates.  Results show that the gains of full CEPT utilisation are indeed marginal, so that 
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given the various costs associated with the application for CEPT rates, the predominant 
use of MFN tariffs could be considered quite rational.  However, the complete removal 
of intra-ASEAN tariffs could have more pronounced welfare effects, especially for 
Malaysia, and to a lesser degree, for Thailand as well.  Policy-wise, this implies that the 
decision to eliminate tariffs in 2010 for ASEAN-5 and 2015 for the CMLV countries, do 
have positive and substantial economic implications for the whole ASEAN region.  
During the various negotiations under the APEC, especially in 1996 when the 
Manila Action Plans were being formulated, ASEAN voiced its readiness to extend the 
AFTA privileges to non-ASEAN partners, if the principle of open regionalism would be 
embraced by the bigger regional body.  While  global MFN liberalisation may be 
politically far-fetched, it is therefore not inconceivable that the notion of open 
regionalism could muster the necessary political-backing, at least within ASEAN.    In 
that event, the growth effects of regional liberalisation will be even more apparent, and 
the policy efforts to address the market fragmentation in ASEAN will yield even higher 
returns. 
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Annex 7.1  Summary of Welfare effects simulations 
  global open reg full FTA AFTA 
IDN 3.9 4.1 0.8 0.18 
MYS 41.9 27.1 14.2 7.1 
PHL 2 3.1 0.8 -0.07 
SGP 5 8.7 2.2 0 
THA 14.1 17.9 3.3 0.45 
XSE 5.6 5.4 2.3 0.61 
CHN 9.4 1.4 -0.8 1.01 
JPN 2.1 0.4 -0.02 0.05 
KOR 11.1 0.6 -0.05 0.17 
XEA 2.6 0.4 -0.04 -0.32 
ROW 1.1 0.1 0 0.1 
 
Appendix 7 
The core CGE model is based on the assumption of optimizing behaviour on the 
part of consumers, producers, and government.  Consumers maximize utility subject to a 
budget constraint, and producers maximize profits by combining intermediate inputs and 
primary factors at least possible cost, for a given technology.  The GTAP model used 
here is a static, multi-regional model, which maps out the production and distribution of 
goods and services in the global economy.  It includes 12 regions and 36 sectors, as 
detailed in Table A7.  The GTAP6 dataset is implemented using the GTAP6inGAMS 
package.  For a full treatment of this modelling package, as well as a complete description 
of the economic structure accounting identities underlying the GTAP model, the reader 
is referred to Rutherford (2005).  The following provides a concise account of the basic 
specifications for the consumption, production and trade relations, as they are applied in 
this chapter.   
Table A1  Regional and Sectoral Aggregation 
Regions 
IDN                         
MYS 
PHL 
SGP 
THA 
XSE 
 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Rest of South-east 
Asia 
 
CHN 
JPN 
KOR 
HKG 
TWN 
ROW 
 
China 
Japan 
Korea 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
Rest-of-the-World 
Sectors 
  159 
pdr Paddy rice b_t    Beverages and tobacco products 
wht Wheat tex    Textiles 
gro Cereal grains nec wap    Wearing apparel 
v_f Vegetable, fruits, buts lea  Leather products 
osd Oil seeds lum Wood products 
ocr  Sugar cane, sugar beet ppp  Paper products, publishing 
ctl   Bovine cattle, sheep and 
goats, horses 
p_c   Petroleum, coal products 
oap  Animal products nec crp    Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
frs   Forestry nmm Mineral products nec 
fsh    Fishing i_s  Ferrous metals 
fos  Coal, Oil, Gas nfm  other metals 
omn  Minerals nec fmp   Metal products nec 
cmt  Bovine meat products mvh   Motor vehicles and parts 
omt    Meat products nec otn    Transport equipment nec 
vol  Vegetable oils and fats ele   Electronic equipment 
mil Dairy products ome  Machinery and equipment nec 
sgr  Sugar omf    Manufactures nec 
ofd    Food products nec ser  Services  
 
The production and consumption structure of the CGE model can be best 
understood by using a technology tree as shown in figure A7.1 
 
Fig. A7.1 Nested production structure 
 
 
 
 
 
The production function as shown above has a two-level nested constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) form, where cost minimization determines the input demands for 
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primary factors of production (labor (skilled and unskilled), capital and land), and the 
demand for intermediate inputs.  The latter can be purchased domestically and also be 
sourced from abroad.  The most bottom part of the tree is the CES nest that describes 
the combination of bilateral imports using the Armington assumption of regionally 
differentiated products. 
Overall consumption is governed by utility maximization subject to the budget 
constraint and specified over composite private consumption, private investments, 
government consumption and government investment. A Cobb-Douglas trade-off 
across domestic and imported goods further characterize final demand.97 Expenditure on 
imports is then further spread across exporting countries with the aim to minimize cost.  
Figure A7.2  represents the consumption structure as described. 
 
Fig. A7.2   Consumption Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the basic GTAP model, the consumer price index is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate 
of the set of  domestic prices, rdP and the set of prices for imported goods, 
r
mP  .  The 
price indices for imported goods are given by: 
(1)  *)1( mrm PtP += ;   
where t   is the tariff rate, and *mP  is the world price. 
                                                 
97 One difference between the GEMPACK version (used in chapter 4) and the GAMS model used in this 
chapter, lies in representation of the final demand system.  The GEMPACK model is based on a constant-
difference-of-elasticities (CDE) functional form, while the GAMS version uses Cobb-Douglas preferences. 
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The domestic price, on the other hand, is determined by the prices of the CES composite 
of factors, v (skilled and unskilled labor, land, resources and capital inputs), and the price 
of domestically produced intermediates, rAP : 
(2)  ),( rArvrdrd PPfP = . 
Given domestic prices for inputs and outputs, the demand for primary inputs, v, will be a 
function of unit input coefficients (determined by relative input prices) and by total 
demand for domestic output, Q :  
(3)  ( )[ ]rvrvrr PcQv )(= ; 
where the input coefficients, c,   follow from the CES production technology for value 
added.   
Demand for goods will be a function of the entire set of global incomes, I,   and prices, 
P: 
(4)  ( )IPfQ q ,=  
where incomes are an outcome of the full general equilibrium solution across final and 
intermediate demands within the model.   
Incomes, I,  in each region are the sum of factor incomes and taxes collected Γ which is a 
function of tax rates γ): 
(5)  ( )( ) ( )γ,,* rvmrrvr PPvPI Γ+= . 
Finally, welfare u is defined in terms of an aggregate consumer with standard preferences, 
such that we can write an expenditure function e ( . ) defined over consumer prices and 
welfare: 
(6)  ( ) rrAr IPue =,  
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Chapter 8 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
8.1   Regionalism and the agglomeration motive 
This book was triggered by the analytical question of how one can characterize the 
political equilibrium of countries when regionalism is driven by the need to trigger 
agglomeration through the pooling of markets and the promotion of foreign direct 
investments.  This is a question not addressed by standard endogenous protection 
literature, opting to focus instead, on the question of how the creation of regional 
integration agreements (RIAs) can accommodate the economic interests of  the most 
politically influential producer groups. Regionalism, in standard political economy theory, 
is largely valued for its ability to enhance protection through trade diversion, and is 
sustained by the balanced distribution of export markets within the region.  In cases 
where trade-creating results dominate, references are made to other political goals, such 
as those linked to regional security, to the enhancement of regional bargaining power, or 
to the need to lock-in domestic reforms.    
The rhetoric behind the surge of RIAs, however, is filled with allusions to the 
necessity of building up scale economies, and making the region an even more attractive 
production hub for global industries.  This led Ethier to suggest that trade diversion and 
trade creation are no longer the principal driving forces behind regionalism, as we have 
witnessed in the 1990s, but the increased globalisation of production processes. 
International firms are in constant search of higher productivity, through the exploitation 
of cost differentials among countries,  and the generation of scale economies by further 
breaking up their manufacturing processes and concentrating the production of each 
stage in single locations.  This has led to a race among developing countries to offer the 
best investment environment for FDIs, not only because of the growth-impetus of 
greater manufacturing activity, but also because of the risk of being relegated to a status 
of a peripheral, low-growth location.  Developed countries, on their part, are spurred by 
access to resources,  and greater cost competitiveness through their ability to service 
global export markets from an integrated hub of regional suppliers.   
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Linking industrial agglomeration and regionalism, however, inevitably begins from 
stepping out of the constant-returns-to-scale framework, on which standard political 
economy literature is largely based.   The literature on variable returns to scale is 
considerably rich, and the welfare effects of trade policy have been adequately laid out.  
The work at hand is therefore to make the relationship between scale economies and 
endogenous protection more explicit.  This is done in this book in two parts.  The first, 
carried out in Chapter 2, consists of a survey of literature covering the fields of 
endogenous protection, increasing returns to scale and regionalism.   This is followed, in 
Chapter 3, by an attempt to further examine the theoretical implications of taking scale 
effects into account in the analysis of endogenous protection.   
 
8.2 Endogenous protection and variable returns to scale:  theoretical 
linkages 
 
To understand how the preferences of political actors over trade policy vary in the 
presence of scale effects, it is key to identify the ways in which these policies impact on 
welfare under the circumstances of variable returns.   It was evident in Chapter 2 that the 
expected welfare effects of trade policy differ depending on the assumptions made about 
the kinds of goods (intermediates or final); market structure; source and scope of 
externalities; and initial market size.   It is well-known, for instance, that  import-
competing interests, are not always necessarily served by rising protection,  nor is free 
trade always the optimal policy that promotes overall efficiency and welfare.  
Circumstances exist wherein increasing the supply of protection, for instance, do not 
inescapably lead to higher political costs on the part of governments, in terms of falling 
levels of welfare for the general electorate.  Moreover, since trade policy can potentially 
induce an economy to move from a low to a high-growth equilibrium and vice-versa, the 
politically optimal level of protection can be expected to change as patterns of trade and 
production correspondingly shift. 
A key point is that once scale economies and agglomeration are taken into account, 
market size no longer becomes a marginal element in the analysis of the political tariff 
equilibrium.  In current literature, the importance of size is merely conditional on the 
amount of lobbying or its implication on the voting power of an industry.  In an 
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increasing-returns-to-scale framework, instead, market size assumes a pivotal role as it 
determines the strength of scale effects  and the effectiveness of trade policy in effecting 
a break-point that could potentially cause the economy to leap towards a more superior 
equilibrium.  
Seen from this context, the political support for the formation of a regional 
agreement is based on the welfare calculus which takes into account the effects of a 
larger scale of production on profits and overall incomes.  The move to freer regional 
trade takes place, therefore, not necessarily despite the falling political influence of key 
industrial players, and because of increased political activity of exporters alone.  When 
scale effects enter the political calculus, it is possible to envisage equilibrium conditions 
where reduction in protection leads to higher profits for firms, especially those whose 
production is characterised by increasing returns.  Since import-competing firms, 
particularly in the developing world, are precisely those operating in industries with 
excess capacity, then one can expect the policy preference of these producers to shift in 
favour of less protection.    
In many policy debates, it is true that government intervention through targeted 
protection has been likewise motivated by the aim to generate that critical mass of 
industrial production, which once reached, could trigger an industrial take-off.    
Policymaking in much of the developing world, in fact, has been strongly shaped by the 
goal of industrial development.   The choice of policy regimes, more than being driven 
by interest group lobbying, has often been driven by ambitions of nation-building, and 
determined by the political consensus on the kind of strategy that could spur 
industrialisation.   The literature on agglomeration and economic geography supports this 
idea of a take-off, illustrating how the incipient growth of manufacturing could have 
catalytic effects on the overall growth of national income, which then stimulates the 
further rise of demand for manufacturing.  Higher incomes and greater manufacturing 
production then strengthen the backward and forward linkages in the economy, 
attracting further growth of manufacturing as firms from other regions relocate in order 
to benefit from the swelling agglomeration in the developing economy. 
Chapter 3 delves into the dynamics of the policymaking process in the presence of 
economies and diseconomies, looking at the interaction of the political and production 
sectors, particularly during industrial transitions. The analysis shows the manner in which 
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political interactions can comprise as a shock in the real sector, pushing the economy 
towards a breakpoint and into a higher level of manufacturing activity.  Multiple 
equilibria, however, imply that the political equilibrium may not be global, so that no 
guarantee exists that the lobbying that leads to higher tariffs leads to higher incomes as 
well.  The larger is the initial size of employment, and/or the higher the returns to scale 
(i.e. via higher public expenditures in infrastructure, etc.), the greater is the likelihood of 
lobbying-driven agglomeration.  Changes in the real sector, on the other hand, such as a 
terms-of-trade shock may likewise lead to permanent political changes.  It could reduce 
the net returns of lobbying (through lower scale effects) and raise the costs of higher 
protection, causing a reduction of equilibrium tariffs.  Results imply that larger countries 
can be expected to be more protectionist in manufacturing sectors where they remain net 
importers.   
Some attention is also placed on the crucial role of the supply side of the political 
market.  The nature of the incumbent government,  that is, whether it is vision-growth-
oriented, or passive/kleptocratic, on one hand, determine the level of public investments 
poured into overall nation-building, and consequently, the potential scale economies that 
can be generated by domestic entrepreneurs.   On the other hand, it sets the pattern of, 
and the rules governing the political interactions between lobbyists and public officials.  
Lobbying may come in the form of investment pledges, for instance, whenever a 
government has a predominantly industrialist agenda.  This is because the decision to 
protect an industry could be conditioned on the ability of firms to display its growth 
potential or its contribution to industrial employment. 
What the results also illustrate is that although the presence of scale economies 
could intensify the demand and supply of higher industrial tariffs, it may also help ensure 
that protection stays temporary.  As production and productivity expands, the economy 
could shift to a higher growth path but with lower or zero incidence of protection.  The 
model discussed here shows that even when strong industrial lobbies are politically 
active, one could expect downward shifts in tariffs, as soon as the critical industrial scale 
is reached, and the role of trade policies in output expansion is reduced or becomes 
redundant. Put in an alternative way, while tariffs may finance industrialisation, growth in 
manufacturing could eventually exert a downward pressure on protection.  This 
corresponds to historical trends of higher manufacturing growth and lower levels of 
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protection through time, not only in industrialised economies  but also recently among 
the  newly-industrialising countries, or NICs.  
 
8.3  Regionalism from theory to practice 
Alongside the visible trend towards liberalisation, is the likewise undeniable evidence of 
continued protection in selected sectors within regional blocs.  Despite the articulated 
ambitions for regional economic integration, producers are confronted with the daily 
reality of tariff peaks, and market fragmentation, as in the case of ASEAN.   The second 
section of this study zooms into the actual practice of regionalism, in particular, at the 
political economy determinants of EU’s structure of protection, and at the current state 
of ASEAN economic integration.   
In Chapter 4, we examine the nature of EU trade policy, initially testing some basic 
correlations between tariffs and industrial indicators that are typically used in literature as 
proxies for political economy variables.  We find that industries with bigger output 
experience lower protection, which could be due to the coordination problems inherent 
in large groups.  Explanations could also be found in the scale economies arguments 
discussed in earlier chapters.  If an IRS economy is lodged in a high-output equilibrium, 
then producer and overall welfare are served by lower and not higher rates of protection.  
It follows then that any lobbying-activity of politically-influential groups  would lead to 
the reduction in tariffs.    
The country origin of industry also seems to matter in EU trade policy.  
Experiments consistently point to both the French and the British as being the most 
prominent players in EU tariff-setting.  It is interesting to note that the trade policy 
posture of the EU countries relative to each other in this study, are still fully consistent 
with their original relative tariff stance in 1958, before the institution of a common 
external tariff.   
In recent empirical works testing the Grossman-Helpman model, the key challenge 
has always been to identify the appropriate indicators for lobbying activity, given the 
central place accorded by the model to the political participation of interest groups.  
Even in studies done on the US where actual data on campaign contributions exist, the 
results generate implausible estimates for the policy weights that government attach to 
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various industries.  These may have been largely due to the data on political contributions 
being unable to adequately approximate the magnitude of private sector lobbying, and 
indirect influence peddling.  A similar approach would thus yield even more problematic 
results for the EU where explicit lobbying behaviour is particularly difficult to track.   
In Chapter 4, we take an alternative route to assess the relative importance of 
industry against the overall interests in the determination of trade policy in the EU.  
Employing a numerical general equilibrium model of the EU, we estimate the direct 
marginal effects of sectoral tariff protection on various industries, the indirect effect on 
upstream and downstream industries,  and the effect on overall welfare.  The model is 
specified using the objective maximization problem of an influence-driven government, 
as in Hillman (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1994).   We then econometrically 
calculate the apparent weights of industry in policymaking given the current tariff 
structure.  We further deconstruct these weights along the lines of industry nationality 
and other sectoral characteristics.  
Unlike previous empirical studies, the values we derive for the revealed policy 
weights tie in with theoretical expectations:  the importance given to industry profits, in 
general, tend to be around 2 to 3 times that assigned to national income.  Moreover, high 
protection is not necessarily always explained by greater political weight attached to a 
particular sector.  In fact, we find that the policy weights of less protected sectors are 
comparable to those that enjoy higher protection rates.  While the agricultural bias of EU 
protection was evident in our results, for instance, the low policy weights suggest that 
tariffs are now currently high in agriculture, not strictly because of the political power of 
farmer groups, but because of the low economy-wide effects that agriculture protection 
implies.   
Despite the collective exercise of trade policy, nationality still matters for EU 
protection-setting.  Industries important to certain Member States (United Kingdom, 
France and Italy) in terms of relative output shares,  also consistently receive higher levels 
of tariff protection.   
For the succeeding chapters, the focus is shifted towards ASEAN.  It is worth 
noting that in more than a decade of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the analyses 
made on the immediate effects of preferences on the regional  tariff structure have been 
largely based on the pace and the tariff lines coverage of regional liberalisation.  No 
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analysis has been made on the impact of tariff liberalisation on actual trade flows.  The 
biggest obstacle has been the non-harmonisation of product codes used in data 
reporting, which correspondingly prevents the convergence of trade and tariff data.  The 
most basic information regarding the actual coverage of AFTA preferences, in terms of 
trade value, is therefore non-existent, and key questions about the relevance and 
effectiveness of AFTA could likewise not be adequately addressed. 
One pressing question, for example, is the extent of the utilisation of the tariff 
preferences inherent in AFTA’s Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme.  
Once again, utilisation data is not available, since data reporting/sharing is voluntary and 
not obligatory in ASEAN.   In Chapter 5, an attempt is made to estimate the importance 
of AFTA preferences in the absence of actual data on its usage.  The concordance of 
trade and tariff data for 2001 – 2003 have been made through WITS, paving the way for 
some basic investigation of the current state of intra-regional trade under the AFTA’s 
preferential regime.   
A look at disaggregated (HS6) sectoral trade show that the coverage of ASEAN 
liberalisation in terms of trade (import) value is indeed substantial, with 90.9% of total 
intra-ASEAN imports in 2003 falling within the AFTA tariff limit of 5%. This is only 
slightly lower than the 94.3% coverage with respect to tariff or product lines.  About half 
of the value of intra-ASEAN imports are also covered by duty-free tariffs under the 
AFTA.  However, the rapid fall of MFN tariffs in the last decade, means that for most of 
intra-ASEAN products, the preferential margins (MFN – CEPT) are actually zero.  In 
2001, 62.8% of imports enjoy zero margins, while in 2003, the figure is 65.3% (without 
Thailand).   
Firm interviews undertaken for the ASEAN secretariat estimate the utilisation of 
preferences at a low 5% of total intra-ASEAN imports.  However, since the total import 
value shares of products with margins above 5%, are only 14.86% in 2001 (and 12.62% 
in 2003),  the preference take-up rates are possibly not low, relative to the product range 
where utilisation can be considered rational.  Compliance costs hover around 4 -4.5% for 
the EU (Manchin, 2006), 6.2% for NAFTA ( Carrére and de Melo, 2004) and about 8% 
for the Pan-European preference Scheme (Cadot et. al, 2005).  Thus, granted that CEPT 
utilisation rates are indeed in the neighbourhood of 5% of total imports,  and assuming 
that compliance costs is at a very conservative rate of, say, 5%, then the take-up rate of 
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AFTA preferences would actually be in the neighbourhood of 30% - 40%.    The higher 
is the compliance cost, then the higher would be the gap between the nominal and real 
rates of preference utilisation.  
An econometric test employing a modified gravity model and using aggregated data, 
further showed that the results of the model which employed CEPT tariff rates in its 
specification performed no better than the model using MFN tariffs.  This implies that 
preferences have indeed not yielded any important influence on their trade flows during 
the period of study.  Another experiment performed using disaggregated data, tested the 
significance of various preferential margins on intra-ASEAN imports.  Only  with 
margins of 10-25 percentage points do preferences begin to exert a positive effect on 
trade. The coefficient is insignificant, however.  At margins hitting at least 25 percentage 
points, preferences have a more evident stimulating effect on intra-ASEAN imports.   
This seem to indicate a rather high range of compliance or administrative costs attached 
to the request for AFTA preferences.   
In the context of a Free Trade Area, these costs are largely attributed to the need to 
prove and certify the origin of products traded within the region.  Chapter 6 therefore 
investigates the whole subject of Rules of Origin, not only in ASEAN, but in the whole 
of East Asia, where FTAs have literally mushroomed in a short span of 3 – 4 years.  A 
survey was made of the rules of origin attached to the 12 FTAs that have been signed so 
far, in order to identify some of the problems brought about by the use and 
implementation of these rules.   For countries applying the value-added or 
domestic/regional content rule, one probable reason for low utilisation of preferences is 
the inability of exporters to cumulate the necessary amount of local / regional content, 
given the degree of process fragmentation in some of the more heavily-traded products.  
Analysis of the direct and indirect value-added and import content of key sectors show 
that indeed, in key export sectors such as electronics and machineries, the import content 
is the highest for ASEAN. The sum of the direct and indirect import content for these 
sectors are 67.% and 60.6%, respectively, slightly above the maximum 60% allowed by 
AFTA.    In terms of value-added, both for AFTA and for the Australia-New Zealand 
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Closer Economic Partnership (ANZCER), members appear to be unable to meet the 
40% (for AFTA) and 50% (for ANZCER) rule for most of the key sectors studied.98   
There is an emerging trend towards the use of product specific rules (PSR) in East 
Asian FTAs.  For AFTA and ANZCER, the move is justified by the need to provide an 
alternative to the value-content rule, given the problems cited above, and also due to the 
cumbersome procedures involved in the valuation and certification of declared costs.  
For other FTAs, the use of PSRs is motivated by the need to maintain the structure of 
protection of politically sensitive sectors, especially in agricultures and in textiles and 
clothing.  One threat is the likelihood that bilateral FTAs with restrictive PSRs define the 
parameters of wider FTAs to be formed later on. One example is the bilaterals that Japan 
is negotiating with individual ASEAN countries, and its impact on the design of an 
ASEAN-Japan FTA, also under negotiation.   
A real challenge, however, is how to facilitate trade and at the same time prevent 
trade deflection in a region characterized by ever increasing ‘back-doors’ for non-
members and where even relatively high tariff countries are acquiring pockets of low 
tariff barriers.  These could lead to more intensive and heavy-handed verification  
procedures that will further raise the already high administrative costs in the region.   
What would be the welfare gains of moving to a much-simplified regime for origin 
rules, and to a harmonised set of customs procedures, so that the use of preferences can 
be fully maximised?  Chapter 7 explores some answers using a CGE approach.  It 
estimates the benefits of the full implementation of AFTA, that is the reduction of tariffs 
down to the CEPT range of 0 – 5%.   Similar work in the past simulates the AFTA by 
eliminating intra-regional tariffs.  However, only about 35% of total intra-ASEAN goods 
are duty-free, so that the incorporation of CEPT rates into the GTAP 6 data base could 
be expected to further approximate the actual impact of AFTA on welfare, output and 
trade.  Results show that the gains of full CEPT utilisation are indeed marginal, so that 
given the various costs associated with the application for preferences, the large use of 
MFN tariffs in intra-regional trade could be considered quite rational.  However, the 
complete removal of intra-ASEAN tariffs could have more pronounced welfare effects, 
                                                 
98 Sectors: textiles, clothing, leather goods, chemical products, motor vehicles, transport equipment, electrical 
machinery, machinery and equipment, and other manufacturing products. 
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especially for Malaysia.  This implies that the policy decision to completely eliminate 
tariffs in 2010 for ASEAN-6 and 2015 for Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, 
could have positive and substantial economic implications for ASEAN.   
 
8.4  Areas for future research 
This book was initially motivated by the desire to understand the political economy 
underpinnings of new regionalism as Ethier (1998) has described it.  There was indeed a 
need to beyond trade diversion motives, if one is to understand how countries with 
protectionist traditions, and with similar production and trade patterns, such as those in 
ASEAN, could reach the political equilibrium that supports the formation of a free trade 
area.  Some initial steps are undertaken in this study, namely, the investigation of the 
implications of scale economies and agglomeration for endogenous protection.   
The model that was developed here is somewhat basic, and assumes that scale 
economies are national in scope.  The gains to specialisation envisaged by Ethier, 
however, and those that are relevant for new regionalism, are the productivity gains 
brought about by the increased division of labour worldwide.  The natural extension of 
this study is therefore towards an open economy version of our agglomeration and 
endogenous protection model.  It is clear that the pooling of regional markets could 
impact on the  locational decisions of globalized firms, thereby accelerating the process 
of agglomeration.  Regionalisation of production could also enable countries to 
internalize whatever spill-overs that might result from public and private spendings 
designed to enhance industrial output. 
In the context of endogenous protection, one area of inquiry is what the political 
implications are of a core-periphery scenario within a regional grouping.  Countries enter 
a regional agreement, with certain ambitions of being the hub of high value-added 
production.  The political support of key interest groups would also be likely based on 
expectations of regionalism-induced investments in their sectors.  What happens when a 
key member, such as Malaysia in ASEAN, is faced with the threat of falling output in 
some targeted sectors, such as car manufacturing, due to the agglomeration of 
production in Thailand?  In a general equilibrium sense, Malaysia might experience a rise 
or fall of overall welfare, depending on the strength of regional scale effects, but the 
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short-run costs in terms of falling profits for a key sector such as motor vehicles would 
strongly impact on the equilibrium political support for the FTA agreement. 
Indeed, looking at the turn of events in 2000 in ASEAN, Malaysia did temporarily 
pull out key items in the motor vehicle sector from the CEPT Scheme.  This triggered a 
similar reaction from the Philippines which also made a request for temporary exclusion 
for petrochemicals.  These measures are generally consistent with the standard theoretical 
expectations of endogenous protection.  The puzzle is why and how these countries 
managed to re-submit these sectors for liberalisation only a few years later.   
Another point of interest is the political consequences of unfulfilled expectations 
with respect to the flow of foreign direct investments.  The threat of a worst-case 
scenario for ASEAN, that is, the combination of full liberalisation, falling investments, 
and a periphery status in East-Asia, could not be completely non-existent, given the 
continued rise of China, and the gaining strength of India as well.  A case could be made 
for the withdrawal of political support for continued regional integration, and political 
economy theory would provide enough motivations for such a policy move.  The 
response of ASEAN to this threat, however, seems to be the opposite.  One of the most 
recent decisions is to create an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020.  Another policy 
trend is to extend the ASEAN preferentialism to its East Asian neighbours.  If this is the 
bicycle theory at work, what are the political economy forces propelling the momentum 
for continued regionalism?  A related theoretical question concerns the political-
economic costs and benefits of a shift back to protection from a free-trade equilibrium, 
when international scale economies remains to be an important component in the 
protection-setting equation.   
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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)  
 
Dit boek is gestimuleerd door de analytische vraag, hoe het politieke evenwicht tussen landen kan 
worden gekarakteriseerd, indien regionalisme bepaald wordt door de noodzaak agglomeratie uit te 
lokken middels het integreren van markten alsmede de bevordering van directe buitenlandse 
investeringen. De retoriek die de snelle opkomst van regionale integratie (RIAs in de studie) 
ondersteunt, staat bol van verwijzingen naar de noodzaak van het bereiken van schaaleffecten, en 
tevens naar het  nog aantrekkelijker maken van de regio als een productie “ hub” voor wereldwijd 
opererende sectoren. Dit noopte Ethier tot de suggestie dat handelsschepping en 
handelsverlegging niet langer de drijvende krachten achter regionalisme zijn, zoals we hebben 
kunnen waarnemen tijdens de jaren negentig, maar juist de toenemende globalisering van 
productieprocessen. 
       Bij de zoektocht naar het verband tussen agglomeratie en regionalisme is het echter 
onvermijdelijk om eerst buiten het kader van constante schaalopbrengsten te treden, waar de 
politieke economie literatuur meestal op is gebaseerd. De opdracht in dit boek is daarom om het 
verband tussen schaaleffecten en endogene protectie explicieter te maken. Dit boek doet dat in 
twee stappen. Hoofdstuk 2 behelst een literatuuroverzicht van drie aspecten :  endogene protectie, 
toenemende schaalopbrengsten en regionalisme. Dit wordt gevolgd door een poging in hoofdstuk 
3 om de theoretische implicaties nader te onderzoeken van het invoeren van schaaleffecten in de 
analyse van endogene protectie.  
      Uit hoofdstuk 2 blijkt duidelijk dat de verwachte welvaartseffecten van handelspolitiek 
uiteenlopen afhankelijk van de vooronderstellingen omtrent de aard van de goederen  
(intermediaire of eindprodukten);  marktstructuur ; de bron en reikwijdte van externe effecten ; en 
de aanvankelijke omvang van de markt. Zo mag het  bekend worden verondersteld dat belangen 
uit de sectoren met sterke invoerconcurrentie niet noodzakelijk zijn geholpen met toenemende 
protectie, en evenzeer dat vrijhandel  niet altijd de optimale politiek is die algehele efficiency  en 
welvaart bevordert. Er  zijn omstandigheden waaronder een toename van het aanbod van 
protectie, bijvoorbeeld, niet zonder meer leidt tot hogere politieke kosten voor de regeringen, 
opgevat als dalende welvaartsniveau’s voor de kiezers. Aangezien handelspolitiek potentieel in 
staat is om een economie te doen bewegen van een lage-groei naar een hoge –groei evenwicht en 
omgekeerd, kan bovendien het politiek optimale niveau van protectie verwacht worden te 
veranderen naarmate de handels- en productiepatronen in vergelijkbare mate verschuiven.  
Een belangrijk aspect is dat zodra met schaaleffecten en agglomeratie rekening wordt gehouden, 
de omvang van de markt niet langer als een marginaal element in de analyse van het politieke tarief 
  183 
evenwicht kan worden beschouwd. In de huidige literatuur is het belang van de grootte louter van 
betekenis voor de omvang van de lobby inspanningen of de consequenties voor de invloed van de 
industrie op beslissende stemmingen. In een kader met toenemende schaalopbrengsten 
daarentegen, krijgt de grootte van de markt een centralere rol omdat het de kracht van de 
schaaleffecten bepaalt alsmede de doeltreffendheid van handelspolitiek om een  drempel te 
overschrijden waardoor de economie potentieel zou kunnen overspringen naar een hoger 
evenwicht. 
In dit verband is de politieke steun voor het bereiken van een regionale overeenkomst dan 
ook gebaseerd op de welvaartsberekening die de effecten van grotere productieschaal op de 
winsten en inkomens in beschouwing neemt. Het is mogelijk evenwichtsvoorwaarden te 
formuleren waarbij een vermindering van protectie tot hogere winsten leidt voor ondernemingen, 
vooral die bedrijven met toenemende schaalopbrengsten. Omdat ondernemingen die met invoer 
concurreren, zeker in ontwikkelingslanden, uitgerekend in sectoren werken met overcapaciteit, kan 
men verwachten dat de beleidsvoorkeuren van deze producenten verschuiven in de richting van 
minder protectie.  
Hoofdstuk 3 graaft dieper in de dynamiek van het beleidsproces ingeval er sprake is van 
positieve en negatieve effecten, waarbij aandacht wordt geschonken aan de interactie van de 
politiek en de productiesectoren, bovenal tijdens industriele overgangsperiodes. De analyse laat de 
wijze zien waarop politieke interacties een impuls in de reeele sector teweeg kunnen brengen, die 
de economie over een drempel helpt en daardoor naar een hoger niveau van industriele nijverheid. 
Meervoudige evenwichten impliceren echter dat het politieke evenwicht niet globaal is, waardoor 
er geen garantie bestaat dat  het lobbyen dat tot hogere tarieven leidt tevens tot hogere inkomens 
voert. Hoe groter de aanvankelijke werkgelegenheid , en/of hoe groter de schaalopbrengsten (bv. 
middels hogere openbare uitgaven in infrastructuur), des te groter is de waarschijnlijkheid  dat  
agglomeratie die lobbies bepleiten tot stand komt. Veranderingen in de reele sector daarentegen 
zoals een ruilvoeteffect kunnen evenzeer tot blijvende politieke wijzigingen lieden. Het zou de 
netto vruchten van lobbyen kunnen verlagen (middels een lagere schaalopbrengst)  en de kosten 
van hogere protectie kunnen opdrijven, waardoor evenwichtstarieven lager uitvallen.  
De resultaten illustreren eveneens dat, hoewel schaaleffecten zowel vraag als aanbod van 
hogere tarieven zouden kunnen versterken, ze net zo goed het tijdelijke karakter van protectie 
kunnen ondersteunen. Indien productie groeit en productiviteit toeneemt, zou de economie naar 
een hoger groeipad kunnen  overgaan maar dan met een lager protectieeffect of zonder enige 
protectie. Vandaar dat, terwijl tarieven eerder industrialisatie financieren, de groei van de industrie 
uiteindelijk een  benedenwaartse  druk op protectie uitoefent. Dit komt overeen met historische 
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trends van hoge industriele groei en lagere protectieniveau’s over langere  periodes, niet alleen in 
ontwikkeldelanden maar recentelijk ook in zich industrialiserende landen ( of NICs).  
 Naast de zichtbare trend ten gunste van liberalisatie, valt tegelijk enige blijvende selectieve 
sectorale  protectie waar te nemen in regionale blokken.  Niettegenstaande de uitgesproken 
ambities voor regionale economische integratie, worden producenten steeds geconfronteerd met 
de dagelijke werkelijkheid van piektarieven en marktversplintering, zoals in het geval van ASEAN. 
Het tweede deel van deze studie gaat dieper in op de actuale praktijken van regionalisme, en vooral 
op de politieke bepalende factoren van de structuur van de handelsbescherming  van de EU, 
alsmede de huidige staat van de economische integratie van ASEAN. 
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we de aard van de EU handelspolitiek, beginnend met het 
testen van enkele eenvoudige correlaties tussen tarieven en industriele indicatoren die in de 
literatuur worden aangewend als ‘proxies’  voor variabelen in de politieke economie.  We 
concluderen dat industrieen  met een grotere productie een lagere bescherming ervaren , hetgeen 
het gevolg zou kunnen zijn van coordinatieproblemen die inherent zijn aan grote groeperingen. 
Het is eveneens mogelijk de verklaring te zoeken in de schaaleffecten die in eerdere hoofdstukken 
besproken zijn. Wanneer een economie gekenmerkt door toenemende schaalopbrengsten ( IRS in 
de studie) zich bevindt in een evenwicht met grote afzet, dan blijkt dat producenten welvaart 
alsmede de algehele welvaart gediend zijn met lagere en  niet hoge protectie. Hieruit volgt dat de 
lobby inspanningen van politiek invloedrijke groeperingen zou moeten leiden tot een daling in de 
tarieven.  
 De landenoorsprong van de industrie  doet er eveneens toe in de EU handelspolitiek. 
Experimenten laten op consistente wijze zien dat de Fransen en de Britten de meest prominente 
spelers zijn bij de formulering van EU tarieven. Het is interessant om op te merken dat de 
handelspolitieke structuur van EU landen  t.o.v. elkaar nog steeds consistent is met hun 
oorspronkelijke tariefstructuur in 1958, voorafgaand aan de vaststelling van het gemeenschappelijk 
buitentarief van de Unie.  
In recente empirische  toetsen van het Helpman-Grossman model, geldt nog steeds als 
belangrijkste uitdaging om geschikte indicatoren te vinden voor lobby inspanningen, gegeven de 
centrale rol die het model toekent aan politieke  beinvloeding door belangengroepen. Zelfs in 
studies over de VS waar gegevens over campagne bijdragen bestaan, brengen de resultaten 
onwaarschijnlijke schattingen voort  van de relatieve gewichten betreffende beleid die de regering 
hanteert voor diverse sectoren. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bewandelen we een alternatieve weg om het relatieve belang te beoordelen 
van de industrie tegenover het algemene belang bij de bepaling van EU handelspolitiek. 
Gebruikmakend van een numeriek algemeen evenwichtsmodel van de EU, blijken de waarden die 
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we afleiden voor de empirisch gevonden  beleidsgewichten  te sporen met de theoretische 
verwachtingen :  het belang dat gehecht wordt aan industriele winsten is om en nabij 2 a 3 maal 
het belang dat wordt toegekend aan het nationale inkomen. Bovendien blijkt dat hoge 
handelsbescherming niet noodzakelijkerwijs altijd wordt verklaard door het grotere politieke 
gewicht van de sector.  In feite vinden we dat het beleidsgewicht van de minder beschermede 
sectoren vergelijkbaar zijn met dat van de sectoren met hoge protectie. Ofschoon de neiging om 
de landbouw te beschermen evident was in onze resultaten, bijvoorbeeld,  lijkt het er op dat de 
lage beleidsgewichten ons vertellen dat landbouwtarieven momenteel hoog zijn, niet zozeer 
vanwege de politieke macht van de boerenlobbies, maar vanwege de geringe effecten van de 
landbouw in de economie die samenhangt met de landbouwprotectie. 
 Niettegenstaande de collectieve bepaling van handelspolitiek doet nationaliteit er nog steeds 
toe in de bepaling van EU bescherming. Industrieen die van belang zijn voor bepaalde Lidstaten ( 
VK, Frankrijk en Italie)  in termen van relatieve output (aandelen), ontvangen ook hogere niveau’s 
van tariefbescherming.  
Voor de hieropvolgende hoofdstukken wordt het zoeklicht gericht op ASEAN. Het is 
opvallend dat er tijdens een periode van meer dan een decennium van de AFTA (ASEAN Free 
Trade Area)  geen enkele analyse is gemaakt van de effecten van tariefliberalisatie op de feitelijke 
handelstromen. Het grootste obstakel daarbij is steeds het gebrek aan harmonisatie van de  
productcodes die gehanteerd worden in de handelsstatistieken, waardoor er geen overeenkomst 
bestaat tussen handels – en tariefgegevens. Zelfs de meest basale informatie betreffende de 
feitelijke dekking van AFTA preferenties, gemeten in handelswaarde, is om die reden niet 
beschikbaar en kernvragen omtrent de relevantie en doeltreffendheid van AFTA kunnen evenmin 
op bevredigende wijze worden beantwoord.  
Zo is er de nadrukkelijke vraag van de mate van benutting van de tariefpreferenties die 
voortvloeien uit AFTA’ s Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) schema. Opnieuw zijn 
gegevens omtrent benutting niet beschikbaar aangezien gegevensverstrekking vrijwillig is gebleven 
in ASEAN. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een poging ondernomen om een schatting te maken van het 
belang van AFTA preferenties, hoewel feitelijkegegevens over de aanwending afwezig zijn.  
Een blik op gedesaggregeerde gegevens (HS 6) van de goederenhandel maakt duidelijk dat 
de dekking van ASEAN liberalisatie in termen van handelswaarde (invoer) verregaand is, met 90,9 
% van het totaal aan intra-ASEAN invoer in 2003 dat valt onder de AFTA tarieflimiet van 5 %. 
Dit is nauwelijks lager dan de 94.3 % dekking in termen van tarief- of goederenregels. Ongeveer 
de helft van de intra-ASEAN invoerwaarde valt onder tariefvrije bepalingen binnen de AFTA. 
Echter, de snelle daling van de WTO tarieven ( ook meestbegunstigingstarieven genoemd, MFN 
in de studie) in het afgelopen decennium betekent dat voor de meeste intra-ASEAN producten de 
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preferentiele marge ( MFN minus CEPT) inmiddels nul bedraagt. In 2001 62,8 % van de invoer 
genoot nul-marges,terwijl dat in 2003 was opgelopen tot 65,3 % (zonder Thailand).  
Interviews afgenomen in bedrijven door vertegenwoordigers van het ASEAN secretariaat  
schatten de benuttingsgraag van de preferenties op een lage 5 % van het totaal aan intra ASEAN 
invoer. Niettemin, omdat de totale aandelen in invoerwaarde van goederen met een marge boven 
5 % niet meer dan 14,86 % bedraagt in 2001, (en 12, 62 % in 2003) ,  zou men kunnen zeggen dat 
de benutting van de preferenties eigenlijk niet zo laag waren, indien gerelateerd aan die producten 
waarbij benutting werkelijk zinvol was.  Dus, gegeven dat CEPT benuttingsgraden  rond de 5 % 
liggen, en er vanuitgaande dat de administratieve kosten op een uiterst conservatieve 5 % kunnen 
worden geschat,  valt te concluderen dat de benuttingsgraad van de AFTA preferenties die er toe 
doen eerder in de buurt van de 30 % - 40 % ligt. Hoe hoger de administratieve kosten, hoe groter 
de kloof tussen de nominale en de werkelijke benuttingsgraad van de preferenties.  
Een econometrische toets waarbij gebruik werd gemaakt van een aangepast graviteitsmodel 
en geaggregeerde gegevens toonde verder aan dat preferenties inderdaad geen belangrijke invloed 
hebben uitgeoefend op de interne handelsstromen gedurende de periode van de studie. Een ander 
experiment waarbij gedesaggregeerde gegevens werden aangewend toetste de betekenis van 
verschillende preferentiele marges voor de intra-ASEAN invoer. Pas bij marges in de orde van 10 
% tot 25 % beginnen prefenties een zekere invloed op handelsstromen uit te oefenen. Helaas is de 
coefficient niet significant.  Bij marges van minstens 25 % hebben preferenties een duidelijker 
aanwijsbaar stimulerend effect op intra-ASEAN invier. Dit lijkt te duiden op nogal hoge 
administratieve kosten die verbonden zijn met het benutten van preferenties. 
 In de contekst van een vrijhandelszone bestaan deze kosten hoofdzakelijk uit het bewijs en 
de certificatie van de oorsprong van de verhandelde goederen in de regio. Hoofdstuk 6 
onderzoekt daarom het thema van de oorsprongsregels, niet alleen in ASEAN maar in geheel 
Oost Azie waar vrijhandelszones buitengewoon snel in aantal zijn toegenomen gedurende de 
laatste jaren. Een overzicht van de oorsprongsregels van 12 vrijhandelszones (die ondertekend 
zijn) is opgenomen teneinde de problemen op te sporen die het gebruik en de implementatie van 
deze regels met zich mee brengen. Voor landen die de toegevoegde-waarde regel of het 
binnenlandse/regionale  productieaandeel ‘ in’  het product  (local contents) toepassen, ligt het 
voor de hand dat de lage benuttingsgraad samenhangt met de onmogelijkheid voor exporteurs 
voldoende lokale toegevoegde waarde te cumuleren, gegeven de aanzienlijke fragmentatie van het 
productieproces in dit soort wereldwijd verhandelde goederen.  
 Er valt een trend waar te nemen van toenemend gebruik van product-specifieke regels on 
Oost-Aziatische vrijhandelszones. Een bedreiging daarbij bestaat uit de waarschijnlijkheid dat 
bilaterale vrijhandelszones met restrictieve product-specifieke regels vervolgens de parameters 
  187 
zullen bepalen van vrijhandelszones met een groter bereik. Een andere uitdaging is hoe handel te 
bevorderen en tegelijk handelsverlegging te voorkomen, en wel in een regio die gekenmerkt wordt 
door steeds meer ‘achterommetjes’ voor niet-leden en waar zelfs landen met relatief hoge tarieven 
altijd wel sectoren met lage tarieven hebben. Deze structuren kunnen leiden tot intensievere 
verificatie procedures die de reeds hoge administratieve kosten in de regio verder zullen opdrijven. 
Wat zou de welvaartwinst bedragen indien men overgaat naar een sterk vereenvoudigd 
regime van oorsprongsregels en naar  geharmoniseerde douane procedures, zodat de benutting 
van preferenties kan worden gemaximaliseerd ? Hoofdstuk 7 verkent enkele antwoorden met 
behulp van een CGE benadering. Het berekent de baten van een volledige implementatie van 
AFTA, de vermindering van (alle) tarieven tot het CEPT bereik van 0 % - 5 % . Soortgelijk werk 
in het verleden simuleerde de AFTA door de eliminatie van intra-regionale tarieven. Echter, 
slechts zo’n 35 % van alle intra-ASEAN goederen zijn tariefvrij, zodat het inbrengen van CEPT 
tarieven in de GTAP 6 gegevensbank  verwacht kan worden de feitelijk effecten van AFTA voor 
welvaart, output en handel beter te benaderen. De resultaten laten inderdaad zien dat de voordelen 
van volledige CEPT benutting marginaal zijn, zodat, gegeven de kosten die het gebruik van 
preferenties met zich meebrengen, het benutten van MFN tarieven als rationeel kan worden 
beschouwd. Overigens kan de volledige elinimatie van intra-ASEAN tarieven wel degelijk 
uitgesproken welvaartseffecten opleveren, vooral voor Maleisie. Dit houdt in dat de 
beleidsbeslissing om tot algehele verwijdering van tarieven te komen in 2010 voor de ASEAN-6 
en in 2015 voor Cambodja, Myanmar, Laos en Vietnam aanzienlijke, positieve economische 
implicaties voor ASEAN kan hebben.  
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